Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

357.AB/3–2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Geneva¹

secret
niact

Washington, March 27, 1952—7:10 p.m.

732. Re Kashmir re Karachi’s 1085 to Dept² and Dept’s 937 to Karachi rptd to Geneva as Deptel 733.³

AmConsul is instructed as matter of urgency to contact Dr. Frank Graham, UN Rep for India and Pakistan who is now in Geneva and hand him copy this tel and paraphrased copies reftels.

(1) Re Karachi’s 1085 Dept views Zafrulla’s comments to Amb Warren as encouraging development fol apparently serious cabinet crisis past weekend resulting from disappointment over apparent lack of agreement re Kashmir and Graham’s departure Karachi. Consequently we believe it of utmost importance, if at all consistent with his thinking, that Graham take some further steps re Kashmir to encourage possible bargaining by parties which we believe parties may now be prepared enter into;

(2) Dept’s 937 to Karachi indicates our suggestions re possible specific proposals which Graham might make to both parties. We suggest that he consider simultaneous communication such proposals or any alternative ones he believes preferable to both govts. Such communication might be made now or as part of suggested procedure in fol para;

(3) Another course of action which Graham might pursue wld be to indicate now to both parties he drafting his report and is planning return to subcontinent to present draft report to both parties for their comments. Such draft report might contain his specific proposals re quantum of troops. Such announcement now and indication that report wld be in draft only wld serve as sound ground for further negots with both parties either by Graham’s returning to subcontinent or communicating with them from Geneva. Important thing is that indication is made of opportunity for further negots prior to SC debate;

(4) We suggest means for continuing negots wld be for Graham address communication to Pres SC before Mar 31 at same time he informing parties per para 2 stating he preparing report per SC members request, but there are certain matters arising out his draft report which he thinks it desirable to discuss further with two govts and trusts SC will see no objection his deferring submission report. Mar 31 deadline suggested since Pak Rep becomes Pres SC Apr 1 and receipt such note might be embarrassing;

(5) In order further negots may be made possible we believe that Graham wld be wise request Indian Govt as matter of utmost importance that he be released of obligation of confidence to GOI re any proposals or concessions which they may have made;

(6) If Graham decides return subcontinent we believe it desirable he have mil adviser and believe decision who mil adviser will be is for Graham to make in light his understanding views of parties. Possible advantage Devers returning is that, if GOP prepared to make any concession on ratio or quantum troops, Devers might serve as face saving device; Devers presence might however antagonize GOI. Dept will render such assistance as possible re this matter on Graham’s request.

(7) Re possible mtg of parties, we believe in view Zafrulla’s statement his country’s willingness consider mtg two PMs, Graham may wish seriously reassess feasibility desirability mtg of parties at some appropriate level;

(8) Our Brit colleagues have indicated to us apparent serious concern, which we do not share, that Graham may be inclined discuss partition proposals either with parties or in report to SC. They believe such discussions at this stage wld be diversionary from main pt negots namely quantum troops. We believe it wise pt out that discussion partition in report, if not agreeable both parties, wld probably cause violent debate in Council particularly between parties. We presume Graham will appreciate necessity that such agreement as indicated in report, is understood and accepted both parties prior to SC debate. Devers experience shld be sufficient underscore this pt. If there any uncertainty re area of agreement it will surely be brought out in SC debate with advantage only to Sov Union. Graham, we trust, is also mindful any recommendations which he may make and which may require SC res may provoke Sov veto. Hench recommendations might best be presented in manner least likely invite veto and most likely be carried out by parties if veto shld occur.

(9) We wish underscore Zafrulla’s indication GOP places no significance to Mar 31 deadline for Graham’s report. We convinced that SC debate on his report can be postponed pending further negots. Accordingly Graham shld not feel that obligation to report by Apr 1 outweighs desirability last minute negots.

(10) We prepared as indicated Deptel 937 to Karachi to give such parallel diplomatic support in Karachi and Delhi as he may believe wise. We are in constant communication with Brit colleagues on such possible courses of action.

(11) Dept prepared to consider assigning an officer familiar with this problem to Geneva to maintain contact with him if Graham so desires.

FYI You are instructed to communicate Graham’s reactions to above and to reftels and you are to keep in close touch with your Brit colleague for possible future joint action. London pls communicate info this tel to FonOff.

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated to London and for information to Karachi, New Delhi, and New York.
2. Supra.
3. Dated Mar. 24, p. 1204.