Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

357.AB/4–2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

secret

New Delhi, April 28, 1952—8 p.m.

3976. Two recent conversations with Bajpai on Kashmir. First just before publication Graham report, second this morning.

First conversation as follows:

1. Bajpai stated he had just recd cable from GOI rep SC stating that at private luncheon Marin on confidential basis had stated it clear to him overall plebiscite was impractical and wld never lead to agreement and strongly implied Graham agreed with this.

2. Bajpai stated this reassuring to GOI but cld not make it jibe with other info they had recd since Graham’s departure from subcontinent which indicated that he interested only in continuing talks on former basis.

3. Bajpai said GOI wld probably not stand in way of Graham’s returning subcontinent even though basis his return seemed indicate no hope for agreement. Bajpai said GOI had no desire take onus for breakdown of negotiations.

4. However, Bajpai said it his conviction that any negotiations limited to problem demilitarization wld simply mean continued beating of dead horse, that it shld be clear by now it was most unlikely either GOI or GOP cld compromise far enough to allow agreement in this narrow concept, and he again wanted make it clear if there was ever to be agreement on Kashmir in his opinion it wld be based on partition and plebiscite in valley.

5. Bajpai further stated:

a. Three zonal plebiscites wld eliminate certainty of bitter minorities such as Azad Kashmir or Jammu attempting undermine overall plebiscite winner. However, zonal plebiscite idea wld not ease disagreement over question quantum of forces which was heart of issue. For this reason he strongly favored giving Azad Kashmir outright to Pakistan and giving Jammu outright to India. He stated this wld substantially reduce number troops needed defend passes into valley. He further stated Ladak region eastern Kashmir might present special problem since it Buddhist, ardently anti-Pakistan and inclined under best of circumstances towards Tibet, but that area thinly settled and some solution probably cld be developed.

b. Bajpai said frankly GOI had not thought through exactly what they wld agree to do if partition proposal was opened up but that as soon as Graham had made statement to SC he wld urge Prime Minister and his associates hammer out position which wld enable GOI, in Bajpai’s words, “to really talk turkey” provided Graham were given broader terms reference to open up partition angle.

Second conversation this morning followed publication of full Graham report in all Delhi newspapers over weekend. Bajpai expressed deep disappointment that Graham had not opened door for broader discussion and had implied that further negotiations shld continue along previous lines. Bajpai reiterated that for obvious reasons GOI did not want to be in position of opposing any negotiations but that in his opinion nothing cld possibly come out of a continuing discussion unless question of partition cld be opened up.

He then referred to my previous criticism of GOI attitude on the negotiations, i.e. that they were very clear on what they wld not agree to but that they were not yet specific on what they wld agree to do except for their frequently expressed belief that plebiscite shld be confined to the valley. He said I was quite right, that the quantum of the forces wld still remain to be decided and that GOI must make up its mind exactly how far it wld go. He stated that he had opened up this whole question with Nehru who in turn brought up the problem of Sheikh Abdullah. Bajpai said no one has any real knowledge of what Abdullah is trying to accomplish beyond the suspicion that he wld like to develop an independent state. Bajpai said they had reports that several of the Communist and fellow traveler associates of Abdullah had regained their position of influence. However, he emphasized this was pure rumor and no one really knew. Bajpai said Nehru said Abdullah shld be asked to come to Delhi to talk out whole problem. He said Abdullah had been consistently stating he favored plebiscite and that they believed he wld agree to the partition but that they had not fully checked this angle with him. He said that Nehru wld return Wednesday night and he wld see him Thursday morning and do all he cld to establish clear cut GOI position on whole situation. He said that whether or not Abdullah was willing to participate in such a discussion and regardless of Abdullah’s views, GOI must be a lot more clear than they are at present.

As result of these and previous conversations I wld like to add fol thoughts.

1. From the beginning of my discussions with GOI they have consistently held to their view that only practical solution lies through partition. This did not come out in Dec conversations but I forced it out just before leaving for States in Jan by stating I cld not recommend to my govt that Graham shld come back unless I felt there was very real hope that problem cld be solved.

2. For some reason or other this angle on which our entire hope for agreement here rests was not discussed with Graham and hence he was unprepared when Bajpai at Nehru’s instruction opened the question of partition a few days before Graham left New York.

3. At that time Graham did not feel he cld go beyond his terms of reference but he told me he felt partition angle was the most likely means of getting settlement and that he intended to go to the SC ask for broader powers and then to open up whole question on basis which promised real solution.

4. For some reason this tentative plan seemed to have fallen through but in any event the situation remains as of the last four months, i.e., that GOI is anxious in theory at least to discuss a settlement of the Kashmir problem on basis of partition and that Bajpai has stated in his opinion such approach wld enable GOI to substantially reduce their forces.

5. Clearly Graham can not come back with broader terms of reference granted by SC unless Pak agrees. If it refuses the suggestion that Graham return with one final try with no restraint on how he handle the discussions then obviously there is no sense in seeking to change his terms of reference. If, however, it appears Pakistan wld agree to one final broad discussion of the problem with Graham granted the same opportunity Dixon was granted, I believe we shld put the situation on ice for few days until I have chance to find out what GOI will really do. If, as I believe, GOI really wants to settle this question, I am in strong position if I tell them I can not recommend to my govt that Graham come back unless I am convinced they have thought through the problem and really intend to present Graham with reasonable proposal that has good chance of being accepted by Pakistan. I can not be sure, but believe I have reasonable chance of getting to do this. If I can not get them come to grips with problem or if for any reason we can not get the partition angle discussed there seems no future basis for negotiation at this time.

6. Any thought, in my opinion, that Graham can come back again, fail again, and then go back to SC for broader powers is mistaken. The five newspapers here yesterday were unanimous in calling Graham’s mission a failure. Statesman was reasonably moderate. The other four, three of which are good friends, stated that clearly UN approach is failure. However, I still have strong hope that Kashmir situation can be settled if we will face up to need of securing broader terms of reference for Graham either through SC action or a clear understanding with Graham himself that he is free to open up the problem as a private citizen and also provided we can get GOI in advance to make up its own mind on what it will do when the chips are down. On any other basis believe Graham is wasting his time by returning to the subcontinent.

Bowles