Office of the Historian

789.5/6–2354

Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs (Smith) to Donald D. Kennedy of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

secret
[Washington,] June 23, 1954.

Subject:

  • Views of Ambassador Ward on Military Assistance to Afghanistan

As instructed by you, I have had discussions in which both Ambassadors Ward and Hildreth participated on the subjects of (1) military assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the possibility of ameliorating the hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan growing out of the Pushtoonistan dispute by using Pakistan as a channel for extending military and economic assistance to Afghanistan.

Ambassador Ward’s views on military assistance to Afghanistan are as follows:

1.
As a result of the Turkish—Pakistan cooperation agreement1 and the U.S.–Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement,2 the belief is growing in Afghan governmental circles that the U.S. has turned its back to Afghanistan. At the same time, the Soviets have been moving to strengthen their ties with this buffer state through trade on terms very favorable to the Afghans and through credits for economic development accompanied by technical assistance.
2.
Should Soviet efforts be intensified, and in the absence of any effective counter move by us, we can expect the Soviets to establish [Page 1475] effective control in the trans-Hindu Kush area of Afghanistan within the foreseeable future, and possibly south of the Hindu Kush.
3.
There should be an appraisal by the appropriate U.S. military authorities of the importance of Afghanistan, both direct and indirect, to the U.S. and it should be determined whether it is in the U.S. interest to permit the Soviet Union to extend its borders southward to Pakistan, at the same time outflanking Iran. This determination also should include the effect on U.S. interests of the loss of Afghan fighting forces, which latter might be very effective in immobilizing Soviet troops through guerilla warfare.
4.
If the loss of Afghanistan and its fighting forces and the extension of Soviet power to Pakistan’s borders are judged sufficiently adverse to U.S. interests, we should extend military assistance to Afghanistan.
5.
Certain Afghan leaders already have indicated their interest in receiving U.S. military assistance despite the Soviet threat. In pursuance of a decision called for in No. 4 above, we should offer military assistance to Afghanistan in the context of a regional arrangement, i.e., association with Turkey or Pakistan or both in arrangements similar to those existing between Pakistan and Turkey.
6.
We should be completely forthright in making clear to the Afghans that we can make no commitments beyond the language of the mutual defense assistance agreement. We cannot guarantee Afghanistan’s borders.
7.
If Afghanistan accepts assistance under our terms, it should be used in strengthening and making more efficient existing military units. It should not be used to expand Afghanistan’s armed forces.
8.
It should not be overlooked that the Soviet Union may react to our assistance by taking over northern Afghanistan, whose people are racially akin to the peoples living on the Soviet side of the present Afghan-Soviet border, but this possibility exists whether or not we extend military assistance to Afghanistan.
9.
The natural frontier of Pakistan for defense purposes is the Hindu Kush. If we do not move before the Soviets do, we may find them on the Durand Line, which would be less possible to defend.
10.
It may be argued that from a psychological and propaganda point of view we should consider timing and not move into Afghanistan until after the Soviet Union had taken the northern part, but a negative approach of this kind could result in the Soviet absorption of all of Afghanistan before we could mount any effective counteraction.
11.
The issue really is whether we should enable the Afghans to oppose the Soviets at the Hindu Kush, or permit the Soviets to advance practically unresisted to the Durand Line, and thus become an immediate threat to Pakistan and the sub-continent. Determined Afghan resistance could upset the time table of a Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean sufficiently to enable the Pakistanis to mobilize for effective defense.

I shall send you another memorandum regarding the possibility of ameliorating the hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan growing out of the Pushtoonistan dispute by using Pakistan as a channel for extending military and economic assistance to Afghanistan.3

  1. For text of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement for Friendly Cooperation, signed at Karachi on Apr. 2, 1954, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1954 (London, Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 185.↩
  2. For text of this Agreement signed at Karachi on May 19, 1954, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 5, p. 1954. For documentation, see pp. 1818 ff. and volume ix.↩
  3. Memorandum as described not found in Department of State files.↩