Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

689.90D/1–552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner)²

confidential

Kabul, January 2, 1952.

Participants:

• H. E. Ali Mohammad Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• John Evarts Horner, Chargé d’Affaires, American Embassy, Kabul

Place: Foreign Minister’s Office

I mentioned that my Government had been hoping for some time to detect a diminution in the volume and intensity of Afghan propaganda directed against Pakistan. Unfortunately, these hopes had not been realized, and offensive articles continued to appear. A case in point were articles published in Anis of November 29 and Islah of December 1 respecting the observation of Christian holidays in Pakistan. The plain implication in both articles was that Pakistan was unduly subservient to foreign and particularly Christian influence. Since these two newspapers are Government-owned, it was difficult to disassociate such items from official Afghan Government policy.

Ali Mohammad denied that the articles in question reflect the views of his Government. Afghanistan made no pretense of interfering in the religious policies of other Muslim countries. It knew, and accepted the fact, that in such countries as Egypt or Turkey full freedom of religion was granted to non-Muslims. Afghanistan does not follow such a policy herself but that happens to be a matter of internal policy. Ali Mohammad asked whether I had noticed the kind of anti-Afghan propaganda appearing in Pakistan. I replied that I was not assigned to Karachi and I was sure our Embassy there was doing everything it could to counsel moderation. I felt that if Afghanistan would set an example Pakistan might well respond favorably.

The Foreign Minister said that he was always ready to bring about a diminution in some of the personal invective provided Pakistan did the same. Afghanistan resented personal attacks on the King and other members of the Royal Family and was obliged to respond in kind. While he was capable of causing reduction in the intensity of Afghan propaganda, “it was impossible” to drop the pro-Pushtunistan case itself.

I asked Ali Mohammad about the so-called Hussein–Majid agreement.³ He replied that no agreement had been reached. Abdul Majid had spent three days in Karachi discussing all aspects of Pakistan–Afghanistan differences. No conclusion had been arrived at other than that the Afghan Delegate to the General Assembly, Prince Mohammad Naim, would continue these same discussions with Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. I asked Ali Mohammad whether he thought Abdul Majid’s visit had brought the two countries any closer together. He replied that he felt no special surge of optimism, and his only suggestion was that Pakistan should be urged to accept unequivocally our November 6 approach.⁴ I remarked that my Government now considered the November 6 approach to be a dead issue, had no further proposals to make, and felt it was up to the two countries concerned to negotiate directly in a spirit of reasonableness.

2. Memorandum transmitted with covering despatch 229 from Kabul, Jan. 5, 1952.
3. In telegram 525 from Karachi, Nov. 15, 1951, it was reported that Abdul Majid, former Afghan Minister of National Economy, met in Karachi that day with Mahmud Hussain, Acting Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Majid and Hussain agreed that the propaganda exacerbating the Pushtunistan issue should be gradually decreased over a period of 3 months, at the end of which time ambassadors would be exchanged between Karachi and Kabul and discussions on Pushtunistan and other issues would begin. (689.90D/11–1551)

4. On Nov. 6, 1950, the United States had approached the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan with an expression of concern over the tension between the two and an offer to act as an informal “go-between” in seeking agreement by the two governments to the following four points:

   1. To cease attacks upon one another by officials or through official channels and to use their best efforts to prevent such attacks in the press or from other nonofficial sources.

   2. To use their influence to prevent incidents among the tribes which were likely to affect good relations between the two governments. The two governments would further agree that if, despite their efforts, incidents did occur, they would consult together through diplomatic channels and avoid public statements on such incidents.

   3. To exchange ambassadors within two months.

   4. To designate representatives to meet within three months for informal, exploratory discussions of their differences without a previously agreed agenda or stated preconditions. The two governments would further agree that there should be no publicity concerning these discussions without prior agreement between them.

   For the Department’s instructions concerning this approach, see telegram 117 to Kabul, Nov. 2, 1950, in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1455.

   The four points were quickly accepted with minor alterations by the Government of Afghanistan, but the Government of Pakistan declined to accept them as a basis for discussions.