Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/10–1852: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

secret

New York, October 18, 1952—5:42 p.m.

359. Re: Kashmir. At Pak request Gross, Ross and Hyde lunched with Zafrulla Khan and Bokhari to discuss Kash.

1. Zafrulla opened conversation by asking what Gross now wanted him to do re Kash case. Zafrulla felt his policy has proved largely a failure. While he did not press on shortness of time, he felt that time was short to arrive at settlement.

2. Going on to specific aspects of case, he feels Graham worked hard in most recent phases, that he is entirely fair and unprejudiced, that he kept Ayyangar from freezing position in Geneva and that he should be continued. Zafrulla discussed in detail his private conversations with Ayyangar. In answer to question he stated it was not fair to say that Ayyangar was not in a negotiating position. However, he was very limited in that Nehru keeps a short rein. He feels that any further negotiations to be meaningful should be at ministerial level and that any SC res should so provide.

3. Zafrulla emphasized that Indian arguments on security of state as test for determining number of Indian troops to remain in Kash is an attempt to go behind UNCIP resolutions which put to one side all legal questions about accession.

4. Zafrulla sees as basis for SC res strong unequivocal approval by SC of Graham’s Sept 2 proposals on troop figures: A request to parties to negotiate with Graham; negotiations at ministerial level to be held at UN headquarters and not on subcontinent. While a deadline or time limit would have some political advantage to Paks at home, Zafrulla did not attach any particular importance to this in a SC res. He felt we should state in SC discussion opinion that Graham has more than a mediator’s powers but not attempt so to provide by res. However, by this Zafrulla did not mean that Graham should be encouraged in any way, certainly not at this stage, to open question of partition which he feels involves problems somewhat beyond Graham’s capabilities.

As to tactics, Zafrulla would prefer not to have any mtg of SC until there is general agreement with US and UK on a type of res which he would hope would be along lines mentioned. Zafrulla feels that Nehru has never really opposed world public opinion as contained in SC resolutions and that he would not do so now. He argued strongly that there was no real danger of Indians completely disregarding such a res.

We discussed possibility of SC res containing recommendation that alternatively parties agree on troop figures or on criteria recommended by Graham, these being clarified in SC discussion. Zafrulla felt that a recommendation to agree on criteria would introduce an intermediate step that might extend discussions for another two years. On other hand, if SC were to suggest concrete figures with Graham continuing negotiations, he thought that could lead to one of two compromise formulas that would settle this issue.

(a) The possibility of taking existing figures recommended by Graham with understanding that PlebAd has power to reduce number of forces in any area when he comes into office. In this connection Zafrulla would insist on interpretation of disposition in this sense.

(b) Other possibility would be to agree on lower original figures with understanding that PlebAd by reason of term disposition would have merely right to direct location of troops during plebiscite period. This is in accordance with report of Zafrulla’s conversation with Salisbury reported in London’s 2155 of Oct 13.¹

5. There was general discussion of partition. Zafrulla pointed out that term can mean any one of number of things. If by partition is intended a division of Kash along cease-fire line, that obviously would be intolerable for Pak because it would be surrender of vale.

On other hand, Zafrulla recognizes that after appointment of Pleb-Ad question may arise on what basis a plebiscite should be held. It might be state-wide or it might be provincial. He cld conceive of possibility of partition with plebiscite in valley. However, he and Bokhari warned that in their opinion a plebiscite in valley could only be held if PlebAd was in position to get substantially all Indian troops out of valley during plebiscite. That might possibly involve other UN troops in their place.

Zafrulla was drawn in his discussion with Ayyangar to say that he did not conceive of a plebiscite necessarily being on a state-wide basis and added that these questions would arise only after appointment of PlebAd.

Zafrulla warned that general discussions of partition except in context mentioned immediately above are an entirely new approach that discards all areas of agreement thus far reached and for that reason involves real dangers.

6. There was discussion of Sheik Abdulla’s role and possible Sov attitude toward SC res. For reasons stated, Zafrulla was not concerned with possibility of Sov veto because he feels moral effect of res on Indians would be substantially as great even with a veto. We frankly discussed possibilities of taking case to GA after such a veto and for familiar reasons Zafrulla was opposed on theory that it is too difficult to educate GA members and there would be ten resolutions proposing solutions which cannot be as effectively handled in GA as in SC. Zafrulla and Bokhari feel that Abdulla is playing a lone hand with clear Communist tendencies and they mentioned his activities as creating in Kash a weak point on subcontinent’s perimeter allowing Communist infiltration. They feel that policy of Abdulla has become increasingly dangerous and added to difficulty of settling Kash issue.

7. In conclusion Zafrulla feels that even though troop quantum is an artificial objection by Indians, who really do not desire to settle case but let it drag on, this troop issue can be settled. We should scale this peak of Himalayas and not despair at higher ones beyond. He recalled that this dispute can affect the broadest interests of Pak and of US in that whole area of world.

Gross commented that US is determined to move on in every practical way toward facilitating settlement. We feel Graham can continue to be useful; we shall confer immediately with UK and discuss issue further with Paks.

Austin

1. Not printed.