Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.5/10–3053: Telegram

No. 118
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

secret

Rangoon, October 30, 1953—1 p.m.

415. My telegram 398.² British attitude re arms sale by US appears place US in invidious position where we must choose whether:

(a) Refuse sell anything to GUB and thereby bear onus supporting continuation British monopoly;

(b) Agree sell selected items with British concurrence, if possible obtain it; or

(c) If agreement with British impractical, unilaterally move to phase three.

Burmese reaction to (a) would seriously injure our relations with important and influential segment GUB. It would certainly result in continued limitation Burma’s ability resist Communist aggression. (b) Although disappointing, could probably be made acceptable as evidence of US desires strengthen Burma especially if quantities supplied were substantial. (c) Would greatly improve our position with GUB and restore confidence in our sincerity. We hope as partial solution this problem, at least (b) may be possible. If situation explained, we hope UK would agree that it in best interests both UK and US avoid what would appear to GUB as connivance coerce it continue present unsatisfactory arrangement for arms procurement.

In any event, recommend that effort be made elicit information from British as to their prices and delivery dates (which I understand have not been formulated …) for selected items on lists already submitted informally and that in cases where British less favorably placed or not inclined supply promptly, immediate effort be made for US do so. Decision on this matter and submission of US prices and availabilities would enable Embassy discuss with GUB question relative priorities in light Burmese financial limitations and lead to phase three of original procedure.

As one principal criticism against British has been for delays and circumventions rather than outright refusal sell, it will be most difficult convince GUB of real change British policy unless they make sincere effort supply Burmese needs promptly. We believe present delays in reaching decision on Burmese request harmful interests both US and UK and my service attachés are unanimous in their belief that their Burmese opposites are inclined suspect US motives in not moving ahead with arms procurement problem. Service attachés concur.

Sebald

1. Repeated to London. Passed to Defense.
2. Dated Oct. 27; the Embassy reported that a reply received from the British Chargé in Rangoon, in response to questions posed by the U.S. military attachés, indicated that the United Kingdom was willing and able to supply all Burma’s arms requirements except napalm bombs. The timing of deliveries was not mentioned, and Sebald noted that the reply consisted of “general answers to specific questions.” (690B.9321/10–2753)