357.AB/4–952: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State1
1165. Ref Embtel 1154 Apr 7, 10 p.m. FonMin yesterday afternoon called separately UK Acting HICOM and myself to say he had now [Page 1220] studied carefully language of suggestion left with him day before by UK which was substantially the same as oral statement I made to him later that afternoon (ref Deptel 1017 [1018] Apr 5). He took exception to the language in para one (UK “A”) and said that it is almost exact opposite of what he has advocated. He had favored Graham’s contd presence in the subcontinent provided he “came to grips with the problem” and had suggested desirability of his return from Geneva provided he wld bring with him a mil advisor and present specific proposals on which SC might take a decision.
Zafrulla then repeated to me substance of his conversations with Graham in Karachi to effect that since no specific proposals had been submitted to Paks, it was assumed none had been presented to GOI. Paks had agreed to Graham’s 12 points and in their last conv at the Gov Gen’s luncheon, with Mohammad Ali present, they deferred to Graham’s judgment on desirability of GOI-Pak mtg at ministerial level.
When no action was forthcoming, they assumed Graham must acknowledge failure, so Gov Gen and the PriMin had called confs of provincial governors and chief mins to consider what action Pak shld take to protect its interest and satisfy its public opinion. These confs are now in session in Karachi. Zafrulla said shld he appear before them and advocate contd negots without clear prospect of decision, his policy of cooperation with UN wld certainly be repudiated.
In his conv with UK acting High Comm, Zafrulla made practically same statements and requested clarification of para A of the UK’s démarche.
The sharp difference in the FonMin’s attitude on Apr 7 (ref my 1154 Apr 7, 10 p.m.) and his demand for clarification of language yesterday reflects in my opinion result of convs he must have had earlier yesterday afternoon with some of his colleagues. He told me he had mentioned to the PriMin fact that UK and US had presented a suggestion for resumption of convs in NY prior to submission of Graham’s report and that PriMin had been so busy with the Constituent Assembly, the governors conf and the provincial PriMin’s conf that he had been unable to fix a date for a more considered discussion of the proposal. I have a feeling that he may have discussed question also with Mohammad Ali whose attitude towards contd negot has been sharply negative.
When I asked Zafrulla if I might review again what he had said to me yesterday, he confirmed the accuracy of my memory but reiterated that before he will go before the Cab, language of the Anglo-Amer approach must be sharply altered. Naturally he offered no suggestions aside from a review of his convs with Graham. From them I inferred he is trying to maneuver Brit and ourselves into an intimation of support for a move to force consideration of Graham’s last four points to which Paks have agreed but which GOI has not accepted.
[Page 1221]Fact that 24 hours elapse between my conv with him Apr 7, for which I had prepared him by an earlier conv with the FonSecy who talked with him before I went to see him, and our conv of yesterday afternoon in which he revealed a radical change of attitude, indicates to me he has been advised either by PriMin or by Mohammad Ali that the Cab may repudiate his suggestion for further discussion with Graham and that his threat to resign may possibly receive some consideration if Paks in their frustration have to find a scapegoat.
If Dept and UK can consider a rephrasing of para one of the msg to put it more in line with Zafrulla’s suggestion that Graham continue his convs by presenting specific proposals to both countries which might be accepted or rejected, and thereby provide the SC with a basis for decision, I believe his present sense of distress at what he considers a misquotation may be overcome.
- This telegram was repeated for information to London.↩