Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/11–3053: Telegram

No. 129
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

New Delhi, November 30, 1953—7 p.m.

844. Eyes only for Secretary from the Vice President.

1. While in Rangoon I had several lengthy conversations with the President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other top members of Government of Burma. Without exception their primary preoccupation is the KMT troop issue. It permeates their thinking to the point of obsession and vitiates their ability to act on other domestic and foreign matters. Furthermore, they are convinced, quite irrationally, that the US, if it so desires, can exert sufficient pressure on Chiang to force him to “call off his dogs”.

2. I understand that the evacuation is proceeding unsatisfactorily with few able-bodied men and a negligible amount of equipment leaving Burma while depredations by the remaining troops continue. There is no question whatsoever that the situation is explosive and may erupt at any time.

3. In my talks with Chiang on this matter in Taipei he left me with the impression that he was sincere in trying to remove the KMT troops but I am inclined to believe now that either he does not have full control over them or is not being honest with us in effecting their evacuation.

4. Whatever the merits or demerits of the case, the United States is in the middle and therefore should intensify its efforts to find an answer which will relieve the tensions or at least clarify its position.

5. Realizing that the Burmese position is not entirely rational and that Chiang’s sincerity is open to doubt, I think we should bring strong pressure to bear on the Burmese to continue the cease-fire for at least another thirty days.¹ At the same time we should bring equally strong pressure on Chiang to clarify his position publicly with respect to the KMT troops remaining in Burma. A definite date should be set after which the remaining KMT troops will be considered renegades and open prey for Burmese armed forces.

6. Should Chiang refuse to make a public statement along these lines, we should inform him that the United States is no longer willing to be party to his procrastination and will not be responsible for the consequences flowing from the continued presence on Burmese soil of troops over which he appears to have no control. It should be made clear that this issue will then become a domestic civil disturbance to be dealt with by the Armed Forces of Burma and will no longer be a matter of UN concern.

7. I realize that our skirts are not entirely clean in this matter but I do not think we can afford to let fear that our earlier indiscretions will be revealed (as they undoubtedly will be) prevent us from taking those actions which are necessary to reduce this issue to manageable proportions.

I leave to your discretion what parts of this message you pass to Sebald, Donovan and Rankin. I told Sebald I would telegraph you and would like him informed that I did so.²

Allen

1. On Dec. 1, the Burmese Government announced the extension of the ceasefire until Dec. 15.

2. Telegram 612 to New Delhi, Dec. 2, approved by Secretary Dulles, replied as follows:

   “Cease-fire extended December 15 and Department instructed Sebald prepare ground with Burmese Government possible further extension if evacuation then still producing results. Prefer no advance cut-off date long as further evacuation possible. Chinese Government has stated clearly it will wash hands of those remaining soon as willing troops evacuated, and Li Mi will dissolve his army.

   “Evacuation proceeding more satisfactorily in quality evacuees. Department making every effort increase arms surrendered. Appreciate your helpful work with Burmese.” (690B.9321/11–3053)

   Telegram 481 to Rangoon, Dec. 2, informed Sebald that the Vice President had cabled and that the Secretary had brought him up to date on the continuing U.S. efforts. (033.1100 NI/11–2753)