690D.91/11–2052: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India1

secret
priority

1510. For Amb from Hickerson and Byroade.

1.
Greatly appreciate urtel 2063 Nov 17 re Kashmir. Dept has given most careful consideration to Embtels recd before and after res placed before SC. Conflicting interests of India and Pak and our basic policy of attempting help both parties without siding with either made necessary decision to support res.
2.
As stated Deptel 1363 Nov 62 Dept had been working in consultation with UK for weeks in effort evolve res which wld meet honest and fundamental conviction each party it morally and legally right and at same time wld provide basis for contd negots leading ultimately settlement acceptable both govts. Dept convinced that given sincere desire settlement by both parties res as tabled offers opportunity and instrument for agreement.
3.
Re reactions of parties to provisions res we believe explanation opposition 30 day time limit is obvious: neither party wishes matter go to GA. GOP fears it will not get sufficient understanding support its position which thus might lead other UN members to recommend partition or solution other than thru UNCIP res. GOI does not wish to face embarrassment thru discussion its record in Kashmir particularly when it so vigorously seeking lead role this GA on such matters as Korea and SoAfr.
4.
Re GOP objection to suggested negot role for Graham during proposed 30 day period we believe of utmost importance emphasis be placed at this stage on direct negot between parties. This does not preclude Graham’s undertaking any initiative parties encourage him undertake. He has already indicated he will indicate his availability to parties immed after passage res. We had hitherto assumed Indians were inclined to direct negots and accordingly wld find no objection this provision.
5.
Re GOI objection that res ignores Pak alleged aggression wld call attention to fact that present res based upon and entirely consonant with UNCIP resolutions which were accepted by both parties and in which ref to aggression was avoided. Re GOI objection that res gives parity of status to Pak in dispute and ignores Ind responsibility re Kashmir security we believe GOI knows res does not ignore these pts and remains entirely faithful UNCIP resolutions because it contains specific ref to principles of criteria contained para 7 of UNRep’s proposal of 4 Sep 19523 which include security of state.
6.
Operative part of res is based on Graham’s proposals of July 16 and Sep 4. Proposals were conscientiously set forth with full appreciation of Ind views and in our opinion they do nothing to prejudice whatever may be GOI’s rights under UNCIP resolutions. Res does not seek equate GOP and GOI rights in Kashmir. Those rights such as they may be were established by parties themselves in UNCIP resolutions. SC has endorsed these resolutions and has scrupulously attempted leave parties’ respective roles in Kashmir to mutual agreement. GOI’s claim to responsibility Kashmir security and its objections to apparent failure draft res to clarify character of forces are covered by ref in res to Graham’s proposals of Sept 4 relating to criteria for establishing nr and nature of forces. As for Ind concern no Pak troops shall remain during plebiscite GOP has already undertaken in UNCIP resolutions assure this will not be case and nobody, not even GOP, advocating any Pak troops remain either by public statement or by implication res. What UK has proposed and what we intend to support in statement before SC is that in our joint view best way assuring law and order in Pak-held Kashmir will be to use Azad–Kashmir armed forces. We believe that GOI in insisting on only “civil armed forces” shld know that under such circumstances there wld be grave danger plebiscite cld not be held because of chaotic conditions which wld exist in Azad–Kashmir as result of absence organized law enforcement machinery.
7.
Initial mild press reaction to res followed later by violent attacks on res and on Jebb indicate as does Embtel 20284 such reaction obviously inspired by GOI. Text of Jebb statement conciliatory. (Text being airmailed to you.) In our opinion to consider it as breach of solemn agreements between UN and Pak and India is unreasonable. Res has no implications beyond clear language of text and in no way departs from our previous approach of patient understanding.
8.
Re Graham’s terms of ref we wish recall Deptel 2431 May 3 particularly para 5. Wld like repeat that we believe your understanding in urtel 15135 re Graham’s powers under Mar 30, 1951 res correct. We believe however that only Graham in position determine when he [Page 1306]may wish exercise powers, other than those relating to demilitarization assigned him Mar 30, 1951 Res. He is not unmindful these powers. We believe it wld be most unwise for SC at this time indicate its concern that Graham has not exercised these powers or direct him do so.
9.
Res does not prevent parties from agreeing on another solution. Either party cld have advanced proposals to other at almost any time during years dispute has been before SC, as we understand Graham hoped they wld.
10.
Dept is not unaware of advantages partition. However Pak wld not accept any proposals which it considered as only a maneuver by India to escape from its commitments under UNCIP resolutions and will not put aside UNCIP resolutions unless there is something concrete to replace them.
11.
Dept considers Nehru key figure in settlement Kashmir issue. Until he is willing make some agreement there of course can be none. When he indicates a sincere desire to make settlement it probably will follow.
12.
Pls therefore at your discretion discuss Kashmir question with Nehru. Explain why we have supported res and that it in no way strikes at Ind position but was intended as means helping India and Pak arrive at agreement. Ask him whether he wants settlement which wld give due weight to claims and sensibilities of weaker Pak nation and whether he is willing work for such settlement. In this connection you might mention GOI’s concern over increasing instability in Pak which was subj Embtel 1103 Sept 13.6 Some move by Nehru making possible progress on Kashmir case wld be of help to Govt at Karachi in maintaining peace and stability. If Nehru desires a settlement and is willing work for it Dept wld suggest you press him instruct his reps in New York at UN approach Pak Del directly to make their proposals.
13.
Dept also suggests you discuss Kashmir issue with UK HICOM in terms of asking him urge Nehru discuss with Paks any proposals he might have in mind.
Bruce
  1. This telegram was repeated to New York.
  2. Not printed.
  3. UN doc. S/2783.
  4. Dated Nov. 13, p. 1299.
  5. Dated Oct. 9, p. 1293.
  6. Not printed.