611.9194/12–3054: Telegram
The Chargé in India (Kennedy) to the Department of State
898. Jha phoned this afternoon to report status of his consideration all our suggestions civil air agreement. He had shown our latest advices to his minister and said that he had some points to make. In hour long conversation it developed that his legal advisers had ruled against possibility thirty-day extension of effective date of termination pending further discussions. Furthermore, Prime Minister and Minister Communications leaving January 8 for all-India congress committee meeting in Madras. This means if there is to be anything accomplished in way of maintaining present agreement, it must move very fast.
Following were counterpoints made by Jha:
- 1.
- Jha referred to our point that we would be prepared in consultation early January to meet Indian point of view by a reduction to two flights each per week for Pan American and TWA. He said he felt it would be impossible to go along with the consultation if it meant that following consultation India would have to take unilateral action to effect reduction. Rather he would want it understood that reduction would take place without such unilateral action. Possibly one way of accomplishing this would be for US and India to jointly agree that flights should be at two each per week and that we inform airlines of that fact and accomplish reduction by mutual agreement. Jha made quite a point of fact that during last consultation Indian position had been that only one flight each per week was justified while our position had been three flights each per week were justified. Therefore, if they now went along on two flights each it obviously was a compromise and if on this basis he had to put forward the proposition that India were to take unilateral action, his opponents would point out that if that was to be procedure, then Indian action should be to list [limit?] flights to one per week each carrier. Jha pointed out that this would be substantiated by Indian expert calculations.
- 2.
- Second point Jha wishes to be met on is that having agreed on two flights for each carrier in January this should not be increased for balance of 1955. In other words, he asks for a freezing of two flights for first year. His point on this is that if we are to start off on new basis of working together, it would be very unfortunate to immediately throw into consultation a return to three flights over which there would be bound to be disagreement and therefore if this were anticipated in his opinion it would be better to terminate agreement and [Page 1813] take necessary action on their own. In further discussion this point it was indicated Indians would be agreeable to a base level of two flights per week for reasonable future. In other words during 1955 and presumably 1956 and later unusual circumstances not arising they would be agreeable to a continuation of that for a base figure for US airlines.
- 3.
- With respect to consultations Jha said India desired regular annual consultations in order that pattern for traffic for subsequent year would be understood and not disturbed. This flows from point 2 above and is part of their general position. I pointed out again that there certainly was no hindrance to regular consultations and referred to language already included in instructions to Embassy on this point. Jha however is still very troubled about frequent or irregular requests for increases in flight frequencies but agreed that he probably could accept language which would say in effect that frequencies would remain as discussed at a regular consultative period, but that under special circumstances special consultations could be requested for purpose of increasing frequencies. Jha used the word “emergency” in this connection but I think he would agree to phrasing such as “special circumstances”. In this connection Jha wishes to have period of notice for special consultation between regular ones raised from thirty days to sixty days and the period of notice for regular or annual consultations increased from sixty to ninety days.
- 4.
- Jha then moved to sticky point of possibility that an increase in frequencies might go into effect during period of consultation. I repeated what had been said previously that if consultations were moving badly or there seemed to be doubt that agreement would be reached for the increase, airlines would be informed and it would be reasonable to expect they then would not put frequency into effect. Jha was evidently not moved by this argument and pointed out that it would be very bad psychologically while two parties were still talking to have action taken. It could have unfortunate effect on putting peoples backs up and as he said “queer the pitch” before consultations were terminated. I believe this point should be looked at in light of trying to develop friendly and understanding working together on civil air matters and I can see that an action of this sort which might be taken could well cause considerable irritation.
- 5.
- Jha then brought up a question of what criteria were to be used in connection with justifying an increase in flight frequencies after 1955. He obviously is not interested in going ahead on a basis which would reproduce sort of discussions on this question which have been had in past. He asked me if I had any suggestions; I said I had not. He then said he had one he would like to put forward to effect that for all future increases in flight frequencies, the criterion to be used was increase in volume of third and fourth freedom traffic. In this connection I asked about Indian position with regard to reduction at later time below the level of two frequencies for each airlines, which was to be agreed upon for 1955. Jha said if we could reach agreement on the criterion he put forward and other points, India would agree not to request any reduction below the two flights so that effect of working agreement of the sort being discussed would be to provide a floor of two flights per week for each carrier.
- 6.
- Jha’s position on disputes now is that there should be no reference [Page 1814] either to ICAO or to an arbitration board of differences of views about frequencies. His view is that such disputes would not occur. I assume that if there were any, he wishes to rest upon our recognition of India’s unilateral rights. I asked him what the position was on this with the British and he said that this was what they had come to in the UK understanding. He would maintain Article XI for all other disputes.
- 7.
- The final point Jha raised was with respect to Pan American’s two stops New Delhi and Calcutta. He said they wished to have one of these eliminated and when I mentioned that this was specified in agreement and therefore difficult to achieve by interpretation, but would call for an amendment he replied he didn’t think this really was required. Rather all that was necessary was an understanding that practically speaking, Pan American would only stop at one point.
Jha made it clear that he was presenting this as personal and not as the official views of the GOI. He said that it would take this in his opinion to get cabinet to reverse its position on termination of agreement and he couldn’t even be sure that having met all of these points, there would be a favorable decision. My own guess is that if we were to meet them, we would stand a very good chance of maintaining the facade of the 1946 civil air agreement.
I asked him if I should suggest to Department that a technician be dispatched immediately to take part in the discussions and he responded, “not if he is going to make trouble”. I do suggest to Department that if they are prepared to meet substantially points above, technician immediately leave. Otherwise effort might well be lost.
Jha made point that one of things he most desired was to establish a basis for working together, which would provide different atmosphere for future discussions. He very obviously is not prepared to go ahead on basis which merely repeats year after year sort of discussions which have gone on in past. I think it is fair to say that Jha and his superiors want to feel that it will not be necessary at least in immediate future to go through same process of termination notice and urgent discussions to try to rectify a situation which has developed through lack of understanding.
On whole, with a guarantee of maintaining two flights per week for each carrier, agreement from India that there will be no further cut in these flights, possibility of making increased flights through increased third and fourth freedom traffic and elimination of irritations involved in air discussions, I feel that very serious consideration should be given to proposals which have been put forward.
Appreciate earliest instructions.1
- The Department informed the Embassy in telegram 835, Dec. 31, not printed, that it was unlikely that the GOI’s conditions set forth in New Delhi telegram 898 would be accepted by the United States, and that the Department expected to advise the Embassy regarding a further approach to the Government of India on Jan. 3, 1955, after first having a further consultation with the CAB and the commercial carriers. (611.9194/12–3054)↩