Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

689.90D/2–1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan ¹

secret

Washington , February 20, 1953—5:43 p.m.

371. Ambassador Naim called on Department 19 to be informed result your submission Zafrulla’s formula to Government Afghanistan² (Embtel 494).³ Naim said he had received report re this matter; that statement unacceptable, that welfare tribal peoples is concern both Afghanistan and Pakistan but real issue is the right “7 million people” to self-determination which Afghanistan supports. Department acknowledged differing viewpoints this issue between disputants and said it not clear how Department can be helpful until both countries exhibit tangible evidence of progress toward resolution their problems. Naim demurred saying divergence views Afghanistan and Pakistan so serious that third party mediatory action essential.

Re Embtel 500⁴ Department referred to press reports in US as well as India and Pakistan re MEDO which are provoking speculation in those countries and reportedly in Afghanistan. By way of background for Afghanistan Government Ambassador was told following: (1) MEDO is presently conceived to be military planning organization only, not involving formal alliances or commitments; (2) MEDO does not exist now and its formation depends upon favorable political relationships within Middle East area, timing of which unpredictable; (3) when organization established perhaps it would wish invite other nations of general area for example Afghanistan or Pakistan if they are then interested; (4) no invitations to join MEDO have been extended to any governments.

Ambassador said Afghanistan concerned about Pakistan participation in any kind Middle East defense organization before solution Pushtoonistan issue. India presumably would feel same way with respect to Kashmir dispute. His government also concerned about Pakistan participation which would result isolation Afghanistan which shares long bordor with USSR. Ambassador gave no indication Afghan Government interest in MEDO participation.

In view Afghan proximity to USSR and Article 2 Afghan-Soviet Treaty of June 4 [24], 1931, Department wonders if Afghan Government would in fact be interested in joining MEDO which as presently envisaged would appear to put Afghan Government in position of being open to charge of violating Soviet Treaty obligations and inviting increased pressure with uncertain compensating advantage. Though public and official reaction to prospect Pakistan participation is adverse because of status Afghanistan—Pakistan relations it can be argued that such participation would help fill power vacuum left by British withdrawal from subcontinent. This would be especially so should MEDO develop into substantial defense system.

You may wish pass on Afghan officials on suitable occasion substance paragraph 2 this telegram. Embassy’s comments re paragraph 4 appreciated.⁵

FYI Naim said he has requested his own recall. He and Hashim⁶ expect stop over in Karachi March or early April enroute Kabul provided Pakistan Government assures them high officials will be there for talks.

Dulles

1. This telegram was drafted in SOA and approved for transmission by Jernegan. It was repeated to Karachi.
2. For a memorandum of this conversation, held Feb. 19, see p. 1393.
3. Dated Feb. 14, p. 1390.

4. In this telegram, dated Feb. 16, Ward had reported that in a conversation held with the Afghan Foreign Minister on Feb. 14, the latter had stated that he had information Pakistan would be invited to join the proposed Middle East Defense Organization and that admittance of Pakistan would be a matter of concern to the Government of Afghanistan. (689.90D/2–1653)

   For documentation concerning the proposal for a MEDO, see volume ix .

5. In telegram 536 from Kabul, Mar. 2, Ambassador Ward reported in part:

   “Considerations in second paragraph Deptel 371, February 20, brought to attention Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz today. Aziz offered no comment other than to say that since MEDO, like NATO, presumably would be purely defensive arrangement, GOA would not be barred from membership because of 1931 nonaggression treaty with USSR.” (689.90D/3–253)

6. Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Counselor of Embassy.