S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D
351, “NSC 5409—Memoranda”
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary
(Lay) to the National Security Council1
secret
Washington, December 14, 1954.
Subject:
- U.S. Policy Toward South Asia
References:
- A. NSC 54092
- B. Memos for NSC from
Executive Secretary, dated November 12 and November 30,
19543
- C. NSC Action No. 12824
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, U.S. Information
Agency, at the 228th Council Meeting on December 9, 1954, adopted
the proposed amendments to Section D of the reference report,
prepared by the NSC Planning Board
and transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 12, subject
to the changes set forth in NSC
Action No. 1282-b. The President on December 11, 1954 approved this
action.
Accordingly, the enclosed revised pages of NSC 5409, incorporating the above amendments, are
transmitted herewith with the request that they be substituted for
pages 12, 13 and 145 thereof and that the superseded pages be destroyed by
burning.
[Page 1152]
Also enclosed for the information of the Council are a staff study on
Afghanistan and a Financial Appendix, to be inserted in NSC 5409, following the staff study now
ending at page 40.6
[Enclosure]
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 46 through 50, which are
identical to the correspondingly numbered paragraphs in NSC 5409, February 19, page 1095.]
51. Give special consideration to Pakistan in providing military
assistance, including grant, in view of Pakistan’s attitude and
key position among the countries of South Asia with respect to
military collaboration with the West.
D. Afghanistan
(In addition to courses of action in Section A above)
52. Support the government of Afghanistan so long as it is not
unfriendly to the United States and not subservient to the
USSR.
53. Encourage the growth of closer economic and political
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus creating
conditions favorable to settlement of the Pushtunistan dispute
and strengthening Afghanistan to enable it better to resist
Soviet penetration.
54. Only if Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrate within their own
governments a convincing mutual desire for confederation,
consider encouraging and assisting in its realization, providing
acceptance of the consequences thereof is then in U.S.
interests.
55. Encourage the settlement of disputes and the development of
trade between Afghanistan and Iran.
56. As a means of increasing Afghanistan’s resistance to Soviet
pressures, provide assistance for Afghanistan for those projects
which would tend to strengthen its ties with Pakistan:
- a.
- By providing technical assistance and economic
assistance.
- b.
- By supporting appropriate applications by Afghanistan
to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and to the Export-Import Bank for sound
development loans.
- c.
- By supporting the inclusion of Afghanistan in the
Colombo Plan as feasible.
57. Refrain from encouraging Afghanistan expectations that the
United States will extend—and for the present do not
extend—military assistance to Afghanistan. However, upon
attainment of improved Afghanistan relations with Pakistan and
Iran, consider extending military assistance to Afghanistan,
through Pakistan if expedient.
[Page 1153]
58. Avoid giving the impression that the U.S. favors
participation of Afghanistan in a regional defense arrangement
at this stage, without foreclosing the possibility of such
participation at a later date.
59. In the event of increased Soviet efforts to subvert or take
over Afghanistan, immediately review U.S. policy toward
Afghanistan.
60. In the event of overt attack on Afghanistan by Soviet forces:
- a.
- Attempt through diplomatic measures to arrest the
action and to obtain prompt withdrawal of Soviet
forces.
- b.
- If unsuccessful, decide in the light of the
circumstances existing at the time what further action
to take through the UN or otherwise.
E. Ceylon
(In addition to courses of action in Section A above)
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 61 through 64, which are
identical to paragraphs 57 through 60, respectively, in NSC 5409, February 19, pages
1095–1096.]
F. Nepal
(In addition to courses of action in Section A above)
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 65 through 67, which are
identical to paragraphs 61 through 63, respectively, in NSC 5409, February 19, page 1096.]
[Enclosure]
Staff Study on Afghanistan
secret
(Supplementary to the Staff Study on South
Asia)
recent soviet
activity
1. Recent Afghan–Soviet economic agreements permitting Soviet
construction of important capital projects in Afghanistan and
entry of considerable numbers of Soviet technicians provide
evidence that the Soviets may be desirous of drawing Afghanistan
out of its present buffer status into the Soviet orbit. Success
of the United States in promoting a defense agreement between
Pakistan and Turkey and in developing a program of military aid
for Pakistan have in part been responsible for intensification
of Russian interest in Afghanistan. Russian and Czech economic
aid estimated at $13 million in loans and grants has been
accepted by the Afghans. A gradual drift towards Soviet
influence may result, although openly aggressive action by the
USSR is unlikely because of strong anti-Soviet reactions which
would probably occur elsewhere in the Arab-Asian bloc.
2. An advance of Soviet ascendency to the southern borders of
Afghanistan would bring undesirable consequences. An added
burden would be created on the defenses of Iran and Pakistan and
the possibility
[Page 1154]
of
Soviet access to the port of Karachi would be enhanced. A wedge
would be driven down into the nascent Turkey–Iran–Pakistan
defense tier and the prestige of the United States and the West
would suffer with the subjection of another free area to Soviet
control.
strengthening
afghanistan
3. As Afghanistan is threatened by increasing pressure from the
Soviets, success of the latter in achieving their goals will
depend to a measurable degree on the extent of Afghan weakness.
Proposals for strengthening Afghanistan and countering Soviet
pressures have included (1) confederation or closer economic and
political cooperation with Pakistan; (2) improved relations with
Iran; (3) economic aid; and (4) military aid.
Confederation or Closer
Economic and Political Cooperation With Pakistan
4. A major source of Afghan weakness is the country’s present
unsatisfactory relations with Pakistan. Thus one means of
strengthening Afghanistan and reducing the disadvantages of its
present position would be through encouraging closer ties
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This might be approached in
two ways: (a) by attempting to bring
about a confederation* of the two countries within the fairly near
future, or (b) by working for closer and
better economic and political relationships of the two countries
within their existing political frameworks which might in time
lead to some form of political union.
5. Confederation should be considered in
the light of the following advantages and disadvantages:
a. Advantages:
- (1)
- The Pushtunistan dispute (Afghanistan’s desire for
some kind of autonomous state composed of the Pathan
tribesmen living in the northwest frontier area of
Pakistan) is the basic cause of friction between the two
countries. Confederation would tend to eliminate this
dispute, or at least greatly reduce its
importance.
- (2)
- Resulting economic union, particularly elimination of
trade barriers existing between the two countries, might
make them economically stronger than they are at
present.
- (3)
- From a military viewpoint confederation would make
available to Pakistan additional space in which to
maneuver her military forces and terrain which favors
delaying or defensive action against a Soviet
invasion.
. . . . . . .
[Page 1155]
b. Disadvantages:
- (1)
- Militarily and politically, a combined Afghanistan and
Pakistan might well be weaker than the existing separate
states. Since Afghanistan’s military forces are
insignificant in training and equipment, Pakistan’s
defenses would be extended over a larger area without
any real addition to the strength of her forces.
Afghanistan, far more backward administratively, would
absorb some of Pakistan’s trained administrative talent.
Progress towards political democracy, while not great in
Pakistan, is well ahead of Afghanistan. Given the
conflicting tribal groups in Afghanistan and the
existing provincial tensions in Pakistan, the prospect
of a politically well unified state seems remote.
- (2)
- Desire for confederation in either country is not
sufficiently deep to make possible successful agreement
on the numerous political and economic matters which
would have to be negotiated to bring it about. Pakistan
has at present unresolved constitutional problems of a
serious nature which would tend to make its government
unreceptive to injection of the complicated problems
implicit in possible merger.
- (3)
- A step directly from the present political status of
the two countries to their consolidation would represent
to the Soviet Union an American inspired effort to bring
United States strength up to Soviet borders in an area
regarded hitherto as neutral ground. Confederation would
thus involve the risk of Soviet reaction which would be
beyond the capacity of the newly-merged countries to
resist. Soviet reaction would create a new area of
tension and might deal a serious blow at the outset to
the now developing Turkish-Pakistan defense axis.
- (4)
- Adverse Indian reaction would be similarly severe
without entailing such serious consequences. Indian
objections would be based on fear of an eventual
increase in Pakistan’s power and the elimination of
Afghanistan as a buffer between the subcontinent and the
USSR.
6. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that impracticality and
the risk of adverse reaction from the USSR, make undesirable
positive U.S. efforts to promote confederation of Afghanistan
and Pakistan in one step. However, the concept of an eventual
confederation, developed logically and gradually out of
progressively improving relations between the two countries,
should not be ruled out.
7. Afghanistan could be greatly strengthened by encouraging
closer cooperation and better relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan within their existing political frameworks. Such a
policy is more feasible now than confederation for the following
reasons:
- a.
- Real economic weakness is an important factor in
Afghan willingness to accept Soviet offers of economic
assistance with consequent gradual increase in Soviet
influence. Strengthened economic ties with Pakistan
would combat this important cause of Afghan
susceptibility to Soviet penetration.
- b.
- A program for increasing cooperation in economic
matters between the two countries presents a series of
more readily obtainable objectives than confederation.
Economic cooperation might help to
[Page 1156]
create an atmosphere
conducive to elimination of the Pushtunistan dispute,
which, once resolved, would open the way for gradual
evolution of a merger.
- c.
- Merger conceived as the end-product of a gradual
evolution would be less likely to excite violent Soviet
antipathies and reaction.
- d.
- As Pakistan and Afghanistan are drawn together through
various forms of cooperation, Pakistan’s strength and
that of the Northern tier defense system is expected to
grow. An Afghanistan gradually drawn into closer
relations with Pakistan could be fitted more easily into
this defense concept with benefit and less risk,
eliminating the strategic liability consequent to
Afghanistan’s geographic intrusion between Pakistan and
Iran.
Improved Relations with
Iran
8. Afghanistan would also be strengthened by the settlement of
disputes and the development of trade between Afghanistan and
Iran. The chief controversy between the two countries concerns
disposition of the waters of the Helmand River, which rises in
Afghanistan and flows into Iran, and which is important for
irrigation. Iran feels that it receives insufficient water and
that its position will become worse as new irrigation facilities
using more water are developed along the upper river in
Afghanistan. Iran has recently agreed to resume negotiations,
which have been suspended since Iran in 1952 rejected the report
of a neutral technical commission appointed at the instance of
the U.S. to find a basis for sharing the waters.
Economic Aid
9. The United States has been carrying on a small program of
technical assistance in Afghanistan of about $1.5 million
annually and the Export-Import Bank has in recent years extended
loans totalling approximately $40 million primarily for the
Helmand River valley development project. Future United States
economic assistance to Afghanistan should be directed toward
giving it maximum resistance to Soviet pressure primarily
through promoting better relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
10. A program of stepped-up United States aid attempting directly
to counteract Soviet economic penetration would entail two
disadvantages: (a) it might involve us in
a bidding contest with the Soviets which would be expensive and
perhaps ultimately useless, or (b)
stimulated by our increased interest in Afghanistan, the Soviets
might try countermeasures dangerous to Afghan independence.
11. Economic aid directed to projects mutually beneficial to
Pakistan and Afghanistan would entail these disadvantages to a
much smaller degree. Such a program would serve to bring the two
countries closer, creating conditions favorable for greater
cooperation and merger as described above. Afghan susceptibility
to offers of assistance from the USSR is the result in part of
economic difficulties arising from its existing bad relations
with Pakistan. Use of our aid to improve relations
[Page 1157]
between the two
countries represents the most practical means of strengthening
Afghanistan.
12. Projects which might help to strengthen and smooth relations
between the two countries could include (a) the establishment of a “free port” for Afghanistan
in Karachi, (b) supply of additional
locomotives and rolling stock to facilitate the movement of
goods between Karachi and Afghanistan, (c) a railway spur, bringing the northern railhead into
Afghan territory, (d) storage facilities
at Karachi and the railhead, (e)
accelerating the construction of the Warsak hydro-electric
project in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier province, with the end
of supplying electricity from Warsak to neighboring areas of
Afghanistan, (f) development of
hydro-electric potential of Kajakai and Arghandab dams for power
deliveries in Quetta and Chamon in Pakistan, and (g) improvement of roads connecting Kabul
with Pakistan.
Military Assistance
13. Military assistance to Afghanistan would have the advantage
of strengthening Afghanistan’s internal security forces and
providing a basis for resisting external aggression should that
develop.
14. However, these advantages would, at present, be outweighed by
an accompanying disadvantage: a possible Soviet threat to the
independence of Afghanistan and perhaps the security of its
neighbors as well. The future assistance and support needed to
counteract the effect of such threats might involve the U.S. in
responsibilities beyond what we would wish to assume in this
area at this time. Recent Russian economic assistance to
Afghanistan indicates a possible Soviet intention to establish
control over the country, altering Afghanistan’s buffer status.
Delivery of U.S. arms would change this possibility to a near
certainty.
15. In addition, there would be the difficulty of overcoming
Pakistan’s probable objections to arms deliveries to Afghanistan
arising from the discordant relations now existing between the
two countries and Pakistan’s fear that arms delivered to the
Afghanistan Government might well fall into the hands of
tribesmen for harassment of Pakistan’s borders.
16. Nevertheless, there are possibilities that military
assistance could be profitably extended to Afghanistan at some
later date. This would be particularly true if Afghan relations
with Pakistan should improve and if Pakistan should agree to act
as intermediary for such assistance. In the light of our present
relations with Pakistan, anything we undertake in the way of
military assistance should be with the knowledge and concurrence
of Pakistan.
17. Because of probable adverse Soviet reaction, the present very
limited military capabilities of Afghanistan, and the latter’s
unsettled
[Page 1158]
dispute
with Pakistan, the adherence of Afghanistan to a Middle East
defense system at this stage in the system’s development would
result in a worsening of the position of Afghanistan and a
weakening of the system itself. We should, therefore, avoid
giving the impression that the U.S. favors participation of
Afghanistan in a regional defense arrangement at this time,
without foreclosing the possibility of such participation at a
later date.
[Enclosure]
Afghanistan
confidential
Estimated Cost of the Proposed
Policies†
Table I. Expenditures by Programs‡
(Millions of Dollars)
|
Actual Expenditures |
Estimated Expenditures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
1953 |
1954 |
1955 |
1956 |
1957 |
1958 |
1955–58 |
| Military Assistance |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Economic Assistance |
§ 1.4 |
║.
4 |
║.
8 |
|
|
|
¶.8 |
| Technical Assistance |
.3 |
.8 |
1.8 |
2.3 |
2.4 |
2.5 |
9.0 |
| Information Services** |
†† |
†† |
.1 |
.1 |
.1 |
.1 |
.4 |
| Educational Exchange** |
†† |
†† |
†† |
†† |
†† |
†† |
‡‡ |
| Total |
1.7 |
1.2 |
2.7 |
2.4 |
2.5 |
2.6 |
10.2 |
[Page 1159]
Table II. Availability of Funds in Relation to
Expenditures FY 1955-FY 1957 (Millions
of Dollars)
|
Total |
Technical Assistance |
Economic Assistance |
Military Assistance |
Information Services§§
|
Educational Exchange§§
|
| Unexpended carryover into FY 1955 |
|
1.2 |
.8 |
|
|
|
| Plus: FY Funds |
|
1.6 |
|
|
|
|
| Equals: Total available for expenditures |
|
2.8 |
.8 |
|
|
|
| Less: Estimated expenditures FY 1955 |
|
1.8 |
.8 |
|
.1 |
║║ |
| Equals: Unexpended carryover into FY 1956 |
|
1.0 |
|
|
|
|
| Plus: FY 1956
Funds |
|
2.5 |
|
|
|
|
| Equals: Total available for expenditures |
|
3.5 |
|
|
|
|
| Less: Estimated expenditures FY 1956 |
|
2.3 |
|
|
.1 |
║║ |
| Equals: Unexpended carryover into FY 1957 |
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
|
[Page 1160]
summary explanation
1. Objectives
Since the end of World War II Afghanistan has been engaged in an
ambitious program of economic development. The Afghans intend to
develop their own basic natural resources at the maximum rate
possible. The effort may be described broadly as natural
resources development (largely in Southwest Afghanistan and
largely by the government) and industrial and power development
by private investors mostly in the northern and eastern parts of
the country.
However, these capital development plans have not been
accompanied by a requisite increase in numbers of skilled and
semi-skilled persons to make effective use of them. Thus the
dams and irrigation canals need competent men in the various
fields of administration and operation; the new textile and
power plants require semi-skilled technicians in management and
technical operations; and the farmers need new methods and
techniques to make the most of the new water resources
available.
The FOA program has as its
principal objective (a) to aid the Afghan
Government in the reclamation, development and settlement of new
agricultural land especially in the Helmand River Valley, (b) to give assistance in improving
primitive agricultural practices throughout the country, (c) to aid the Afghan Government in
establishing and strengthening schools to train technicians
required in the economic development efforts, (d) to aid in improving public administration in all
fields of activity, (e) to assist in
developing sounder communications and transportation systems,
(f) to assist in utilizing coal resources, and (g) to assist in raising the level of
technical competence by awarding grants for training in the
United States and elsewhere.
2. Progress to Date
FOA has provided technical
assistance to Afghanistan in several major fields of activity.
FOA technicians in the
Helmand Valley working with the Helmand Valley Authority have
trained men in stream gauging, have established experimental and
demonstration farms, have demonstrated improved irrigation
techniques, and are assisting the Helmand Valley Authority
itself to become an effective administrative body able to
regulate the use of land and water resources and to provide
service to the people already there and to the nomads who are
settling on newly irrigated lands.
In the field of education, teachers and equipment have been
provided for the Afghanistan Institute of Technology. Salaries
of teachers at Habibia College have been supplemented in order
to permit the maintenance of a higher standard of instruction.
By means of a contract with the University of Wyoming a
vocational agricultural school
[Page 1161]
has been strengthened. A training program
for sub-professional health workers is now underway at the
extension training center in the Helmand Valley. Assistance in
teacher training is being given through a contract with Columbia
Teachers College. Output of coal in two mines has been increased
and safety measures for mines has been improved.
3. The FY 1955 Program
The FY 1955 program is planned at
a level of $1,620,000. The FOA
Mission will continue in the activities started in earlier years
with a major part of their efforts being devoted to the Helmand
Valley Development program.
4. Host Country
Participation
In the past seven years Afghanistan has invested between 60 and
70 million dollars of its own and borrowed funds for Helmand
Valley development. Its contributions to activities associated
with the technical cooperation program are about four times the
U.S. contribution. Despite extreme shortages of trained
personnel, Afghanistan officials and technicians head up each of
the program activities and work cooperatively with the FOA technicians. The Afghans,
realizing the importance of modernizing techniques and methods,
have sent annually at least 50 students to the U.S. and other
Western countries for advanced training not available in that
country.
5. Other Technical Assistance
Programs
The United Nations and its Specialized Agencies have sent large
numbers of technicians to Afghanistan. The total cost of these
operations is estimated at approximately $500,000 annually.
Close coordination of FOA
operations and other technical assistance programs is maintained
at all times.
