Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.00/2–1552: Despatch

No. 11
The Chargé in Burma (Day) to the Department of State

top secret
No. 679

Rangoon, February 15, 1952.

Ref:

• Saigon tel 1541 Feb. 4 to Dept., rptd London 29, Paris 567, pouched Rangoon, New Delhi, Taipei, Hongkong, Bangkok.

Subject:

• Aid to KMT troops in Burma.

Telegram 1541 of February 4 from the Embassy [Legation] at Saigon to the Department concerns policy on aid to Chinese Nationalist guerrillas on the Asian mainland. The purpose of this despatch is to comment, with particular reference to this telegram, on aspects of the problem which relate solely to KMT troops in Burma. The Embassy does not believe that helping these troops will serve American interests.

Burmese neutrality and amenability to persuasion.

For background, it is believed necessary first to review aspects of Burma’s policy of neutrality and prospects of persuading the Burmese Government to prepare for resistance to aggression and accept the KMT troops as a potential source of strength.

While it may be assumed that there is general agreement that we should continue efforts to convince Asian nations that aggression can only be stopped by united action and resistance there is perhaps incomplete appreciation of the reality of Burma’s inability to defend itself and of the effects of this weakness on the Burmese Government’s amenability to persuasion. We cannot expect Burma to prepare to make a serious effort to defend itself against an attack by Communist China. Nor can we expect Burma to look to distant friends for help if Burma is invaded.

Burma knows that it cannot defend itself against a strong invading force. It thinks that any close association with the more powerful countries of the free world could not offer advantages to counterbalance the dangers from the hostility the association would provoke in Peking. It believes its best hope of being spared disaster lies in maintaining the friendliest possible relations with Communist China. This is not a sentiment based on ideological sympathies but a conviction founded on instinct to survive.

General Ne Win has twice informed our Army Attaché that Burma would fight if invaded. The Embassy believes that there could be little better than token resistance. If conquered, most Burmese would prefer to accommodate themselves to the first invader, i.e., Communist China, than seek help which would turn Burma into a battleground of foreign armies. Their attitude is, of course, conditioned in part by Burma’s experience in World War II. The Burmese feel they then were helpless victims of a struggle that did not concern Burma and in which they had no say from beginning to end. Now that Burma is independent the Burmese think they may be able to avert counter-invasions if not an initial invasion.

If the United States does not propose to send armed forces to Burma in the event of an invasion by Communist China and if both the United States and the United Kingdom would be unable to give assurances in advance that they can defend Burma’s independence even if Burma wants them to, we must be realistic enough to recognize the validity of this Burmese attitude, whether it is to our interest and we approve it or not, and we must see if we cannot actually derive advantage from Burma’s position of neutrality, even if it is only the negative one of keeping Burma out of the Communist camp and making friends who will offer resistance to Communism if a Communist government comes to power by subversion or invasion.

It would undoubtedly be desirable to convince Burma to drop neutrality. But what are the prospects of success of efforts to persuade Burma to do so? Most officials in the Burmese Government and most of the people will remain unwilling to regard our efforts at persuasion as genuinely directed toward helping Burma as long as Burmese are in their present frame of mind of suspecting that the United States is either tacitly consenting to the activities of those who are supplying the KMT troops in Burma by not acting to prevent the Chinese Nationalist Government from directing and aiding these troops and curbing General Li Mi or is covertly contributing to the support and organization of these KMT troops. Unless the United States Government can remove these doubts and suspicions and gain the confidence of the Burmese in our good faith and integrity, they will continue to regard all our suggestions, requests, and programs in Burma with misgivings and scrutinize them for hidden motives they assume must be there.

Repercussions in area.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that until the belief that the United States is unwilling to help end the trouble caused by KMT troops in Burma is dissipated other Governments and peoples in Asia will be assailed by the same doubts as to the genuineness of our professions of desire to uphold the sovereignty of independent countries and provide them with aid without expectation of achieving a position of dominance in their internal affairs. As pointed out by the Embassy in London such doubts in the event of world war would most surely endanger the prospects of the support which the United Nations and the United States would be entitled to expect from Asian countries.

Potential usefulness of KMT troops in Burma.

As regards the potential usefulness of the KMT troops in Burma, the information in the hands of this Embassy is scanty. On the basis of the piecemeal reports that the Embassy has received, present indications are that the KMT troops in Burma would provide a very slender reed if indeed they would not turn out to be a handicap. If the events of June and July 1951 are any indication there seems little prospect that the KMT troops in Burma can move into Yunnan and conduct successful military operations against the Communists. In June they moved into Yunnan and were driven back into Burma. Fears that they would be pursued across the border into Burma by Communist troops did not materialize but there is little assurance that the same would be true if the KMT troops again cross into Yunnan and are defeated.

The manner in which the KMT troops are now regarded by the inhabitants of areas they control or have traversed into Burma suggests they might prove a handicap rather than a help. The Embassy is informed that they are not very different from bandits. There has been more than one report that they have been smuggling gold and trafficking in opium. They live and prey upon an agricultural countryside which can ill afford to support them. According to comments of the Foreign Minister and War Office officials over the past year these KMT troops are a greater source of trouble than the insurgents and efforts to keep them in check have meant diversion of forces from insurgent areas. It is highly questionable whether the United Nations could count on any military assistance or disciplined cooperation from these soldiers. The Army Attaché concurs in this view. That the KMT troops had to take refuge in Burma and have no place to go or other immediately apparent means of livelihood does not alter the fact of their lawlessness and defiance of authority. Their refusal to surrender cannot be justified by the claim that they would be ill-treated in internment camps. It is by no means certain that this would be the case.

Probable Burmese reaction to suggestion that KMT troops could be useful.

In any case, if this Embassy were to make any suggestion to the Burmese Government to the effect that these troops in Burma might be useful or should be aided, even if it is possible that the troops could be useful to Burma, the Burmese Government might well reject the idea with vehemence and conclude that our past denials of official American aid to the KMT troops in Burma were attempts at deception. Any step which has the effect of confirming suspicions of Burmese of our official involvement will tend to move Burma from its neutral stand in the direction of the Kremlin: the more so at this particular time because of absence up to now, at least in Burmese eyes, of any real evidence of aggressive intentions toward Burma on the part of Communist China.

There seem to be two impressions which, if still held, this Embassy would like to dissipate. One is that the KMT troops receive the collaboration of local officials and the welcome of the inhabitants of the area. The other is that the Burmese objections to the presence of and aid to the KMT troops arise merely from affronted susceptibilities.

The Embassy at Taipei in telegram 450 of October 3, 1951, to the Department (repeated Rangoon as No. 3)¹ reported that the Director of the East Asia Department of the Chinese Government commented that Chinese Government troops in Burma receive collaboration of local officials and the welcome of the populace. There may have been an element of truth in this in the beginning when the number of KMT troops was small and the troops had funds to pay for food and services. But it is not so now. If there is collaboration and welcome it is subservience to superior force if one may credit reports of reactions of inhabitants of the area east of the Salween from the Wa State south to Thailand. Any initial tolerance of welcome has worn more than thin. It is not merely a result of living off the land but of dislocations and disruption of authority (Embdes 690 Feb 8, 1952)¹ and the high handed attitude of General Li Mi and his troops. The Embassy has received reliable reports that the KMT troops have levied taxes in rice and money, built barracks and constructed a landing field at Li Mi’s headquarters at Mong Hsat, and are requiring inhabitants to obtain passes for travel through areas they occupy.

As far as Burmese officials and the Burmese people are concerned the presence of the KMT troops in Burma, the difficulties these troops create, and the outside aid the troops receive have produced a reaction that is more serious than a case of wounded susceptibilities. The Government is embarrassed by non-Communist opposition groups which are able to use the difficulties caused by the KMT troops to publicize the Government’s weakness. The above-ground Communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party for several months has repeated the charges that the imperialists are helping the KMT troops and has used the rumors of American aid to these troops to the best propaganda advantage. The Government believes these attacks weaken its position and is apprehensive over the effectiveness of this propaganda and the advantages which the Communists may derive from it. High officials in Rangoon, the Police, the Army and the inhabitants of the Shan State are incensed over the depredations of KMT troops, the attempts of these troops to enlist inhabitants, some of whom do so to acquire arms which they can sell after they desert (Embdes 690 February 8, 1952), the dislocations to the economy of the districts they operate in, and the defiance of existing authority. Since, rightly or wrongly, the Burmese think the United States can induce the Chinese Government at Formosa to stop helping these troops and order them to surrender, their frustration, anger and fear are given some expression in resentment at the United States. The more widespread this resentment becomes and the longer it lasts the less likelihood there is of achieving United States military as well as political objectives in Burma.

The resentment does not necessarily mean that Burmese do not sympathize with or understand our struggle against Communism. It does reveal that the Burmese are not now in a frame of mind to welcome use of Burmese soil for any sort of military operation against Communist China. About six months ago General Ne Win had an informal conversation with Colonel Davies, Army Attaché, in which the General said “I know you are not waging war on China. You are fighting the Great Bear and I am for you. But it is a dirty trick to do it on Burmese Soil.” A recent remark the General made to the Assistant Army Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel McGowan, showed that despite the denial of the Secretary of State he thinks the KMT troops in Burma are receiving such aid. The attitude of many Burmese Army officers has been noticeably cool towards this Embassy. There seems little doubt that not only most men in the Army but many officials and other Burmese still believe the United States is helping these KMT troops. Without some solution of the problem itself and dissipation of the belief that the United States has or is helping these KMT troops it will be most difficult to draw the best advantage from the anti-Communist sentiment which exists although it is not reflected in Burma’s policy of neutrality.

The Burmese regard the law defying KMT troops in Burma and the activities of those aiding them as a violation of Burmese sovereignty. The Burmese may be wrong but they remain convinced that if the Chinese Nationalist Government stopped aiding and directing the KMT troops in Burma many of these troops would sooner or later give themselves over to the authorities and surrender their arms. They believe the United States Government can exert the influence on Taipei that is necessary to induce the authorities there to take such action. General Ne Win wants the troops to be removed from Burma. The Foreign Office sees surrender and internment as the solution more likely to prove practicable.

If it should be decided that the policy of the United States should be to aid the KMT troops in Burma, we should be ready to accept the consequences of real Burmese hostility toward the United States and a consequent weakening of the position of the present Burmese Government. To regain local prestige the Government might be forced to terminate the economic aid program and veer from its neutral path toward Peking and Moscow. It is not impossible that a pro-Communist group would overthrow the present government. The usefulness of this Embassy as anything more than a point of observation would presumably be virtually ended.

The information and cultural programs of this Embassy would probably have to be curtailed or eliminated. A continuation of efforts to convince Burma of our friendly regard and desire to strengthen its independence would probably be futile.

The Embassy believes that a solution of this problem which will convince Asian Governments that the United States actively desires to uphold and does not intend to infringe on sovereign rights of free nations in the pursuit of its policies and its political and military objectives will have greater political and military advantages than a policy of open or covert aid to KMT troops on the soil of Burma. Despite the obstacles, it is not impossible that such a solution can be found. Internment in Burma under conditions to which the KMT troops would not object and to which they might be induced to agree in advance would seem the course most likely to offer hope of success.

Summary.

In the light of the prevailing belief among Burmese that circumstances force upon them a policy of neutrality it is doubtful if efforts to persuade them that they must prepare to resist aggression will be successful. Present prevailing doubts among Burmese as to the true motives of American policy which have followed from widely believed rumors that the United States is aiding KMT troops in Burma must be removed before the United States can expect the Burmese to welcome advice or suggestions from the United States on problems of meeting the external threat of Communism. Any suggestion from the United States that the KMT troops could be put to good use if aided would confirm suspicions and give validity to the rumors of past aid. There is little assurance that the KMT troops in Burma could be of military value either to the United States or to Burma. If the United States were to extend aid to the KMT troops in Burma a strongly hostile reaction to the United States would follow and the Government, if not replaced by a pro-Communist authority, would be forced to veer from neutrality to a more pro-Communist course. To draw best advantage from the established neutral policy of Burma and the anti-Communist thinking of many influential Burmese, it will be better to satisfy the Burmese that we fully respect their country’s independence than to disregard scrupulous observance of Burma’s sovereignty by aiding KMT troops on Burmese soil.

Action requested: If there is no objection, please send copies to Saigon, Taipei, Bangkok, New Delhi, London, Paris.²

Henry B. Day

1. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
2. Copies were sent as requested.