711.56346E/2–254
The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nash)
My dear Mr. Nash: In a letter dated January 5, 19541 this Department informed you that our Ambassador at Ceylon was being requested to make a current assessment of the prospects for success of any negotiations with the Government of Ceylon which we might undertake to obtain certain military facilities in Ceylon. At the same time, our Ambassador in New Delhi was requested to give an estimate of probable reactions by the Government of India to such negotiations by the United States with Ceylon.
Ambassador Allen telegraphed from New Delhi (No. 1155, January 21, 1954)2 in effect that the Indians would react strongly and automatically against United States military facilities in Ceylon, that Prime Minister Nehru probably would bring every pressure on Prime Minister Kotelawala of Ceylon, and in view of the probable intensity and bitterness of Indian reaction he hoped that we would not approach the Government of Ceylon in the matter unless there was considerable likelihood of success. Failure, he said, would incur all disabilities without any compensating advantages, and Nehru would win a resounding victory at our expense. He believed, however, that if there were adequate grounds for thinking facilities would be granted, an approach should be made to Ceylon despite immediate and strong reaction against the United States in India.
In a recent despatch from Ceylon (No. 401, February 2, 1954),3 a copy of which has been transmitted to the Department of Defense, Ambassador Crowe concludes that negotiations with Ceylon at this time probably would be not only unproductive but imprudent as well. However, with the view to judging how and when we could seek to make an approach, he requests additional information as to exactly what the Defense Department desires and whether and how much it is [Page 1604] prepared to pay for the facilities. He also raises the question whether it would not be useful to work through the British, who already have a defense agreement with the Ceylonese.
This Department, in general, is in agreement with the conclusions of both Ambassadors Allen and Crowe. However, in view of the implications for South Asia, including Ceylon, of our decision to grant military assistance to Pakistan, this Department believes that the basic consideration from the point of view of the Ceylon Government will be how much we are prepared to pay for military rights, and that, if we pay enough, other factors will become secondary. It will be noted that the question of a quid pro quo has been prominent in previous evaluations and that on June 27, 1953 our chief of mission at that time, Ambassador Satterthwaite, wrote that it was his belief that we would have to offer both economic and military benefits of a “substantial character” in order to interest the Ceylon Government in our proposals.4
This Department will be glad to communicate with Ambassador Crowe again upon receipt of the response of the Department of Defense to the questions which the Ambassador has posed.
Sincerely yours,