Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

446E.119/10–452: Telegram

The Ambassador in Ceylon (Satterthwaite) to the Department of State

confidential

Colombo, October 4, 1952—11 a.m.

150. Following is Embassy’s evaluation net results endeavoring deprive Ceylon of dusting sulphur requested Deptel 107, Oct 2:¹

1. Stopping of sulphur shipments to Ceylon was temporary device to achieve an immediate specific objective. Our long-term policies will not be served by imparing Ceylon rubber production or injuring Ceylon economy.

2. Exceedingly unlikely any action re sulphur, even assuming all exports to Ceylon could be stopped, would succeed in halting rubber shipments to Chi.

3. Irrespective fact that future embargo on sulphur exports Ceylon might be imposed by joint action, it would be difficult if not impossible avoid impression embargo was result US pressure. Reaction certainly would be violent in Ceylon and our position in other sulphur producing areas would be embarrassing (Paris 1994 Oct 1).²

4. From practical point view, although GOC estimated 6,000 tons sulphur would be required for compulsory dusting program (Embtel 125 Sept 22),³ the 3,500 tons which Deptel 107 reported have been shipped or licensed thus far 1952 by other supplying countries will be sufficient tide over coming spraying season and demand therefor will not again become urgent for another year. In this connection it should be noted that small holders specifically exempted from provisions compulsory dusting requirement and Emb considers great majority Ceylonese producers in whose support GOC is interested are more concerned with short-term prospect of premium prices for their rubber than with long-term consequences of not receiving sulphur.

It is therefore Embassy’s considered view that it would be in our best interest to abandon efforts deprive Ceylon of sulphur of non-American origin.

Satterthwaite

1. Supra.
2. Telegram 1994 from Paris, not printed, pointed out the embarrassing circumstances of the French Government’s refusal to grant an export license to a French exporter of black sulphur to Ceylon. The exporter, convinced that the American Embassy was instrumental in the refusal, protested vigorously to the Consul General at Marseilles and supplied extensive statistics showing sulphur shipments to Ceylon from the United States as well as from other European countries. The Consul General was placed in a difficult position because the exporter was a leader in a pro-American organization in Marseilles. The telegram concluded that in view of the businessman’s influence in economic circles and the fact that Ceylon provided the only market for most of France’s black sulphur production, the French decision to embargo sulphur shipments to Ceylon would probably be reversed sometime in the future. (446E.519/10–152)
3. See footnote 2, supra.