889.2553/9–952: Telegram

The Chargé in Afghanistan ( Horner ) to the Department of State 2

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125. Over past year Emb has reported evidences increasing Sov interest in Afghan. Without burdening Dept with citations particular des and tels, it may suffice to say that we have felt earlier estimates of relative Sov non-interest in this country to be in need of radical revision.

In conversation this morning with Philip Beck and Louis de Laive of UN technical assistance mission, FonMin 3 confirmed that (a) Sov Chargé Shpedko delivered stiff aide-mémoire 4 two weeks ago stating USSR wld regard GOA plans for oil drilling in north (by French firm under UN auspices) to be “unfriendly act” and specific violation of 1936 [1931] non-aggression treaty5 and (b) Afghan Amb in Moscow Sultan Ahmad a few days ago was called in by Vishinsky6 and given a severe tongue lashing in same gen sense. In written reply to local Sov Emb yesterday GOA asserted that planned oil developments was purely internal matter.

Ali Mohammad informed Beck and de Laive that GOA most seriously concerned over this latest Sov move, and went so far as to say that had dispute with Pak over Pashtunistan been resolved he wld [Page 1448] have declined to accept Shpedko’s note. While indicating that for time being GOA intends to suspend any fresh UN activities in north Afghan (an important hydrological project also is in course of being implemented) he recognized that Sov démarche regarding oil had much broader implications. GOA was on horns of dilemma. In his own recent trip throughout north he had clearly understood there was widespread resentment over fact that large sums of money were being spent in developing Helmand Valley whereas nothing whatsoever had been done in north. As polit realist, he knew country wld simply fall apart unless econ assistance was accorded north which is only economically viable part of country in modern sense and harbor bulk of natural resources. On other hand if GOA goes ahead with plans to develop north, it risks an intensified Sov propaganda campaign designed to separate this strategic area, inhabited largely by Turkish peoples and their incorporation into USSR. A third course wld be to accept “repeated” Sov offers technical assistance in north, but this wld be tantamount to relinquishing this area to USSR.

Ali Mohammad reiterated that at this stage settlement of the quarrel with Pak is absolutely essential. However GOA cld not accept recent suggestion UK Amb Ligeman that matter be left in abeyance for few years. Present regime inevitably will be overthrown if it cannot reach face-saving settlement since it is already deeply committed. A greater danger for entire area is fact that Pashtun tribesmen are interested in nothing except “money and rifles”. If Sovs decide to proceed energetically with program of subversion they wld find “irreligious” tribesmen ready tools.

FonMin has given Beck permission to communicate tenor his conversation to UK Amb and myself. At same time, he indicated that we wld soon be called in to discuss both this new Sov threat and possibly future means of procedure.

Since any advice we may give (and it is hard to conceive of our being able to take completely negative position) depends upon evaluation of over all Sov intentions, it will be useful to have Dept’s view as well as those of Emb Moscow. On face of it, it is somewhat difficult to imagine that at this particular time the Kremlin wld take any overt steps against Afghan, especially since any such move wld serve to cancel out Sov gains in ME generally and perhaps in India, Pak and Iran especially. This argument seems all the more cogent if it is true, as we have assumed that Afghan in itself does not constitute a primary Sov target. On other hand there seems to me to be strong likelihood that if GOA goes ahead with development in the north (and the alternative is to abandon that area) Sovs are quite capable of whipping up campaign of propaganda and subversive activities possibly under slogan of reunification oppressed Tadjik Usbek and kindred brothers in “free” republic of Sov central Asia. At same time Hyrat province [Page 1449] cld be rewarded to a quiescent Iran. With its corrupt and inefficient govt, weak econ and inefficient milit establishment, and above all owing to the discontent that prevails among the Afghan populace generally it is hard for me to see how this govt cld withstand determined Sov pressure aimed at exploitation of egocentric tendencies.

It is very encouraging that Ali Mohammad referred at some length to pressing need for settlement with Pak. It may be that Sov pressure and Afghan apprehensions as regards her northern frontier may afford a mental climate in Afghan which will be more favorable to real settlement with Pak than at any time in past or possibly any time in future. As minimum possibility I shall continue to suggest that GOA reciprocate the appointment of an Amb to Pak. However it seems that present opportunity shld be used to make another real effort at settlement of Pashtunistan problem. Some workable and face-saving compromise, if combined with assurances of Pak moral or milit support to Afghan against direct Sov aggression or subversion wld have far better chance of settling problem at present time than in past. It appears that if agreement can be reached at all it can be reached speedily under present circumstances. Among various possibilities we might suggest the setting up of a joint Afghan-Pak Comm on welfare of Pashtun tribes, or perhaps a system of intergovt consultations on question or policy regarding tribes within two countries. In either case chance for success wld be greatly increased if US cld offer real fin assistance to any binational body for econ developments, and even further to provide additional inducements separately to Afghan in the shape of econ development funds aside from Export-Import Bank loan or Point IV. If GOP is willing to take advantage this moment to meet Afghan aspirations settlement of Pashtunistan question and vastly increased security for Pak itself is possible.

Horner
  1. This telegram was repeated to London, Moscow, and Karachi.
  2. Ali Mohammed Khan was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
  3. Apparently a reference to a Soviet note dated Aug. 7. An English translation of this note is included in airgram 48 to Kabul, Oct. 24, 1952. The phrase “unfriendly act” does not occur in this translation. Instead, according to the pertinent section of the translation, the USSR stated that oil exploration and exploitation in areas of Afghanistan bordering on the Soviet Union, by foreign firms and specialists belonging to the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, pursuing hostile aims with respect to the Soviet Union, might endanger the safety of the frontiers of the USSR, and might do damage to the good neighborly relations existing between the USSR and Afghanistan. The USSR then invoked the first sentence of Article 2 of the Treaty cited in footnote 5 below, and concluded by stating its expectation that Afghanistan would eliminate the abnormal condition referred to and would ensure the essential fulfillment of the conditions of the Treaty. (889.2553/10–2452)
  4. For text of the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Kabul on June 24, 1931, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clvii, p. 371.
  5. Andrey Yanuarevich Vishinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister.