357.AB/3–2252: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State1
1052. 1. Under Cab instrs resulting from a mtg that lasted late last nite the FonMin sent for the UK HICOM2 and me separately today and expressed in almost identical language, the Pak Govt’s sense of bitterness and frustration at the failure of Graham’s present mission to the subcontinent. The UK HICOM read to me his draft of the interview including his advice to Zafrulla.
2. After Zafrulla’s conv with me yesterday as reported in mytel 1042,3 he attended a Cab mtg at the Gov Gen’s house and reported that Graham proposed to leave Pak in a few days for Geneva there to prepare a report for the SC to the effect that there was no agreement between India and Pak on the minimum nbr of troops to be held by each side in Kashmir to insure conditions for a fair pleb. As a consequence it had not been possible to proceed to consideration of the remaining point in Graham’s proposal, that is the installation of the pleb admin in Kashmir. FonMin told the Cab that Graham had come out to the subcontinent without his mil advisor and was accompanied by an undistinguished group of assistants, that he had not made any specific proposals and the time had been wasted. He recalled to the Cab that Pak had agreed to this present visit of Graham’s only on the insistence of Lord Ismay. The Cab’s reaction to this report was violent. They said that Pak has been “tricked”.
3. The FonMin then said that as he had advocated recourse to the SC for the resolution of the Kashmir problem and as his efforts had proved to be futile and as the SC seemed unable thru its agent to bridge the gap of differences between Pak and India, it appeared that he shld confess the failure of his policy by tendering his resignation as FonMin. What the public reaction wld be shld his resignation be accepted cld not be surmised but the Cab agreed with him that if he were to resign Pak public opinion might force the resignation of the Cab and face the country with a grave crisis.
[Page 1202]4. Some members of the Cab in the heat of discussion advocated Pak’s immed withdrawal from the commonwealth of nations. They said that their presence in the commonwealth prevented them from taking the water rights dispute with India to the Internatl Court of Justice and they might do better if they were “on their own”.
5. The US came in for sharp criticism on the grounds that the present Amer policy in India is more than conciliatory while the US has never shown any marked preference for Pak’s goodwill altho Pak reps in internatl bodies have almost uniformly aided the US in voting and advocating the Amer point of view on critical conditions.
6. The Cab finally decided that the FonMin shld call in the UK HICOM and myself and request that we inform our govts of the grave sitn that will arise when the Graham report is presented to the SC and the Govt of Pak must inform its people of the position as it sees it. The FonMin was to recommend to each of us the urgency of obtaining Amer and Brit support for the application of art 37 of the charter of the UN to the Kashmir issue.
7. The UK HICOM after he had listened to the exposition, ventured to impress on the FonMin the necessity for caution on the part of his govt so as not to excite public opinion at this time. He said that while he wld report as requested the attitude and feelings of the Pak Govt, that he doubted if the UK Govt wld be able to instruct him on further steps to be taken until after the Graham report had been recd and considered by the SC. He said that while he cld not express an opinion on the minimum nbr or troops required for internal security in Kashmir he agreed with Zafrulla’s previous stand that the question is a tech one and he hoped that the GOP had taken this into consideration in its convs with Dr. Graham.
8. The FonMins conv with me was conducted on a somewhat more informal basis than his interview with the UK HICOM altho they are close personal friends of many years standing. Since he had talked to me earlier yesterday before the Cab mtg, he did not review in detail his statement to the Cab but did point up the tender of his resignation and the probable consequence shld it be accepted. I asked him if there were any likelihood of that taking place and he said no. On the other hand, he told me that the bitterness and frustration in the Cab was violent in its demonstration and that in such a tempo it was quite possible that foolish and disastrous decisions might be taken.
9. We then proceeded to a more considered discussion of the present sitn bearing in mind that Graham is still in Karachi and will not be leaving for several days. I asked Zafrulla why it was that he had allowed a situation to come about where no specific proposals had been made and where nothing had been done without placing his own posit on the record. Graham had told him yesterday of India’s intention to withdraw a division from Kashmir leaving 45,000 troops there [Page 1203] and the program of the Ind Army’s withdrawal from the Punjab frontier to a depth of 70 miles. While Pak over the past months had withdrawn without fanfare over 75 percent of her troops from the border adjacent from the Ind Army, nevertheless, I suggested Ind by publicizing its contemplated disposition wld go far in re-establishing a sympathetic world posit which it had lost last year at the time of troop mobilization. It seemed to me that Pak made no point of its willingness to accept the mediators estimate or even to ascertain what the estimate wld be of the minimum troops necessary in Kashmir, and that Graham in drafting his report wld in all fairness blame Pak possible more than Ind for an intransigent attitude on troop dispositions and mil posture. Earlier in our convs of this present month, Zafrulla had expressed the point of view that he was incompetent to estimate the ratio or quantum of troops which shld remain during the pleb. When I asked him if he had placed this attitude on the record, he replied it was that point that gave him reason to think.
10. I told him I cld sympathize with the Cab’s sense of frustration at the negative report he had presented, but at the same time I was sure he wld counsel them to the contd exercise of caution and the contd patience on the part of the press which has been useful in recent months. It seemed to me that time had not yet run out and I hope that he and his colleague wld review the sitn in the hope that further convs might be held with Graham that wld narrow the gap of difference and press the responsibility on the mediator of fixing the quantum rather than ratio of forces in Kashmir.
He is seeing Graham again tomorrow.