601.8991/9–652
The Chargé in India (Taylor) to the Department of State1
secret
No.
686
New
Delhi, September 6, 1952.
Ref:
Subject:
- Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation with Afghan Ambassador
Re Prospects of Reopening Afghan–Pakistan Negotiations.
The Embassy encloses as of possible interest to the Department a
memorandum of a conversation which took place on August 31 between
the Afghan Ambassador to India, His Excellency Najibullah
Khan, and an officer of the Embassy. Inasmuch as this
conversation appeared to reflect a somewhat more realistic attitude
than formerly by the GOA toward its
long-standing differences with Pakistan, the conversation has been
reported in some detail.
This is the second time recently that the local Afghan representative
has interviewed Embassy officers on the subject of Afghan economic
and political problems, especially as they are related to the GOP. It seems likely that the economic
and political pressures are becoming so serious that the GOA may be ready to renew negotiations
with Pakistan, and that if arranged, negotiations may have a
slightly greater prospect of success than heretofore.
With regard to the merits of the Afghan case for more extensive
economic and technical assistance, the Embassy is, of course, not in
a position to comment. The subject may have been brought up
primarily by way of introduction to other topics which the
Ambassador had on his mind.
While a number of the latter’s “official” remarks bore a marked
[Page 1369]
similarity to views
which the Department has heard many times, the reporting officer was
struck by the omission on this occasion of the repetitious and
emotional circumlocution which has become almost a ritual on these
occasions, and by a certain note of urgency which attended the
Ambassador’s presentation of numbered points 4 and 5 in the attached
memorandum, which seemed not to be just another variation on the old
refrain with its occasional overtone of international blackmail, but
to introduce a new and more plausible theme. This officer was also
impressed by the Ambassador’s suggestion that the (heretofore
perfidious) British might be helpful in promoting renewed
negotiations with Pakistan. To a graduate of many weary talks on
this subject, the impression was pronounced that the Afghan approach
wore a “new look”. It occurred to the reporting officer that the
GOA showed a certain readiness
to take constructive steps on its own and not rely entirely on the
interest of a third power.
It is suspected that the Ambassador’s thinking, if not that of his
Government, may be colored by the following considerations: (1)
Possible imminence of Soviet moves to cut off trade, with a prospect
of economic collapse. (2) A conviction that Pakistan’s present
internal and external problems would now render it more than usually
amenable to a liquidation of difficulties on at least one of its
borders, that of Afghanistan. (3) Developments in Kashmir involving
the latter’s limited accession or partial autonomy within Indian
territory, which might be considered by the GOA as a favorable precedent, or as an index of an
advantageous talking point to be used with regard to the
Pushtu-speaking areas of Pakistan. (It will be recalled that never
since 1947, at least, has the GOA
ceased to regard these areas as presenting a special case.) (4)
Recent developments in Iran eliminate that country for the
foreseeable future as a source of petroleum and other supplies
(alternatively to Pakistan and Russia) and have probably reinforced
Afghan dread of the growth of Communist influence on its
borders.3
It is difficult to understand why this indirect channel of
communication has been employed unless it is that the Afghan
Government is making a concerted attempt to make an impression
concurrently through our Embassy at Kabul, through this Embassy, and
through its own Embassy in Washington. No other explanation comes
readily to mind, except that the American Ambassador at New
Delhi4 is widely known in this
area as a sympathetic advocate of assistance to under-developed
countries in this part of the world. It would be of interest to the
Embassy to learn whether representations have been made along
similar lines either directly to the Department in Washington or
through the Embassy at Kabul.
[Page 1370]
Action Requested: The Department is requested
to send reproduced copies of this despatch to the American Embassies
in Moscow, Karachi, and London.
For the Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.
Everett F.
Drumright
Counselor of Embassy (Political)
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First
Secretary of the Embassy in India (Leach)
secret
New
Delhi, August 31, 1952.
Participants:
- His Excellency Najibullah Khan,
Ambassador of Afghanistan
- Richard S. Leach, American
Embassy
Reference:
- Embdesp #368, August 2,
1952
Subject:
- Afghan–Pakistan Relations
At the request of the Afghan Ambassador I called at his residence
this morning and conversed almost two hours with him privately.
The conversation was divided between what he said he was
officially authorized to say and what he represented as his
personal views, which he wished to have kept distinct. I assured
him I should respect his wishes and accordingly for purposes of
this record, the substance of this conversation is divided into
two parts. In summary, some of the views which the Ambassador
outlined as representing those of his Government, and which he
hoped might be brought to the Department’s attention, were the
following:
- (1)
-
Afghanistan is disappointed at the limited amount
of U.S. economic and technical assistance provided
for that country believes that it can effectively
absorb a much greater amount, and fears that the
progress already made in Afghanistan may be
jeopardized if additional assistance is not
obtainable.
The Ambassador showed me a copy of a letter from the
American Chargé at Kabul to the Foreign Office
conveying the Department’s reasons for extending
limited assistance to Afghanistan.5 He took this limitation
of economic assistance as the point of departure for
his ensuing remarks.
- (2)
- The Ambassador emphasized that Afghan economic
difficulties grew out of transit trade difficulties with
Pakistan whose solution demanded as a prerequisite, a
political rapprochement.
- (3)
- Afghan economic and political life is threatened with
being crushed between the upper and nether millstones of
Soviet and Pakistan pressures.
- (4)
- The Soviets have recently made clear to the Afghan
Ambassador at Moscow their displeasure over oil
development plans and operations in northern
Afghanistan,6 and
the Afghan Government expected them to make further
representations.
- (5)
- The Afghan Government would by no means yield to such
pressure in a matter involving its own sovereignty and
internal affairs, but felt certain that its rejection of
the Soviet representations would be followed by drastic
economic sanctions in the curtailment or even the
termination of the current barter agreement between
Afghanistan and the USSR, upon which Afghanistan is
dependent for critically needed petrol supplies for the
northern half of the country, and for other essentials.
As is well known, the only practical alternative source
of such supplies is from or through Pakistan.
- (6)
- Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot live without each
other economically, politically or otherwise, and it is
time that they came to a mutually advantageous
understanding, to preserve stability in the area, which
both countries need, and to make sure that the
subcontinent does not lose the defensive frontier
provided by the Hindu Kush.
- (7)
- Afghanistan–Pakistan differences can be negotiated and
the present time is not unfavorable.
- (8)
- Although the GOP had
not gone all the way in accepting the U.S. “November 6
approach”, the gap to be bridged was not so great that
it could not be accomplished with a little assistance
from the U.S.
- (9)
- The GOA would be glad
to resume conversations on a high level with the GOP and hopes that the U.S.
may be willing to take the initiative in bringing them
about.
- (10)
- The basis proposed for a resumption of negotiations
would be that the two parties should enter into them
unconditionally and without prejudice to the previous
positions of either Government, in the event that
agreement should not result.
The role which it was hoped the U.S. would play, as the reporting
officer understood it, would be (a) to
provide the initiative in having the negotiations resumed and
(b) to act as an “observer” and to
render friendly “advice” to either party when it appeared that
either was taking a wrong stand.
The second phase of the conversation, for which the Ambassador
did not wish to be held accountable except on an unofficial and
personal basis, reverted to conversations which he himself had
had with Liaquat Ali
Khan7 in 1947 when, he said, the
possibilities of economic, military and other fields of
association between the two countries had been discussed. It is
the Ambassador’s personal view that at the present time there is
no reason why, assuming some ultimate, and not necessarily
sweeping, concession by the GOP,
to the idea of “freedom” or autonomy for Pushtoonistan (not
defined) within the borders of Pakistan, the two countries
should not proceed with very constructive
[Page 1372]
discussions of their respective,
and mutual problems. The time is favorable because both
countries now have particularly compelling reasons for doing so;
Afghanistan, for the reasons already mentioned and Pakistan for
the reason that it was in a parlous state internally, (he
mentioned ties with East Pakistan as being very shaky), and
particularly needed stability along its western borders in the
face of other difficulties. He went on to say he personally
believed it entirely possible, along with reaching an
understanding regarding the tribal Pushtoons (who were, in fact,
independent) for the GOP and the
GOA to work out a complete
political, economic, and defensive agreement between themselves.
He believed that on this basis Afghanistan would be willing to
enter into some sort of a federal scheme or confederation which
would embrace all three entities, namely Afghanistan,
Pushtunistan, and Pakistan. (He did not think that Pakistan’s
commonwealth connection would stand in the way of an association
of this sort.)
It may be mentioned here that, in the course of the conversation,
which included many points which have been raised in former
discussions of this subject, it was mentioned by the reporting
officer that the U.S. had made a protracted but unsuccessful
effort to assist in a solution between November 6, 1950 and the
latter part of 1951, and it was suggested that some other
impartial third power might be in a better position to extend
its good offices. The Ambassador replied that in his opinion
only a great power such as the U.S. was competent to sponsor the
negotiations which he had outlined; moreover, Afghanistan hopes
the U.S. will become permanently interested in the survival of
South Asian countries against threatened Communist domination.
(He also suggested that the U.K. might also be helpful in the
course of negotiations, if they should take place.) He said he
realized that in Afghanistan’s present state of defencelessness,
the USSR could move in militarily very easily, given a pretext
or even without one, at any time, and he again pointed to this
fact as demonstrating the necessity for complete stability,
agreement, and cooperation among the South Asian countries.
Considering the long history of U.S. efforts to promote a
settlement, and the circumstances of its termination of the
“November 6 approach” about a year ago,8 and
other factors, I told the Afghan Ambassador that while the U.S.
is always interested in the peaceful adjustment of differences
such as those between the GOA
and the GOP, I could not offer
any assurance of a renewed interest in the exercise of its good
offices, but said that I would see that his views were brought
to the attention of the Ambassador and the Department, with due
regard to those which he indicated were his personal and
unofficial opinions.
[Page 1373]
The Ambassador also made the interesting observation that since
the Security Council had been seized of the Kashmir problem, he
had never felt that he should visit Kashmir. (It will be
recalled that despite alleged GOA efforts to restrain their own tribal elements
in 1947, some of them undoubtedly participated in the Kashmir
raids.) However, he felt now that in light of recent
developments he could properly do so, and expected to go there
in October. He intimated that he would very likely be called
upon to make some public addresses, possibly at the University
in Srinagar.
