790D.5 MSP/8–1754: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1
227. Embtels 1472 and 183.3 Following Embassy reports discontent on part Pakistan officials as to magnitude and nature US military assistance, Department convinced that in interest healthy US Pakistan relations exaggerated expectations of certain Pakistan officials which have been self-stimulated and publicized without any US encouragement should be replaced by clearer understanding objectives and capabilities US and Pakistan’s own responsibilities.4
Development and maintenance effective military machine, costs of which Pakistan could pay from own resources and at same time provide for minimum civilian requirements, will require growth over period of years of well balanced expanding economy.
It is not within US financial capabilities create such an economy by massive financial donations. It must be built by Pakistan’s people and leaders as product largely their own efforts. Our willingness support those efforts has been amply demonstrated and our aid was extended on large scale even before Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan signed. Presently we are attempting render some assistance following flood disaster East Pakistan. We have rendered considerable grant and technical assistance and are hopeful continuing it in some form in future. Pakistan’s official expressions of gratitude have been so full and so sincere we are embarrassed to cite these instances of our aid but even so we feel there should be no misconception in Pakistani minds to effect US assistance is without cost or effort to our people, our resources are unlimited and we are without accountability to Congress or American public.
Our resources and capabilities being not unlimited we must expend them on a priority basis. Turkey for example received priority because [Page 1866] it was vigorous self-reliant ally, geographically adjoining Soviet Union, under direct and immediate threat and prepared take its stand and defend its territory regardless whether it received US assistance. Even so our program developed over period of years and on basis effective utilization by Turkey of aid already extended by us. With Pakistan as in case Turkey we would think in terms of systematic program.
Pakistan officials concede even Phase One Pakistan program could not be carried out because of adverse economic conditions. In other words Pakistan military establishment still remains substantially short of its limited Phase One goal.
Implicit in US—Pakistan military aid agreement is US desire for Pakistan eventually attain that degree military strength supported by sound economic base which will enable it play effective role Middle East defense.
Nevertheless in our view present deficiency must be overcome before consideration can be given more ambitious programming. More specifically it is our plan that as phase one Pakistan Army should be adequately armed at approximately its present numerical strength. This objective alone will require considerable dollar and foreign exchange outlay and maintenance rupee expenditure at approximately current level. It was one of General Meyers’ recommendations that survey be made to determine economic and defense support requirements necessary effectuate desired military program. Heinz Mission was instructed determine and evaluate those requirements. Subject revision under changing circumstances and light other available information Heinz report will be important element in our planning.
During initial phase it will be possible develop, through continuing consultation and in light evolving international political and strategic considerations, clearer pictures long term military economic requirements needed permit Pakistan plan constructive role area defense. We are pleased note both Pakistan military and civil authorities appreciate importance long term planning re personnel and budgetary considerations. We believe our intention initially confine ourselves at this time phase one will not in any way prejudice but rather contribute to orderly approach to problem.
US cannot express itself more concretely now (in terms estimated dollar figures, troop strengths, area defense plans, etc.) than is set forth above.
Purpose this telegram is provide guidance for you and Sexton in upcoming talks on this problem. Meanwhile as Embassy recognizes immediate job at hand is lay necessary groundwork for ready incorporation into existing forces of initial flow end items. We are most surprised by allegation Pakistan not able divert that number troops from present deployment to make use those items and would appreciate clearer explanation [Page 1867] as well as statement whether this official position of GOP. Pakistani leaders undoubtedly recognize that assessment first year this program will affect attitude Congress 1956 appropriations.
- This telegram was drafted by Smith and Metcalf (SOA) and Anscheutz (NEA); and cleared in the offices of Jernegan (NEA), Stoops (FOA), S/MSA, and Defense.↩
- Dated Aug. 9, p. 1860.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 1, supra .↩
- This telegram was sent after a State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, held on the morning of Aug. 20. Admiral Radford expressed concern over the fact that the Pakistan Government had received an erroneous impression concerning the nature and amount of military aid to be received from the United States and said it was important to get the matter straightened out. Jernegan, who was not present, was informed of the substance of the discussion concerning Pakistan. (Substance of discussion of State-JCS meeting of Friday, Aug. 20, 1954; State-JCS meeting files, lot 61 D 417)↩