689.90D/10–2952
Memorandum of Conversation, by William Witman of the United States Delegation at the United Nations 1
Subject:
- Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations
Participants:
- H.R.H. Prince Naim, Afghan Ambassador to U.S.
- H. E. Mohammed Kebir Khan Louddin, Chairman of Afghan Delegation to UN General Assembly
- The Secretary
- Mr. Plitt, US Delegation
- Mr. Witman, US Delegation
- Prince Naim and Mr. Louddin called at their request on the Secretary at 10:45 this morning.
Mr. Louddin referred to the conversation which he had had on October 23 with Mr. Plitt, and to the appointment which Ambassador Naim had had on October 24 with the Under Secretary. He then proceeded to read, with frequent verbal interpellations, a long statement, copy of which is attached hereto.2
The statement opened with a reference to the recent Soviet démarche regarding petroleum exploration and exploitation in northern Afghanistan, and cited the view of the Afghan Government that the démarche was a “logical consequence” of the “strained relations” between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which had adversely affected political, economic and social conditions in Afghanistan.
[Page 1379]The statement then dealt at length with the historical origins and present status, by Afghan lights, of the Pashtoonistan dispute with Pakistan. It observed that the Soviet authorities, who were fully aware of their predicament, might “wish to exploit it realistically in a political sense.” Thus, there existed a “critical situation” for Afghanistan, far reaching in its influence for peace and security in that part of the world. The Afghan economy was deteriorating, and the political situation resulting from the strained relations with Pakistan had resulted in dangerous restiveness and tension among the peoples of Afghanistan.
Expressing appreciation for the U.S. Export-Import Bank loan,3 the statement recounted the various measures of economic development which the Afghan Government has taken, including the petroleum project which has had to be stopped as a result of the Soviet note. The Afghan Government has “answered” that note, but is also “conscious of the risks” of such an answer to the Soviet Government.
The statement went on to declare that if the Pashtoonistan problem were solved, the whole region would enter upon a new era of harmonious cooperation “which would result in the joint economic development and prosperity.” In that event, it said, “the whole region can be considered as one economic and security unit,” increasing its political stability and assuring its security. With “farsighted statesmanship” on the part of responsible authorities of Pakistan, an unrestricted plebiscite might provide a solution, as demanded by Pakistan in the case of Kashmir.
In conclusion, the statement “respectfully requests the expression of an opinion by the friendly Government of the United States of America.”
When the reading of the statement had been concluded, the Secretary inquired precisely what it was that we were being asked to express an opinion on. Prince Naim and Mr. Louddin expanded somewhat on the points made in the statement, and mentioned the great assistance rendered by the good offices of the United States in connection with the Helmand River problem with Iran.4 They also expressed appreciation for our earlier efforts at good offices with Pakistan, and said that Afghanistan had stood ready to accept them but [Page 1380] Pakistan had refused. They now hoped that the United States would be able to suggest means by which the Pashtoonistan question could be solved.
The Secretary stated that their views would be carefully studied and that he would be pleased to discuss the matter further with them after he had consulted his staff.
It should be noted that in the statement and subsequent conversation, Mr. Louddin and the Ambassador did not go as far as Mr. Louddin did in his conversation with Messrs. Plitt, Witman and Fluker on October 23. (See top secret Memorandum of Conversation of that date.)5
- William Witman was the Officer in Charge of India–Nepal–Ceylon Affairs and an Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.↩
- Not printed.↩
- On Nov. 23, 1949, the Export-Import Bank approved a loan to Afghanistan of $21,000,000 to cover the construction costs of the Kajakai Dam, completion of the Boghra canal system, and such subsequent river development and irrigation projects in the Helmand and Arghandab valleys as might later be approved by the Bank.↩
- In February 1948, the United States tendered its informal good offices to facilitate a settlement of the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran concerning the distribution of the waters of the Helmand River. A basis for a settlement of the problem was ultimately established when the Helmand River Delta Commission submitted its report to the Governments of Afghanistan and Iran on Feb. 28, 1951. For a full discussion of these developments, see the editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1459.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩