Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

357.AB/2–2152: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

secret

Washington, February 21, 1952—7:37 p.m.

306. Re Kashmir.

1. During past week Brit Emb has repeatedly pressed Dept support UK suggestion with Graham that he get Nehru and Nazimuddin in face-to-face conf re Kashmir. Brit have expressed view that for Graham to continue merely as go-between will freeze GOP and GOI positions and prevent successful agreement re demilitarization. Dept has pointed out to Brit that if 2 PMs meet before Graham has exhausted all possibilities private mediation, PMs’ positions under public pressure might freeze even more quickly. Dept has indicated while having no objection to Graham’s getting 2 PMs together, if he so desires, wisdom such mtg is for him determine. Dept’s reservations re such mtg are as fol:

A. Purpose such mtg is not clear and we believe 2 PMs shld not meet re Kashmir unless objective of mtg clearly established and something like agenda agreed upon. While possible 2 PMs wld be willing get together merely to discuss 2 major outstanding differences in Graham’s 12 point program, i.e., quantum troops remain each side cease fire line end of demilitarization and date for appointment PlebAd, we feel such high ranking mtg for such purpose wld be trying kill ant with baseball bat.

B. If purpose mtg 2 PMs is effect quick political settlement of Kashmir dispute, it shld come only after quite clear present UN efforts reach agreed demilitarization program cannot succeed. SC has made no such assumption, nor has Graham. Effect of such mtg therefore wld be that India wld feel entitled believe it relieved of obligation to reach agreement pursuant to UNCIP res on demilitarization and state-wide pleb. Presenting opportunity to India at this time to avoid agreement pursuant to UNCIP obligations will wipe out effect of UN efforts during past year.

C. Graham has indicated repeatedly his conviction his duty is effect demilitarization per Mar 30, 1951 res. He understands he has other rights and powers than those merely relating to demilitarization but believes demilitarization is priority obligation.

2. In view above, Dept believes you shld inform Graham Dept’s views re proposed mtg, indicating to him our belief attempting to get 2 PMs together entirely up to him. Dept assumes that UK Del will present UK point of view to Graham when he is in NY early part next week.

3. USUN at its discretion may discuss our reservations re mtg of 2 PMs with UK Del. In so doing shld indicate, as Dept is with Brit Emb, we open to persuasion if UK can convince us re chances success such mtg and can indicate ideas re logical course of action in event mtg 2 PMs fails.

4. Dept does not dismiss idea mtg 2 PMs at some time in future but, unless Graham desires such mtg, we believe it premature. Dept’s present thinking is that mtg of 2 PMs might fol as logical step to SC action on Graham’s final report if he reports failure.

Webb

1. This telegram was repeated to Karachi and New Delhi.