Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

689.90D/11–1954

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth) to the Department of State

secret
No. 297

Karachi, November 19, 1954.

Subject:

• Pak-Afghan Relations

The purpose of this despatch is to summarize the salient points developed in several recent discussions which the Ambassador and members of the Embassy staff have had in Karachi and in Kabul on the subject of Pakistan—Afghanistan relations, and to offer certain comments for the Department’s consideration.

The Ambassador and several members of the Embassy staff flew to Kabul with the Air Attaché the weekend of November 5–7. While there, they talked at some length with the American Ambassador and members of his staff, and with the staff of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul. (Ambassador Shah was absent from his post.) The principal points which emerged from these discussions may be summarized as follows:

1. Soviet efforts at penetration of Afghanistan are increasing in pressure, and have already reached a point to cause us serious disquiet. The Pakistanis are acutely conscious of this development and are seeking all possible ways to check it. (The Embassy staff were impressed with the caliber of Pakistani representation in Kabul; considering the relative scarcity of trained skills in the Pakistan Foreign Service, they have obviously made a considerable effort here. To a considerable extent, however, this has been accomplished by means of recruitment from other than the normal sources. Pakistan Embassy officials in Afghanistan expresed annoyance that the people with “big names” in Pakistan wanted assignments in the Western countries and were relucant to go to Afghanistan in spite of its greater importance to Pakistan.)

2. A solution of the Pushtu question is the obvious prerequisite of effective Pakistani moves to the above end. At present, such a solution is nowhere in sight. Prime Minister Daud is so emotionally involved in the issue, and his personal prestige so bound up with it, that it would be unrealistic to expect any change in the inflexible Afghan position so long as he retains his dominant voice in Afghan policies.

3. Nevertheless, there is no fundamental anti-Pakistani feeling in the country, and basic conditions are such as to make possible an accommodation on the issue if Daud specifically, and the royal family generally should change their attitude. In spite of the synthetically fabricated anti-Pak campaign in the press (thought to be heavily subsidized by India) the people generally show themselves friendly to Pakistan. In fact, there appears to be considerable uneasiness with the Government policy of aligning itself with India, whose internal and external policies can be considered as anti-Moslem, and against Moslem Pakistan. It is difficult to assess the strength or potential importance of this attitude, but it is a factor which might become significant.

4. The motives of the Afghans in putting forward the Federation concept last spring are not completely clear. At the moment, the idea is quiescent, and it is best that it should remain so for the time being. Signs that such a move was being seriously considered might be a signal for the Soviets to move with vigor. Before this risk is run, Pakistan’s military strength should be very substantially increased, and, if possible, other deterrents developed in the area.

5. As a practical matter, for the Pakistanis there seems to be no feasible alternative at present to the policy they are following. This policy is understood to include the following elements:

a. Despite the constant Afghan provocation, to maintain a friendly attitude and a certain tolerance of the abuse which is their lot. (There are influential Pakistanis who reject this idea and have urged a campaign of retaliation, including the incitement of a jirgah or so. This policy threatened to win acceptance for a while last spring, according to Colonel Shah, but has lost ground in recent months.)

b. To try to persuade the Afghans to work with them in the removal of specific irritants in the relations of the two countries.

c. At the same time, to strengthen and consolidate their position in the tribal areas to the east of the Durand line, and to make a concentrated effort to improve the living conditions of the Pathans in this area. (This will be the most effective possible means of exerting pressure on the Afghans. At the same time, such an effort is needed to counter the demonstration which the Soviets are making among the peoples immediately to the north of Afghanistan of the material benefits which Communism brings.)

d. It would be a most useful concrete measure if the Paks could persuade the Afghanis to cooperate on at least one joint project of mutual benefit. Once the possibilities of fruitful cooperation had been demonstrated, it might be possible to extend the principle. (This recommendation had been made by Ambassador Ward both at the Ambassadorial Conference in Istanbul last May and during his subsequent visits to Washington.)¹

6. Given the realities of the situation in Afghanistan and the limitations inescapably imposed on direct U.S. intervention there, the conclusion seems clear that U.S. policy objectives in this general area can be best served by a rapid strengthening of Pakistan. (Ambassador Ward concurred unreservedly on this proposition.) We should encourage the Paks to follow the policy outlined in paragraph 5 above. However, in encouraging “c” we shall need to be particularly discreet and avoid any overt involvement, since in the present highly nervous state of the Afghan leaders this would be interpreted as a hostile act and might impel them definitely into the Soviet camp.

Following his return to Karachi, the Ambassador had talks on this general subject with the Prime Minister and Colonel Shah, the Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, who was in the city on consultation, and Embassy officers discussed the matter with Secretary Rahim of the Foreign Office. The following points were developed in the course of these discussions:

1. The discussions just concluded betwen Pak officials and the Afghan Foreign Minister, Prince Naim, showed the Foreign Minister in a more conciliatory mood than previously, and the Pakistanis were feeling somewhat encouraged.

2. There had been no mention of Federation in these discussions, and the idea was not active at this time.

3. The Paks think that the way to proceed is to take up with the Afghans a series of specific problems: trade, customs, etc. and settle these one by one.

4. The Paks are definitely interested in the possibility of securing Afghan agreement to cooperate on some joint project.

Embassy comment: So far as the Pakistan Government is concerned, there is no doubt of the welcome which it would give to any proposals of the United States Government designed to assist and facilitate Pak-Afghan collaboration in the economic development of the Pushtu area. (Deptel 582, November 4, 1954.)

With the expanded development program in prospect for next year, and the increased availability of counterpart funds, there should be opportunity for accelerated development in the tribal areas within Pak jurisdiction. The Embassy believes that in addition to the objectives listed in 5c, such developments might serve specific U.S. security interests in the area, and that they should be discreetly examined. The Embassy concurs in the judgment that the United States should not be openly involved in any such developments, but considers that ways might be found to accomplish these objectives through indirection.²

For the Ambassador:

Alexander B. Daspit
First Secretary

1. A conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Near East area was held at Istanbul, May 11–14, 1954. Ambassador Ward visited Washington for consultation and home leave from June 16 to July 2 and from Aug. 16 to 20. For documentation on the Chiefs of Mission conference, see volume IX.
2. Marginal comment by an unknown author: “maybe but pretty risky”.