Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/11–353: Telegram

No. 123
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

secret
priority

Washington, November 9, 1953—6:44 p.m.

387. Part I.

Department continues concerned at possible delay after first batch 400–500 evacuees and fears jungle generals will veto proceedings (para 2 Taipei’s 260).² Despite Rangoon’s 428³ Department hopes now that some troops have crossed border (Rangoon’s 421)⁴ GUB will make and publicize commitment extend cease-fire. Embassy Rangoon therefore transmit request extension to December 1 to GUB in name of Committee, Part 1 Bangkok’s 910.⁵ Point to procedural delays such as Bangkok’s 911⁶ which almost inevitable in such operation but which Department hopes Committee will solve. Point out UN postponed consideration to November 23 at earliest and discussion will probably continue to December 1. Hostilities would cause operation collapse with blame on Burma. If on-the-spot Burmese recommendation necessary for extension, suggest GUB refer question to Burmese garrison Tachilek carrying on in absence appointed observers.

Part II.

Embassies Taipei and Bangkok should inform Rangoon Chinese Government reply to question of bases (Rangoon’s 447⁷ and Bangkok’s 910) but Department believes cease-fire should be extended regardless this point.

Part III.

Re our 399 to Taipei,⁸ continue every effort induce Chinese Government persuade jungle generals cooperate in moving succeeding evacuation batches soonest. Burmese cooperation at Tachilek may be cited to dispel fears reported Bangkok’s 914.⁹ Believe helpful if Chinese Government make known to evacuation candidates that first group well treated and operation being observed not only by representatives US, Burma, China, Thailand, but also UK and France.

Part IV.

Bangkok’s 914 last paragraph.¹⁰ Taipei support forcefully as possible with Chinese Government.

Part V.

Guidance re last paragraph Taipei’s 260 in later message.¹¹

Dulles

1. Also sent to Taipei and Bangkok; repeated to USUN.
2. Document 120.
3. Dated Nov. 3; it reported that the Burmese Foreign Office considered that Burma’s previous commitments adequately guaranteed the safety of the evacuating troops. (690B.9321/11–353)
4. Dated Nov. 2; the Embassy commented that the Burmese Government probably would not extend the ceasefire beyond Nov. 15 until the evacuation had begun. (690B.9321/11–253)
5. Dated Nov. 8; it transmitted a request by the Joint Committee that the Burmese Government continue the ceasefire until Dec. 1; the telegram added that, if Burma extended the ceasefire until Nov. 25, the request might be withheld pending further developments. (690B.9321/11–853)
6. Dated Nov. 9; the Embassy in Bangkok reported that the evacuation was temporarily halted because the Burmese observers at the evacuation point refused to allow 38 members of the foreign forces to leave Burma because they were Burmese nationals. (690B.9321/11–953)
7. Dated Nov. 6; the Embassy in Rangoon reported that the Foreign Minister confirmed that, if the Chinese Government agreed that the bases would be handed over Peacefully no later than Nov. 25, the ceasefire would automatically be extended until that date. (690B.9321/11–653)
8. Supra.
9. Dated Nov. 9; it reported the arrival of the first 155 evacuees at the evacuation center on Nov. 7. The evacuees were fearful because they were unsure of the Burmese reaction to their presence. (690B.9321/11–953)
10. This paragraph reported that the evacuees had not brought any weapons; the last paragraph urged action by the Department and the Embassy in Taipei to make the troops carry out their weapons in order to strengthen the Chinese public position.

11. Telegram 392 to Rangoon, also sent to Bangkok and Taipei, Nov. 10, instructed the Embassies as follows:

    “If irresponsible charges US involvement made public by jungle generals or their spokesmen Department considers it preferable Embassies not become involved in dispute with jungle generals, or dignify and give added circulation to any charges they might make by taking official cognizance of them. If atmosphere your post should in your judgment make official statement advisable you should at that time make your recommendation to Department.” (690B.9321/11–653)