Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

120.4346E/4–2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Colombo, April 23, 1954—4 p.m.

330. Prime Minister told me this morning that he is under great pressure from Nehru to join India at the forthcoming conference in a “hands off” Asia policy which would apply equally to Communist and Western nations. He added further that in regard to Indochina he may have to stand alone as even Pakistan may go along with Nehru on an anti-colonial resolution. He still holds to his original statement to me that he will do his best to keep the conference from becoming a “tool of Nehru’s Asian ambitions” but said the United States was not making this stand easy for him. He then spoke somewhat bitterly on our refusal to buy Ceylon’s rubber and our subsequent failure to give his country aid. While he did not specifically mention it I think he is also piqued by our silence re his earnest desire to visit America. I pointed out that the real benefit that he and his neighbors received from America and the Commonwealth was found in our firm stand against Communist aggression. He agreed with this but said he wished that we should phrase our declarations on protection more gracefully. My personal feeling is that the Prime Minister is still on the side of the West but is under the strongest possible pressure from all sides, and anything we could do to indicate our appreciation at this time would be a wise move. The Ceylon press is hundred percent behind Indian view and many members of Cabinet also lean toward it. I then talked to Sir Oliver Goonetilleke who told me that C. C. Desai, Indian High Commissioner, has attempted sell Prime Minister, J. R. Jayewardene and himself on the scheme to bring up Nehru’s plan (re Embtel 329, April 23 to Department,² repeated all addressee posts) but that he personally strongly opposed it and believed that Prime Minister and Jayewardene did also.

I also consulted with Sir Cecil Syers, British High Commissioner, who told me that he had talked with Prime Minister on Dulles-Eden communiqué of April 13 and that it was his opinion that the Prime Minister would strongly resist Indian domination at forthcoming conference.

Crowe

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London as telegram 47, to Paris as 5, to New Delhi as 66, to Rangoon as 19, to Karachi as 31, and to Djakarta as 7.
2. Telegram 329 from Colombo, Apr. 23, 1954, sketched Nehru’s plan for Indochina as follows: (a) a cease-fire in Indochina with each side retaining territory it then held; (b) a 5-year transitional period during which all foreign elements would be excluded from Indochina; and (c) enforcement of the agreement during the 5-year transitional period by the five Colombo powers (i.e., those invited to the conference in Colombo: India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia, with Ceylon as host). Although the plan was formulated in India, Nehru desired to have it formally introduced by another of the five powers to avoid charges of attempting to dominate the conference. (120.4346E/4–2354)