690D.91/4–2853
Paul G. Hoffman to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: In the cables which I sent you from India and Pakistan I tried to give you a running account of what transpired. [Page 1320] The significant development was, of course, the agreement of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations on a “neighbor to neighbor” basis for the resolution of all important issues in dispute between their countries and to persist in these negotiations until a mutually satisfactory settlement had been reached. It is not clear as to whether the United States can take further action to facilitate these negotiations, but on the assumption that an opportunity might arise, I thought it would be in order for me to supplement the information already given by offering my impressions of the personalities of the individuals who will be the principal participants in these negotiations.
Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, is young, without experience as the head of the State, but a man of action and of great zeal to serve his country well. He can be counted upon to negotiate in good faith, to go more than half way, in fact, in trying to work out a settlement. Furthermore, he recognizes that the settlement of the issues between Pakistan and India is an essential condition to the success of his administration. One action must be taken by the U.S.A. in order to insure the support of his own countrymen and that is the effecting of some arrangement whereby shipment of sufficient wheat can be made in order to prevent famine.
The three men to whom the Prime Minister will, in my opinion, turn for counsel are the Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, the Minister of Finance, Mohammed Ali, and in a more limited way, the Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan. All three can, I believe, be counted upon to support the Prime Minister, both in his efforts to arrive at a settlement and in obtaining acceptance of a settlement when once reached. Perhaps it is worth knowing that these gentlemen feel that prompt action in meeting the famine is necessary to insure stability to the new regime.
Jawahrlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, as everyone knows, is a complicated person. He is supersensitive both as to himself and his country, rather ready to take offense at what he considers a slight, even though one is not intended. He believes that as the undisputed leader of the largest free state in Asia, his counsel should be sought by the U.N., U.S.A., and U.K. before important policy decisions are made. As one of his ministers told me, “You don’t need to follow his advice, but you should ask for it.” This supersensitiveness also affects Nehru’s attitude toward foreign aid. He recognizes the rather desperate need for help but he will not be a supplicant. He will welcome aid but only if it comes to India as an equal among equals.
Nehru’s attitude toward Communism is worth knowing. He is under no illusions about it, recognizing both its limitations and the menace [Page 1321] it carries for all free people. His recognition of how little Communism has brought to people was made clear by a remark he made to me in commenting upon the progress Russia had made both in achieving a somewhat higher standard of living and in promoting literacy. The remark was, “At what a cost.” He is fully aware of the drive the Communists are making to take over India, but he is confident that they will not succeed. Most notable to me is the fact that he is completely unafraid. This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that there is no trace of appeasement in his attitude toward the Kremlin.
Like most of the Asians I have met, Nehru feels that “New China” should be admitted into the United Nations. He understands that this is not possible now because of China’s action in initiating an undeclared war against the U.N., but he feels that until a situation develops which permits such recognition, it will be difficult to lead Asia to peace. While Nehru did not say so in so many words, I gathered the impression that he felt that the Russian strategy for the past few years has been directed toward keeping China out of the U.N. on the theory that China would thus be left without friends and would become more and more dependent upon Moscow. In view of Nehru’s attitude about the admission of “New China” into the U.N., the relations of the U.S. to the Government of Formosa are a complicating factor.
The attitude of Nehru’s which holds the most promise from the standpoint of success in the forthcoming negotiations is his attitude toward peace. He not only has a passion for peace, but an acute consciousness of his own responsibility toward helping to bring it about. The most potent argument I found in my efforts to persuade him that he had to put his mind and heart into solving the differences between India and Pakistan was that only by so doing could he adequately meet his responsibilities as a world leader in the drive for peace.
In endeavoring to persuade Nehru that time was of the essence in arriving at a settlement, I stressed that this is one of those fluid moments when prompt and vigorous action on the part of the world’s leaders can be of historic significance.
I am deeply appreciative for your having given me the opportunity to try to be of service to you.1
Sincerely yours,
Secretary Dulles replied on May 7 as follows:
“I have your very informative and interesting comments about your recent trip to India and Pakistan. Please let me express my warm appreciation for your most helpful efforts. It has been of tremendous value to me to be able to draw upon not only your breadth of experience and sensitive perception but also the immediate knowledge which comes from your visit.
“The President joins me in this note of thanks.” (690D.91/5–753)
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