357.AB/3–954: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth) to the Department of State1
708. Reference Deptel 728.2 Embassy in agreement with Graham estimate that GOI and GOP will not be able agree on plebiscite administrator by April 30; Pakistan officials seem in almost unanimous agreement this view. In absence agreement on plebiscite administrator GOP approach to SC would seem inevitable but Embassy believes from conversations Karachi Pakistanis will not make approach until after deadline. Officials stated privately to Embassy officers that for sake Pakistan position world opinion they must give August agreement every possibility implementation althouh they state flatly such implementation impossible as result Nehru’s stand.
Zafrulla’s statement that Pakistanis would not countenance removal US observers from UN team presages Pakistan’s last ditch stand on Graham should, as seems likely to us in Karachi, Nehru attempt exclude Graham from negotiations. Pakistan likely to be insistent last Graham report be considered by SC, stating they have in good faith initiated direct Ali–Nehru discussions but events subsequent to initiation those discussions, including ouster of Abdullah, Nehru’s present stand on Kashmir and Nehru’s refusal meet Ali again have resulted in stalemate which can only be solved by SC. Strongly-held Pakistan view is Nehru’s stand prompted by desire escape previous commitments with possible attempt on part Nehru withdraw case from SC.
Embassy believes and this confirmed by Foreign Minister, Ayub, other officials approach to SC inevitable. Pakistanis watching with interest Nehru’s action on US observers. Should Nehru officially insist that Council withdraw US observers, this would bring issue up before Pakistanis feel that they could rightly do so themselves. Embassy believes that Pakistanis would not be unhappy if Nehru brings up issue.
From Pakistan’s point of view, effect SC consideration issue this spring would depend entirely on tone of discussions. Foreign Office official stated to Embassy officer privately that he foresaw Soviet veto any resolution damaging to Indians, giving Indians advantage in not having to accept or reject any such resolution. Added, and Embassy concurs, that with no plebiscite administrator and in view possible Nehru rejection Graham continued mediation, dispute back where it was immediately after cease-fire but with essential difference that Indians (and Communists) have consolidated their position in Kashmir.
Only Pakistani officials found reasonably optimistic have been Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub, and Adjutant General, Sher Ali, both of whom have told US officials in last few weeks that they had [Page 1341] advocated patience to their civilian colleagues. Both stated that beside the religious element, other elements ensure ultimate Kashmir junction with Pakistan. General Ayub in discussion with Embassy officer stated it up to army to prevent any precipitate armed action in Kashmir, that he able stop any possible tribal incursion and that he intended do so, should the tribes get restive.
As reported before, Embassy convinced US arms assistance will not lead to GOP attempt reach military decision in Kashmir but it obvious that as result arms assistance promise, Pakistanis feel they in better bargaining position. They feel also that Nehru has weakened his own position in eyes of world on Kashmir. Nevertheless, they remain as in past, pessimistic.