746E.13/4–2654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) to the Department of State1
336. Goonetilleke, Minister Finance and Governor General-designate told me today that I have no fears that Ceylon delegation to Prime Ministers’ conference will endorse any proposals for an Indochina settlement opposed to the Dulles–Eden agreement.2 He said Prime Minister, Agriculture Minister, Attorney General, who was today [Page 1613] added to Ceylon delegation, and who are all in complete agreement to hamstring any efforts by Nehru to force Ceylon into Indian camp on this issue. He added that recent information from Burma indicates that Burmese Prime Minister has indicated to Sir Oliver that Burma will not throw its weight behind India on Indochina issue. Sir Oliver said he has been told that Pakistan Prime Minister will also refuse to be bullied by India whether issue is Indochina or Kashmir. Sir Oliver had no opinion on Indonesian Prime Minister, saying that he is crazy and unpredictable. I asked Sir Oliver if there was any significance in story which Prime Minister gave Philip Deane (re Embtel 329 to Department)3 and he replied it should be considered meaningless. Sir Oliver concluded conversation by saying he feared India more than Communism.
I then saw Prime Minister and told him I had been empowered invite him visit United States but was not able set specific date at this time. He was immensely pleased and told me that such a trip would mean great deal to him personally and to Ceylon. I then brought up matter of conference and he repeated substantially what I had heard from Sir Oliver. He added gleefully that he had told newspapers recently he would make a treaty with the devil rather than with Reds. In view press opposition and chance such an invitation might be regarded by it as a last-minute bid by US to curry favor with Prime Minister it was agreed not to release news of his invitation visit America now.
Harry Toyberg-Frandzen, Danish Minister to Ceylon, told me this morning Sir John Kotelawala told him yesterday that if Ceylon was placed in a position where she had to choose between the “spiritual” nations, such as India and the “practical” nations “such as the Western allies” she would of course side with latter.
- This telegram was repeated for information to New Delhi as telegram 69, to Karachi as 33, to Djakarta as 9, and to Rangoon as 21.↩
- This agreement presumably referred to the Dulles–Eden communiqué, dated Apr. 13, 1954, in which both statesmen agreed that the United States and Britain would examine “the possibility of collective defense measures” in Southeast Asia (telegram Secto 2, Apr. 13, 1954; for text, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1321).↩
- See footnote 2 to telegram 330, Apr. 23, p. 1608. Nehru’s plan for Indochina was relayed to the U.S. Embassy by Deane, a correspondent for the London Observer.↩