Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/9–2653: Telegram

No. 108
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

secret

Washington, September 29, 1953—6:57 p.m.

235. Chinese counter-proposals embodied Taipei’s 198² and 180³ appear maximum Chiang will be prevailed on to offer at this time. While Department agrees with Rangoon’s 281⁴ that 3000 probably minimum acceptable to GUB, proposals are tangible offer and should be got on committee record and transmitted GUB when Chinese representative makes them in committee.

Embassy Rangoon should point out to GUB that US, while recognizing number of evacuees offered is below GUB expectations, believes evacuation Monghsat and other bases would contribute substantially to solution GUB problem. US therefore prepared continue good offices to remove forces as proposed provided GUB willing cooperate on basis specific four-power agreement. US would of course continue keep matter before Chinese Government and would continue exercise maximum influence secure such further results as may be possible. (For example President is writing Chiang personally this subject and is so informing Burmese Prime Minister in answer latter’s letter.)⁵ If GUB unwilling entertain Chinese proposals, US good offices manifestly no longer useful.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and USUN.
2. Dated Sept. 26; it transmitted the text of a memorandum, personally approved by Chiang, which Yeh had given Jones that day. The memorandum stated that: (1) The Chinese Government was positive that no further effort on its part could increase the number of evacuees from the number it had previously estimated; (2) the Chief of Staff had on several occasions instructed Li Mi to urge his men to evacuate from Burma to Taiwan; (3) any of Li Mi’s troops who chose to remain in Burma did so at their own risk and the Chinese Government had no intention of furnishing them with supplies of any kind; and (4) the Chinese Government called attention to press reports of Burmese air attacks on Li Mi’s troops in and near Mong Hsat and requested the U.S. representative on the Joint Committee to support the Chinese representative in calling for an immediate end to such attacks. (690B.9321/9–2653)
3. See footnote 2, Document 102.
4. Dated Sept. 26; it transmitted a recommendation from Sebald and Donovan that the Embassy in Taipei should, in the strongest possible terms, request the Chinese Government to issue a statement declaring that it would issue unequivocal orders to the troops in Burma to evacuate, estimating that at least 3,000 would do so, and declaring that those failing to comply would be considered deserters. (690B.9321/92653)
5. See Document 106 and supra.