711.56346E/1–2154: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State1
1155. Indians would react strongly and automatically against US military facilities in Ceylon (CA 3475 January 5).2 Coming on top of proposed military aid to Pakistan, reaction would take form of greatly intensified propaganda and official outbursts against US. Indians would allege US was endeavoring to encircle India with bases; would protest that Ceylon would become prime target in an atomic war; and would intensify accusations US trying wreck Nehru’s non-alignment policy.
[Page 1597]Nehru would probably bring every pressure he could to bear on Kotelawala to reject US request and would undoubtedly instruct Congress Party and all Indian diplomatic missions abroad to agitate against it. Further charges of imperialism, colonialism, war-mongering would be made against US.
While GOI would probably not say so publicly, many Indians would also jump to conclusion that US bases in Ceylon would incline US to support Ceylonese in dispute between India and Ceylon over status of Indian residents of Ceylon. This feeling would be especially intense in South India, principally in Madras and “Tamiland”.
Nehru’s personal reaction would be especially bitter because he would regard grant of bases to US in Ceylon as running directly counter to his efforts to develop South Asia into “third area”, under his leadership, not aligned with any power bloc.
I hope Department will not approach GOC in this matter unless there is considerable likelihood of success. Failure would incur all disabilities without any compensating advantages, and Nehru would win resounding victory at our expense.
At same time, if there are adequate grounds for thinking facilities would be granted, I believe approach to Ceylon should be made despite immediate and strong reaction against US in India. I believe long-range Indian national interests lie with free world and that more and more Indians will become disillusioned with so-called neutralist or independent foreign policy of GOI Firm attitude on our part in supporting elements in this area willing to align themselves with us under collective security program will encourage them to declare themselves openly, whereas weakness or vacillation on our part in face of Nehru’s displeasure would build up his ego and make him increasingly difficult to deal with.
Perhaps I should add, paradoxical as it may seem, that in my opinion present GOI is probably more satisfactory, on balance, than any we would be likely to encounter if Congress Party were overthrown. I would not favor a policy designed either to uphold or unseat Congress Party or Nehru’s leadership. I do not rule out possibility that Nehru himself may be forced, grudgingly, to change of foreign policy, but whether he stays in office or not is incidental to our objective of helping this part of world strengthen its posture against threat of Communist aggression. We should hew to our line and let question of local leadership in India or elsewhere take care of itself.
- This telegram was repeated for information to Colombo as telegram 38.↩
- See footnote 4, supra.↩