690D.91/11–2452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India1

secret

1574. Re Kashmir urtel 2172 Nov 24.

1.
We appreciate your info re unlikelihood GOI acceptance SC res and your suggestions re possible SC action which in your opinion wld receive more favorable GOI reaction. However we believe this res is the only logical and useful step which might lead to agreement on demilitarization program pursuant to parties’ own undertakings in UNCIP res. Whether or not Indian reaction to our res is govt-inspired we believe that Indian decision to reach any agreement is in the last analysis responsibility Nehru personally and therefore it is essential res which comes out of SC debate is one the logic and intent of which Nehru understands.
2.
Because of our estimate of our res as only logical and useful step which SC can take at this time we cannot agree to course of action which you suggest even although it has its attractions. Tactically it wld be dangerous in Council for us withdraw support of res we have now tabled, and table res along lines you now suggest. As you know we have held all along it is important that UK be in forefront in settling this dispute. For us as co-sponsor now to “back out” on res which has presently been tabled and about which Jebb has spoken wld be to bring strong reaction from UK and jeopardize cooperation on future course of action in Kashmir. We cld also expect violent reaction from Paks and quite likely some raised eyebrows from other members of SC whose contd support we need in this case. For these reasons we also cannot fol your suggested alternative course, namely that we withdraw so far as possible from position of initiative in case. We intend to be moderate and impartial in debate.
3.
As you know per Deptels 13532 and 15103 we now have in mind possibility taking Kashmir case to GA if at end 30 day negot period agreement or evidence of progress toward agreement not forthcoming from parties. Obviously final decision whether or not to take case to GA will have to be made at end of negot period. As indicated in Deptel 1510 both parties are opposed to idea of case going to GA but as we [Page 1310] see it if parties cannot agree on nature and nr of troops we must either get much wider internatl support from other UN members for continuing to require parties to negotiate on basis their previous undertakings or start upon possibly radically different lines of negot. If this latter step is to be set before parties it can best be done as result of GA debate rather than by further SC resolutions or direct intervention by US, UK or other friendly powers. In our opinion GA recommendation on new course of action for parties wld be best face-saving device for both GOI and GOP to shift to something more likely to lead to settlement Kashmir question.
4.
Awaiting with interest report your conversation with Nehru accordance Deptel 1510.
Bruce
  1. This telegram was repeated for information to New York and Karachi.
  2. The same as telegram 682 to Karachi, Nov. 5, p. 1298.
  3. Dated Nov. 20, p. 1304.