Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/11–2853: Telegram

No. 127
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

secret

Taipei, November 28, 1953—1 p.m.

308. Following comments relate in sequence to paragraphs of Rangoon’s 504 to Department.²

1a. Present evacuation occurring solely in response strong US pressure arm [and?] Chinese have undertaken to repudiate those remaining in Burma after current withdrawal completed. It should not be difficult to determine whether this is lived up to. Meanwhile suggestions of bad faith unlikely to help matters.

1b. Purely speculative. May contain minor and incidental element of truth but could scarcely affect policy decision of Chinese Government.

2. No one denies President Chiang has degree of influence of Li Mi or that latter has degree of influence over considerable number of Chinese in northwest Burma. Also no one here assumes either Chiang or Li Mi or both to have anything approaching effective authority over more than fraction of many thousand Chinese who have sought refuge in Burma since 1949. In my opinion Chiang incapable of accomplishing appreciably more than he is now doing to meet US wishes.

3. No evidence available here that removal of 2,000 Chinese, or of any larger number President Chiang might persuade to leave, or of any particular quantity of arms, would “solve” problem. At best situation can be measurably relieved and credit gained by US for sincere effort.

Taipei Embassy has made numerous approaches to Chinese Government fully as strong as Department instructed, many more than specifically directed; it is always ready to take still stronger line including issuance of threats of any kind desired. When latter point previously raised some time ago Department rejected idea, I believe rightly.

Assuming purpose of current evacuation movement is to get as many Chinese troops out of Burma as possible, I believe present continuous flexible pressure on all parties and urging of patience as regards timing most likely produce maximum results. Crackdown on Chinese could well have opposite effect stopping movement entirely and producing rift with most serious effect on progress of our current 2 billion dollar aid program for free China. Communist propaganda should be expected to exploit affair no matter what happens but would gain maximum benefit from Chinese-US breach which inevitably would become common knowledge.

Rankin

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Rangoon.
2. Document 124.