Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

646E.93/4–1453: Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ceylon

confidential

Washington, April 14, 1953.

A–82. The Department refers to what appears to be an increasingly friendly attitude in Ceylon toward Communist China and to the shift in public opinion toward a friendlier feeling for communism within Ceylon as a result of statements by UNP and public officials in their attempts to justify the Ceylon-Communist China rice-rubber pact. These shifts have meant a corresponding increase in suspicion of the United States and dissatisfaction with its policies as they affect Asia and particularly, Ceylon. They have been referred to most recently in the Department’s Fourth Quarter review of US—Ceylon relations (A–54, January 7, 1953)¹ and Part II A of the Embassy’s despatch No. 559 of March 17, 1953,² USIS Country Plan–Ceylon.

The Department is considering publishing shortly a paper in its “Background” series on the embargo of strategic materials to Communist China and Ceylon’s rubber shipments to that country. This paper is designed for the United States public but may very possibly come to the attention of the Government of Ceylon or the Ceylon press. Because it sets forth the United States’ position regarding US–Ceylonese discussions prior to the China–Ceylon agreements, it will no doubt be unfavorably received in Ceylon and may stimulate a rejoinder.

We believe that we should take all possible measures to stem the shift which seems to be developing in Ceylon. One course of action which is suggested for consideration and adoption, if the Embassy concurs, is for the Ambassador and senior officers of the Embassy to make the following points on suitable occasions to appropriate UNP leaders and Government of Ceylon officials.

1. Ceylon’s breach of the embargo has received wide and unfavorable notice in the United States. It is normal for agencies of the United States Government to issue periodic reports to Congress and to the public to keep them informed on important issues. Therefore from time to time statements regarding Ceylon’s action will have to be made by the United States Government. Such statements and reports are a required feature of the United States Government operations and are not designed to stimulate inter-governmental arguments.

2. As the Government of Ceylon is fully aware, it was able to negotiate a contract with Communist China on favorable terms only because other countries were not selling rubber to China. If the embargo should be lifted or if rubber should otherwise become available to China from other sources, it is entirely possible that the Chinese Communist regime will not live up to its contract with Ceylon. What then would Ceylon’s position be? What is Ceylon doing about preserving its relations with countries to whom it may have to turn in such circumstances? It should be borne in mind that anti-US statements by Government of Ceylon officials receive publicity in the United States. Such statements, plus the fact of Ceylon’s rubber being used against the United States and the United Nations in actual combat, must necessarily be taken into account in considering any action that the United States might take vis-à-vis Ceylon should it require help. In the United States, Congressional and public opinion are controlling in any consideration of US assistance to Ceylon even in such matters as an allocation of a scarce food or other commodity.

3. The UNP won the May 1952 elections largely on an anti-Communist platform.³ Now UNP members and high officials of the Government of Ceylon (such as de Fonseka and R. G. Senanayake) are making public statements indicating friendship for Communist China and pointing to the great strides made by Communist China. These statements may very possibly lead Ceylonese voters to decide that communism might make equally great strides within Ceylon and thereby swell the ranks of the Communist Party and its supporters. UNP leaders in their zeal to justify Ceylon’s agreements with Communist China may, perhaps unwittingly, be facilitating Communist plans to displace the UNP and gain control of the Government.

4. We hope that Ceylon will ultimately recognize that it is acting contrary to its own long-term interests and take steps to put itself squarely on the side of the democracies to which it claims to belong. The United States, on its part, is engaged with other UN nations in a war that is costly not only in loss of life but also in treasure and resources; it is also fighting inflation within its own country (which affects directly or indirectly practically all countries of the world), and has been paying higher than peace-time prices for practically all materials, including, until recently, rubber. If Ceylon is itself unwilling to ease the burden of war in Korea, the least it can do is recognize that the responsibility for keeping democracy alive in the world is being shouldered by the United States and other freedom loving countries who must take steps which they consider necessary towards that end.

5. While we deplore Ceylon’s trade in rubber with the aggressor Communist China, we are aware of the immediate pressures which led to the decision by the Government of Ceylon to continue and expand this trade. However, Ceylon’s critical economic problems are deep seated. The temporary alleviation brought about by rubber exports at premium prices and rice imports with price inducements could end very quickly. Ceylon’s trade with Communist China, under an obviously politically inspired arrangement on the part of the Chinese, is not likely to solve these problems; the alleviation of symptoms in this manner creates new dangers. It is important for Ceylon now to lay the groundwork for meeting the problems with which it will be faced when it will wish to return to its traditional patterns of trade, or to the development of new trade with free countries and for assistance in meeting the deep seated problems of its economy.

Some of the foregoing points may be subject to interpretation as undue or improper interest in Ceylon’s internal affairs. They should be conveyed informally, and only to those who are regarded as friendly to the United States. It is not believed that a written communication along the above lines would be useful. It seems possible that persistent reiteration of the foregoing points may raise doubts in the minds of some responsible and influential leaders as to the wisdom of the views being widely expressed in Ceylon today. With reference to numbered paragraph 3, our Embassy in New Delhi reports that public statements by leading Indian officials praising the “accomplishments” of Communist China are much less frequent and more restrained than formerly. The Indian officials appear to have recognized that it was bad politics to emphasize the accomplishments of Communism abroad while they were criticizing Communism in India.

Smith

1. Airgram A–54 to Colombo, not printed, stated that Ceylonese Communists, taking advantage of the generally favorable feeling in Ceylon toward Peking, could receive closer guidance and financial support from the Chinese Communists (611.46E/1–753).
2. Part II A of despatch 559 from Colombo, not printed, indicated that there was a growing fear in Ceylon that the United States was pursuing an imperialistic course in Asia which disregarded the rights of small nations to act in their own best interests (511.46E/3–1753).
3. Sir John Kotelawala, United National Party leader and later prime minister of Ceylon, defined the election as a contest between democracy and totalitarianism and described his party’s approach in this manner: “We did our best to convince the voters that, if we were defeated, the political freedom we had won would be destroyed, and the country would be exposed to a much more tyrannical domination than the old colonialism at its worst. The Marxist parties would assume power, and might destroy our religious and national traditions.” He thus interpreted the resulting UNP victory as a triumph for democracy; Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story (1956), pp. 82–83. For a summary of the election results, see telegram 650 from Colombo, June 1, 1952, p. 1520.