493.918/8–1453: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State
priority
318. Eyes only for the Secretary. Embassy’s telegram 310, August [Page 1711] 13. I have come reluctantly to conclusion that even aside from Battle Act, we should insist on clear cut statement by Government of India at this time, recognizing that acceptance of US aid involves obligations on part of India. During first meeting I had with Deshmukh, he referred to US aid as “coming from US capital surplus, which US must export”. When I discussed thorium nitrate case with him July 25, I mentioned that all governments requesting aid from US accepted certain limitations in connection therewith. Deshmukh denied that India had ever requested US grants of assistance. This point of view not only plays directly into hands of Soviet accusations that US aid is being forced on reluctant recipients, but also encourages Indians to think US aid is solely at US request and for US convenience.
I should add that Deshmukh is probably most reasonable and understanding GOI official in Cabinet on subject of American aid.
At start of our aid program here, it would have been preferable, in my judgment, if we had insisted (as we did in Yugoslavia) on clear-cut request by GOI for our assistance. Instead, we skirted around question of request and agreed to Indian position that GOI merely let us know, in answer to our inquiries, how much GOI lacked in funds to complete five-year plan, but was not asking anybody for anything. One can understand Indian motives, but we might have foreseen what difficulties this positon would lead us into. I believe continuation of this essentially dishonest fiction would be fraud on American people as well as continue to place US-Indian relations on false and therefore unsound basis.
As regards Battle Act, record is clear that we relied, unwisely, on informal assurances from one or two GOI officials that no strategic materials were being shipped to prohibited areas. Machinery was never set up in GOI to carry out these assurances, and Prime Minister Nehru now categorically states, perhaps justifiably, that we were mistaken if we understood such arrangements existed. We would be foolish in my view to rely on informal assurances again, even if given by Nehru himself, which he has indicated clearly he cannot give.
I think it unlikely that GOI will make clear-cut statement re aid, and that my recommendation, if followed, will therefore presumably result in termination of assistance. This would have especially serious repercussions at present moment in view of Kashmir situation. Nevertheless, I believe we can ride out the storm with calmness, patience and dignity and that long-term result will be sounder and eventually more friendly basis for US-Indian relations.1
- In response to New Delhi telegram 318, the Department, on Aug. 15, in telegram 184, not printed, agreed with Ambassador Allen on the need for clear-cut assurances from the Government of India and believed that those Allen had already sought represented the minimum the United States could accept. Therefore, the Ambassador was instructed to continue his efforts to obtain these assurances. And Ambassador Allen was informed that the Department was greatly impressed by his general observations about the U.S. position on aid to India and invited him to advance any further views on the subject. (791.5 MSP/8–1553)↩