611.91/10–753
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)
Subject:
- Meeting between Ambassador Mehta of India and the Secretary on Tuesday, October 6th at 12:00 noon.
Participants:
- Ambassador Mehta
- Secretary Dulles
- Mr. Byroade
Ambassador Mehta of India called upon the Secretary on October 6th at his own request for a general discussion of US-Indian relations.
Mehta opened the conversation by stating that many of the long-range aspects of the above problem would be discussed this week in a seminar in Washington and he would therefore only take the Secretary’s time in dealing with more immediate problems. He stated that he was greatly concerned at the apparent deterioration in US-Indian relations. He felt that the officials who worked on matters such as Korea fully understood the US position. They might not in all cases agree with the US, which he thought relatively unimportant, but he was certain that they understood our views, which was the more important element. What he was more concerned about was the uninformed public opinion in both the US and India. He stated that he was often embarrassed in this country by being asked questions such as “Why is India pro-Communist”? He reported that the responsible Indian press had turned predominantly anti-American—and he felt that there was considerable feeling in India that America really did not want peace. There was also wide belief that Rhee was the puppet of the United States and would obey our wish if we told him to do so. Mehta said he realized these things were untrue; that the Communists have been given very fruitful lines in India and he was worried about the results. Communist propaganda also plays the line that India would be ignored by the US in any matters of importance because they could count upon the Latin American votes in the United Nations to outvote the Indian position.
Mehta stated that Nehru was most reluctant to undertake India’s present mission in Korea and has done so only because he felt that India could not shirk this responsibility. Nehru had been greatly pleased with his talks with Dulles in Delhi and he knew there was no [Page 1725] change of heart so far as Nehru was concerned since those talks.1 He reported Rhee’s attitude that everything that went wrong now in Korea was the fault of the Indians was most unfortunate. He stated that he believed the Swedes and the Swiss were convinced that the Indians were attempting to do the right thing. He stated that Nehru’s concern that others would be quick to blame India for being biased had caused him to pick a military official to head their mission in Korea. He felt that the Indian Army and the officials in charge were in fact completely non-biased and that the political advisers assigned to them also held no prejudice or bias. Mehta concluded by saying that he was searching for some way to correct the deterioration of public opinion in our two countries and wished to be helpful in any way he possibly could in this task.
The Secretary stated he appreciated Mehta’s calling upon this problem. He stated that he has personally never had any idea that the Government of India was communist inspired and had expressed that view whenever the opportunity presented itself. He realized that the circumstances under which India had been placed lead the Indian Government to deal with the Communist issue on a different basis from that of the United States. Whether India was right or not was not for us to judge as we did not consider that we should know better than Nehru how to handle affairs in his own country.
The Secretary added that it must be frankly recognized that the methods India has chosen, regardless of its merits or possible advantages or disadvantages would inevitably not have popular appeal in this country. We can do very little to change or guide popular impressions. The United States believes in stronger methods in dealing with Communism than does India—and the somewhat neutral or middle-road could not be popular. The Secretary added that he did not mean that the thinking people of India were really neutral—they were trying to be more neutral in deeds than in spirit. He recalled a similar period in our history when President Wilson appealed to the United States people to be neutral in spirit as well as in deeds as regards the first portion of the first World War. This position made us extremely unpopular in Europe.
The Secretary stated that the difficulty was partly due to the fact that Indian citizens, conscious of their own ideals and purposes, were naturally hurt when they were misrepresented. This seems inevitable for all who operate in the World arena. The Secretary drew upon his own experience in public life and of his own feeling when his purposes were misrepresented. We as a Nation do not like to have our attitude misrepresented in India. The Secretary added that he felt general [Page 1726] deterioration was unfortunate but not overly serious as popularity of Nations quickly change and as long as there was no real divergence of interests between the United States and India, the matter would correct itself with time. The Ambassador agreed that he thought this was the case.
The Secretary then dealt at length upon the actual situation we have faced in Korea. He stated that he had personally adopted our position on India only after a visit to Korea. He was convinced that the most important thing for the entire world, including India, was to prevent war from breaking out again—which could only lead to a major disaster of a type not easy to define or foresee. We have been faced with one of two choices. One course appeared to us to have a reasonable chance of success in Korea at a price which made us unpopular in India. The other choice would probably be popular in India and end up with no control over Rhee. We felt we could not adopt both courses at once. The Secretary stated he believed that if India knew more about the actual problems we have faced in Korea they would be less critical of the choice we had made.
The conversation ended with the Secretary again expressing appreciation that Mehta had called to discuss this subject as it gave a possibility of both sides understanding each other better.