The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India1
1686. For Amb. Re Kashmir. Embtels 2718 Jan 30 and 2851 Feb 12.
A. Dept guided by certain genl principles:
- Primary US consideration is maintenance strictest neutrality as between India and Pak. US desires simply assist in any possible manner early solution acceptable to both parties. Either party showing unwillingness make fair concessions and live up to previous commitments wld naturally be inviting adverse criticism.
- Case must be viewed as urgent problem with most delicate internatl polit overtones. Only possible solution regardless of claims and counterclaims of past rights and wrongs wld be one based on present realities and recognition that both sides have justifiable if conflicting interests. No disposition of case which is not freely accepted and implemented by both parties can possibly free subcontinent from danger eventual hostilities, lighten present drain on respective economies and enable both nations pool their defense capabilities against possible outside aggression.
- Patience in view of intense emotionalism on each side continues be essential. This must not exclude firm pressure on either or both sides where calculated to induce them accept reasonable proposals.
- It clear that Sovs and commies are intensifying their activities in and on borders of subcontinent in such manner as unmistakably to indicate immed threat. Kashmir maneuvers may well be one aspect overall commie strategy. Deptel 1571 to New Delhi Feb 22 provides background these developments; note especially presence of nr of commies or fellow travelers in Abdullah’s entourage and Beg’s proposed visit Peking.
- Case shld continue be pursued through UN, wherein UK assumes lead in intra-Commonwealth dispute, while US lends strong support. UN action of course does not preclude independent discussion by parties themselves. SC by implication in Mar 30, 1951 res rejected partition as result parties objections para 4 Feb 21 res3 containing partition provision. Therefore discussion such step by or with the parties obviously must remain contingent outcome Graham’s final effort or upon his judgment re timing or appropriateness such discussion. Premature discussion partition might be seized upon by one or both parties as pretext for not coming to agreement on demilitarization proposals and so prevent all possibility success this stage.
- In view inability adequately anticipate polit-mil situation at time “free and fair plebiscite” it wld seem unwise assume which way Kashmiris wld vote. If India is confident of winning plebiscite it is to be hoped it will adhere to its own previous commitments and meet views UN Rep in order conditions may be established hold plebiscite early date.
B. Additional comment re next stage:
- Graham leaving for subcontinent approx Feb 24. Badly in need rest week ten days in US before departure.
- Is returning for negots with small staff. Devers remains officially as Mil Advisor but for urgent business reasons must remain in US, hence will not accompany Graham. Shld Graham later need him Graham will request him (or substitute) join negots immediately.
- Two polit decisions most important: a) appointment of PlebAd by India; b) agreement quantum troops. Other problems re phasing demilitarization can be worked out per his program’s point 9.
- Graham will submit report SC as near time indicated by SC as possible. This means he will be subcontinent approx three weeks.
- Nature SC action and possible res naturally will depend Graham’s recommendations in report. Dept believes Graham not likely recommend SC take steps involving “moral judgment” and not likely to “take sides”. Possible res wld endorse Graham’s demilitarization proposals as spelled out by him in report and recommend to parties that they put such program into effect forthwith or soon as such details as may be pending are worked out, i.e., phases involved demilitarization program which wld be determined under point 9 Graham’s proposals. If Graham reports unwise pursue idea demilitarization further Council undoubtedly wld consider his recommendations re next course action.
- Dept understands Graham does not intend deviate from present assignment of achieving agreement 12 point demilitarization program and believes most essential he be given complete support this effort. Evident Graham believes SC has given him prior responsibility work out demilitarization; he does not believe it his duty or right raise such possible proposals as partition which by their nature not in accord general objectives UNCIP res, presently only basis UN action. If either party indicates to him desire make proposals to other re possible partition and plebiscite in Vale he no doubt prepared act as messenger. Dept concurs this view his responsibilities and role.
Dept foresees possibility requesting you use ur immense personal influence at some given moment to be determined later to obtain Indian acceptance Graham’s final proposals.