Office of the Historian

OCB files, lot 61 D 385, “Afghanistan”

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

secret
[Washington,] June 29, 1954.

Subject:

  • Soviet Economic Penetration of Afghanistan

I understand that Soviet economic penetration of Afghanistan, described in Kabul’s telegram No. 472, June 24 (Tab A),1 has been suggested for discussion in an early OCB meeting. I believe that before this step is taken, the Department should develop a position on the problem along with suggested courses of action. This is being done on a priority basis.

[Page 1479]

Soviet economic penetration first became noticeable at about the time we were entering into our military aid program with Pakistan early this year. We had, of course, anticipated that the Soviets might take some such action in the area in response to Pakistan’s committal to the West. Afghanistan has already yielded somewhat to the constant Soviet pressure to accept the extensive bilateral economic development program which it is offering. Some projects have been entered into and others are being considered, all involving growing numbers of Soviet technicians in the country and constituting an increasing mortgage on the Afghan national economy. There is a division of opinion among Afghan leaders as to their ability to keep an eye on the activities of all the Soviets who will be working in the country but the Prime Minister, although not pro-communist or pro-American, is attracted by the intrinsic value of the Soviet offers, and reportedly believes that he can maintain control of the situation.

Any action on our part in Afghanistan to counter the Soviets further probably will have far-reaching consequences. We, therefore, are giving the problem careful study.

  1. In this telegram the Embassy, after describing a number of Soviet aid proposals, reported on the Afghan attitude as follows:

    “Foreign Minister Naim has stated he is fully aware dangerous implications Soviet aid offers and although under great pressure has only accepted least objectionable projects. Embassy not convinced his views fully shared by Daud and Malik and fears latter may have naive belief they can adequately guard against dangers inherent these projects. Sources close Malik and Economy Minister report considerable anxiety expressed cabinet meetings over these proposals but further cabinet discussion choked off on instructions presumably from Daud.” (661.89/6–2454)

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