Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

689.90D/7–2153

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Ward) to the Department of State¹

secret
No. 15

Kabul, July 21, 1953.

Ref:

• Department’s Instruction No. 13, June 25, 1953²

Subject:

• Afghan Agitation Regarding Pushtoonistan

The Embassy has read with interest the copy of the memorandum from Sardar Najibullah Khan, Afghan Ambassador to India, to Assistant Secretary Byroade, on the Pushtoonistan question, enclosed with the Department’s Instruction No. 13 of June 25, 1953.

Najibullah’s memorandum is, as would be expected, the more or less standard Afghan presentation. It is perhaps worthy of note, however, that Najibullah appears to place some emphasis on the alleged historical inclusion of the Pushtoons in the Afghan nation, and implies forbearance on the part of the Government of Afghanistan in not demanding the return of the Pushtoons to Afghan sovereignty, “notwithstanding that the land of the Pakhtoons was severed from Afghanistan”. Najibullah may thus be among those Afghans who are in reality strong irredentists, dreaming of Afghan expansion to the Indus. The official pronouncements of the Government and the press articles generally confine themselves to demands for the independence of the Pushtoons. In private conversation, however, it is not unusual for officials to admit that they consider the ultimate aim to be annexation of Pushtoonistan by Kabul.

As the Department is doubtless aware, Najibullah’s figures on the results of the 1947 referendum do not correspond with the official returns announced by the British who conducted the plebiscite in the N.W.F.P. The officially announced results of this controversial referendum appeared to establish that a majority of the registered electorate in the province favored union with Pakistan. Although it is true, as the Afghans allege, that numbers of the inhabitants abstained from voting, British figures show that 51 per cent of the total electorate voted for Pakistan, although only 65 per cent of the electorate went to the polls. Thus, even had the abstaining 35 per cent been able to vote for an independent Pushtoonistan, in theory they could not have registered a majority. Najibullah’s statements on the plebiscite are, however, representative of the official Afghan Government position, which is that the number of abstentions represented a majority vote for independence.

In the closing paragraphs of his memorandum, Najibullah expresses concern over the prospect of military aid and other assistance being given to Pakistan. There is reason to believe that the apparent determination of the United States to shore up the economy of Pakistan, as well as the possibility of early solution of some of Pakistan’s difficulties with India, have aroused fears among Afghan officials that these developments, possibly leading to a more economically and politically stable Pakistan, may have a detrimental effect on Afghan plans to alienate the tribes from their connection with Karachi.

The Embassy, in its last comprehensive survey of the Pushtoonistan controversy between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Embassy despatch 131, October 12, 1951),³ suggested that any further American efforts to break the deadlock must await a more propitious time. The Department has, we believe, also maintained the position in the intervening time that, the U.S. approach of November 1950 having been unsuccessful, further intervention would be equally unavailing, conditions remaining essentially the same.

The intervening years since 1950 appear to have brought the two countries no nearer a solution of the problem of Pushtoonistan. The Afghan Government, mainly through the media of a controlled press and radio, continues to vilify the Government of Pakistan in a manner probably unequalled in malignancy anywhere in the non-Communist world. Its unremitting efforts to subvert the Pushtu tribes in Pakistan territory by propaganda and subsidy, while probably not notably fruitful, nevertheless serve to keep the tribes in turmoil and thwart Pakistan plans to integrate the inhabitants of tribal territory as useful citizens of the state. Neither country now enjoys a thoroughly sound economy. Yet each year substantial proportions of their respective budgets are expended in competitive subsidies to the obstreperous tribes, who are the real beneficiaries of a continued state of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There have been informal conversations between Afghan and Pakistan officials in Karachi, and the Pakistan Ambassador to Kabul, Colonel Shah, has striven to create an atmosphere of amity between the two nations, but basically the situation remains the same as that prevailing in 1950. The Afghan Government will not take part in formal discussions, or send an accredited representative to Karachi until the Pakistan Government agrees to a public announcement that Pushtoonistan will be discussed. The Paks do not feel that they can make such an announcement, which would constitute acknowledgement of a legitimate Afghan interest in affairs within the borders of Pakistan.

There seems little likelihood that the Afghans will, in the foreseeable future, retreat from their uncompromising position on the Pushtoons. Quite possibly, they feel that they cannot retreat, even if they so desired. That may be on the horns of a dilemma of their own creation. The present regime came to power in Kabul in 1929 with the support of the Pushtu tribes from both sides of the Durand Line. It is not confident of the allegiance of the other racial groups in Afghanistan, nor, it may be said, does it make any real effort to secure this allegiance. The ruling house, therefore, woos and fears the Pushtoons, whom it cannot really control. While the British were masters on the North West Frontier, the Afghans were reasonably sure that the Afghan Pushtoons, as well as the trans-Durand Line tribes, would be generally friendly towards Kabul, and that the manifestations of their predatory inclinations would be directed at the infidel British. But when a Muslim state succeeded the British on the Frontier, the danger immediately arose that the successor authority might be able to make its peace with the tribes of the unadministered districts, and indeed that the Afghan Pushtoons would be oriented to Pakistan, leaving the Kabul regime without what it considered its mainstay.

It may thus well be that the Afghans, faced with the potential danger described above, seized upon the issue of Pushtoonistan as a means of preserving the status quo of the former British era, and fostering the idea that they are the only true friends of the tribes. It is also possible that the Afghans have no great expectation of the attainment of an independent Pushtu state, and do not really wish it, preferring the continuance of anarchy in tribal areas.

The Embassy feels that the legal position of the Afghans on Pushtoonistan is extremely weak, and that they well know it. They are, therefore, unlikely willingly to submit the controversy to an international arbitration or fact-finding body, in spite of pious calls on the U.N. to come to the aid of the Pushtoons.

The stake of the United States in this area is considerable. We are trying to shore up the economies of both Afghanistan and Pakistan and help them to attain a stage of economic development which will make for higher living standards and stable government. So long as both nations dissipate their energies in a continuation of this seemingly aimless dispute, the achievement of these objectives will be materially delayed, and investment of American funds and technical skills will not bring the maximum return in terms of U.S. objectives. Even perhaps more serious in terms of U.S. objectives is the fact that this quarrel between Afghanistan and Pakistan prevents the two countries adopting a joint defense program against possible Soviet aggression and the fact that Afghan attacks on the Karachi Government on this issue furnish an excellent precedent for the Soviets at an opportune moment to commence agitation for liberation of the Tadjiks, Turkomans or other ethnic groups having population on both sides of the Afghan-Soviet border.

So long as Afghanistan persists in villifying Pakistan and demanding that that nation permit itself to be carved out of existence by the creation of an independent Pushtoonistan, and so long as Pakistan refuses to concede that affairs within what it considers to be its borders are any concern to Afghanistan, the wasting deadlock will continue. There appears to be little reason to believe that either party will make the concessions required to satisfy the other.

As noted above, the Embassy is inclined to believe that the Afghans rest their case on rather shaky legal ground. On the face of it, it appears that conducting a campaign for the independence of a portion of a neighboring sovereign state constitutes unwarranted intervention in the affairs of that state. The Afghans, however, imply that their campaign is not such an intervention, since they maintain that the Durand Line, the recognized international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is not a legal boundary. What then would be the result of a request by the Government of Pakistan that the legality of the Durand Line be adjudicated by an international commission composed of representatives of nations having no interests in the area, say Saudi Arabia, a Scandinavian country and a Latin American country? The Embassy believes that the United States, members of the British Commonwealth, and India for obvious reasons should not be represented on any such commission.

If, as the Embassy believes, the decision of such a commission would be in favor of Pakistan, Afghanistan would be placed in the unfavorable light of interfering in the internal affairs of a neighboring state if it continued its Pushtoonistan agitation, and Pakistan would be entitled to the assistance of other powers in bringing pressure to bear on Afghanistan to abandon its agitation in the frontier areas of Pakistan. It is entirely possible and even likely that any such request by the Government of Pakistan would be scornfully rejected by the Government of Afghanistan on the ground that any arbitration must consider the broad question of Pushtoon independence and not just the narrow legal issue of the validity of the Durand Line. Nonetheless the Embassy believes that to be forced to take such a position would be embarrassing to the Afghan Government and would not only weaken their position on this issue with other friendly powers but might also cause them to moderate their agitation.

The Embassy cannot anticipate the reaction of the Pakistan Government to this idea and would welcome the comments of the Embassy at Karachi as to possible Pak objections. Presumably the Government in any event would wish to delay any démarche until the conclusion of the current conversations with the Indian Government over Kashmir and other disputed points.

If the Department and the Embassy at Karachi concur in this Embassy’s belief that this type of approach might be fruitful, it is suggested that the Department discuss it with the Pakistan Embassy in Washington. The Embassy at Kabul is of the opinion that a discussion with the Pakistan Ambassador at Kabul would be unwise at least at the outset and that the United States should confine its activity in this matter to a suggestion to the Pakistan Government and should not directly or indirectly be known to be sponsoring any such move.

Angus Ward

1. Copies also sent to London, Karachi, and New Delhi.
2. Instruction 13 conveyed to the Embassy a copy of a memorandum delivered by Ambassador Najibullah Khan to Assistant Secretary Byroade on May 19 in New Delhi. The instruction noted that the memorandum, which dealt with Pushtunistan, did not call for a reply and none was contemplated. (689.90D/5–1953) The memorandum is not attached to the copy of the instruction found in the files, and no other copy of the memorandum has been found in Department of State files.
3. This 16-page despatch, not printed, contained a summary of the question for the period 1950–1951. (689.90D/10–1251)