601.8991/9–652

The Chargé in India ( Taylor ) to the Department of State 1

secret
No. 686

Ref:

  • Embdesp # 368, August 22

Subject:

  • Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation with Afghan Ambassador Re Prospects of Reopening Afghan–Pakistan Negotiations.

The Embassy encloses as of possible interest to the Department a memorandum of a conversation which took place on August 31 between the Afghan Ambassador to India, His Excellency Najibullah Khan, and an officer of the Embassy. Inasmuch as this conversation appeared to reflect a somewhat more realistic attitude than formerly by the GOA toward its long-standing differences with Pakistan, the conversation has been reported in some detail.

This is the second time recently that the local Afghan representative has interviewed Embassy officers on the subject of Afghan economic and political problems, especially as they are related to the GOP. It seems likely that the economic and political pressures are becoming so serious that the GOA may be ready to renew negotiations with Pakistan, and that if arranged, negotiations may have a slightly greater prospect of success than heretofore.

With regard to the merits of the Afghan case for more extensive economic and technical assistance, the Embassy is, of course, not in a position to comment. The subject may have been brought up primarily by way of introduction to other topics which the Ambassador had on his mind.

While a number of the latter’s “official” remarks bore a marked [Page 1369] similarity to views which the Department has heard many times, the reporting officer was struck by the omission on this occasion of the repetitious and emotional circumlocution which has become almost a ritual on these occasions, and by a certain note of urgency which attended the Ambassador’s presentation of numbered points 4 and 5 in the attached memorandum, which seemed not to be just another variation on the old refrain with its occasional overtone of international blackmail, but to introduce a new and more plausible theme. This officer was also impressed by the Ambassador’s suggestion that the (heretofore perfidious) British might be helpful in promoting renewed negotiations with Pakistan. To a graduate of many weary talks on this subject, the impression was pronounced that the Afghan approach wore a “new look”. It occurred to the reporting officer that the GOA showed a certain readiness to take constructive steps on its own and not rely entirely on the interest of a third power.

It is suspected that the Ambassador’s thinking, if not that of his Government, may be colored by the following considerations: (1) Possible imminence of Soviet moves to cut off trade, with a prospect of economic collapse. (2) A conviction that Pakistan’s present internal and external problems would now render it more than usually amenable to a liquidation of difficulties on at least one of its borders, that of Afghanistan. (3) Developments in Kashmir involving the latter’s limited accession or partial autonomy within Indian territory, which might be considered by the GOA as a favorable precedent, or as an index of an advantageous talking point to be used with regard to the Pushtu-speaking areas of Pakistan. (It will be recalled that never since 1947, at least, has the GOA ceased to regard these areas as presenting a special case.) (4) Recent developments in Iran eliminate that country for the foreseeable future as a source of petroleum and other supplies (alternatively to Pakistan and Russia) and have probably reinforced Afghan dread of the growth of Communist influence on its borders.3

It is difficult to understand why this indirect channel of communication has been employed unless it is that the Afghan Government is making a concerted attempt to make an impression concurrently through our Embassy at Kabul, through this Embassy, and through its own Embassy in Washington. No other explanation comes readily to mind, except that the American Ambassador at New Delhi4 is widely known in this area as a sympathetic advocate of assistance to under-developed countries in this part of the world. It would be of interest to the Embassy to learn whether representations have been made along similar lines either directly to the Department in Washington or through the Embassy at Kabul.

[Page 1370]

Action Requested: The Department is requested to send reproduced copies of this despatch to the American Embassies in Moscow, Karachi, and London.

For the Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.
Everett F. Drumright
Counselor of Embassy (Political)

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in India ( Leach )

secret

Participants:

  • His Excellency Najibullah Khan, Ambassador of Afghanistan
  • Richard S. Leach, American Embassy

Reference:

  • Embdesp #368, August 2, 1952

Subject:

  • Afghan–Pakistan Relations

At the request of the Afghan Ambassador I called at his residence this morning and conversed almost two hours with him privately. The conversation was divided between what he said he was officially authorized to say and what he represented as his personal views, which he wished to have kept distinct. I assured him I should respect his wishes and accordingly for purposes of this record, the substance of this conversation is divided into two parts. In summary, some of the views which the Ambassador outlined as representing those of his Government, and which he hoped might be brought to the Department’s attention, were the following:

(1)

Afghanistan is disappointed at the limited amount of U.S. economic and technical assistance provided for that country believes that it can effectively absorb a much greater amount, and fears that the progress already made in Afghanistan may be jeopardized if additional assistance is not obtainable.

The Ambassador showed me a copy of a letter from the American Chargé at Kabul to the Foreign Office conveying the Department’s reasons for extending limited assistance to Afghanistan.5 He took this limitation of economic assistance as the point of departure for his ensuing remarks.

(2)
The Ambassador emphasized that Afghan economic difficulties grew out of transit trade difficulties with Pakistan whose solution demanded as a prerequisite, a political rapprochement.
(3)
Afghan economic and political life is threatened with being crushed between the upper and nether millstones of Soviet and Pakistan pressures.
(4)
The Soviets have recently made clear to the Afghan Ambassador at Moscow their displeasure over oil development plans and operations in northern Afghanistan,6 and the Afghan Government expected them to make further representations.
(5)
The Afghan Government would by no means yield to such pressure in a matter involving its own sovereignty and internal affairs, but felt certain that its rejection of the Soviet representations would be followed by drastic economic sanctions in the curtailment or even the termination of the current barter agreement between Afghanistan and the USSR, upon which Afghanistan is dependent for critically needed petrol supplies for the northern half of the country, and for other essentials. As is well known, the only practical alternative source of such supplies is from or through Pakistan.
(6)
Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot live without each other economically, politically or otherwise, and it is time that they came to a mutually advantageous understanding, to preserve stability in the area, which both countries need, and to make sure that the subcontinent does not lose the defensive frontier provided by the Hindu Kush.
(7)
Afghanistan–Pakistan differences can be negotiated and the present time is not unfavorable.
(8)
Although the GOP had not gone all the way in accepting the U.S. “November 6 approach”, the gap to be bridged was not so great that it could not be accomplished with a little assistance from the U.S.
(9)
The GOA would be glad to resume conversations on a high level with the GOP and hopes that the U.S. may be willing to take the initiative in bringing them about.
(10)
The basis proposed for a resumption of negotiations would be that the two parties should enter into them unconditionally and without prejudice to the previous positions of either Government, in the event that agreement should not result.

The role which it was hoped the U.S. would play, as the reporting officer understood it, would be (a) to provide the initiative in having the negotiations resumed and (b) to act as an “observer” and to render friendly “advice” to either party when it appeared that either was taking a wrong stand.

The second phase of the conversation, for which the Ambassador did not wish to be held accountable except on an unofficial and personal basis, reverted to conversations which he himself had had with Liaquat Ali Khan 7 in 1947 when, he said, the possibilities of economic, military and other fields of association between the two countries had been discussed. It is the Ambassador’s personal view that at the present time there is no reason why, assuming some ultimate, and not necessarily sweeping, concession by the GOP, to the idea of “freedom” or autonomy for Pushtoonistan (not defined) within the borders of Pakistan, the two countries should not proceed with very constructive [Page 1372] discussions of their respective, and mutual problems. The time is favorable because both countries now have particularly compelling reasons for doing so; Afghanistan, for the reasons already mentioned and Pakistan for the reason that it was in a parlous state internally, (he mentioned ties with East Pakistan as being very shaky), and particularly needed stability along its western borders in the face of other difficulties. He went on to say he personally believed it entirely possible, along with reaching an understanding regarding the tribal Pushtoons (who were, in fact, independent) for the GOP and the GOA to work out a complete political, economic, and defensive agreement between themselves. He believed that on this basis Afghanistan would be willing to enter into some sort of a federal scheme or confederation which would embrace all three entities, namely Afghanistan, Pushtunistan, and Pakistan. (He did not think that Pakistan’s commonwealth connection would stand in the way of an association of this sort.)

It may be mentioned here that, in the course of the conversation, which included many points which have been raised in former discussions of this subject, it was mentioned by the reporting officer that the U.S. had made a protracted but unsuccessful effort to assist in a solution between November 6, 1950 and the latter part of 1951, and it was suggested that some other impartial third power might be in a better position to extend its good offices. The Ambassador replied that in his opinion only a great power such as the U.S. was competent to sponsor the negotiations which he had outlined; moreover, Afghanistan hopes the U.S. will become permanently interested in the survival of South Asian countries against threatened Communist domination. (He also suggested that the U.K. might also be helpful in the course of negotiations, if they should take place.) He said he realized that in Afghanistan’s present state of defencelessness, the USSR could move in militarily very easily, given a pretext or even without one, at any time, and he again pointed to this fact as demonstrating the necessity for complete stability, agreement, and cooperation among the South Asian countries.

Considering the long history of U.S. efforts to promote a settlement, and the circumstances of its termination of the “November 6 approach” about a year ago,8 and other factors, I told the Afghan Ambassador that while the U.S. is always interested in the peaceful adjustment of differences such as those between the GOA and the GOP, I could not offer any assurance of a renewed interest in the exercise of its good offices, but said that I would see that his views were brought to the attention of the Ambassador and the Department, with due regard to those which he indicated were his personal and unofficial opinions.

[Page 1373]

The Ambassador also made the interesting observation that since the Security Council had been seized of the Kashmir problem, he had never felt that he should visit Kashmir. (It will be recalled that despite alleged GOA efforts to restrain their own tribal elements in 1947, some of them undoubtedly participated in the Kashmir raids.) However, he felt now that in light of recent developments he could properly do so, and expected to go there in October. He intimated that he would very likely be called upon to make some public addresses, possibly at the University in Srinagar.

  1. Copy also sent to Kabul.
  2. In despatch 368 from New Delhi, Aug. 2, Political Counselor Everett Drum-right reported on a conversation on July 19 with Najibullah Khan, the Afghan Ambassador in India. The Ambassador made the usual Afghan arguments concerning the Pushtunistan issue and complained that Pakistan was engaged in a policy of economic “strangulation” of Afghanistan. (601.8991/8–252)
  3. For documentation on the oil crisis in Iran, see volume X.
  4. Chester Bowles.
  5. This letter, which has not been found, probably repeated the reasons outlined in telegram 21 to Kabul, July 24, not printed. The Department explained that funding for economic assistance programs for several South Asian countries had been reduced for fiscal year 1953 to levels which were appreciably lower than those which had been approved for the previous year, and the reductions had to be apportioned accordingly. (889.00 TA/7–1852)
  6. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1447 ff.
  7. First Prime Minister of Pakistan.
  8. For documentation on the decision of the United States to become less actively involved in the Pushtunistan controversy, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1929 ff.