Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

745W.00/4–3052: Telegram

No. 977
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

top secret
priority

Washington, April 30, 1952—8:43 p.m.

1681. Calling on instr Brit Amb Apr 30 gave Secy text new Sudan formula reported by separate tel.² Ref Apr 25 discussion (Deptel 5501 to London, Apr 25, 1662 to Cairo)³ Brit Amb said ambiguity phrase previous formula “pres status Sudanese people” avoided in redraft.⁴ Amb believes now clear para refers to status Sudanese during entire interim period prior to self-determination. Amb reported Eden believed it useless consult Sudanese prior presentation formula or obtaining desired guarantees (para 2 reftel) from Egypt unless UK already had Egypt guarantees in form conditional promises.⁵ UK intended it wld be made clear that Egypt guarantees wld not become operative until Sudanese assent to title recognition. Secy ptd out that redrafted formula made no mention guarantees tho UK undertook consult Sudanese immed and speculated on Egypt reaction this pt.⁶

Turning to ques possibility delay constit devel as aid settlement Amb indicated no pub statement poss but said Brit Amb in Cairo wld be instr make clear to GOE that UK during negots hopes it poss find means (a) assoc Egypt closely with UK in working out constit devel; (b) facilitate Egypt-Sudan arrangement for control Nile Waters; and (c) further closest coop between Egypt and Sudan in way contribute to best interests both countries. Amb added that Caffery’s statement to Farouk that UK approaches Sudan problem from this pt of view wld be most helpful. Thus thru fact Egypt assoc with constit devel, natural delay in its progress might result and also Egypt wld be in posit influence trend events. Reading from instrs Amb indicated Eden personally attached greatest imptce full US support UK efforts on Sudan formula. Unless Caffery prepared approach King with full conviction and make clear formula is limit UK can go in advance negots his approach wld be useless. UK cld not consider taking action conflicting with its pledges. If US support not possible UK wld then be obliged go ahead without it since half-hearted assistance worse than none.

If US decides support formula Caffery cld be instrd make clear to King, that if Egypt rejects formula only solution for UK wld be open negots without prior formula and during course bring in Sudan Reps consider matters of concern to them. Amb stressed UK interest in devel formula was to help Hilali Govt.

Amb reported Brit Amb Stevenson wld return Cairo May 1. UK hoped US cld instr Caffery by then so two Ambs cld consult May 2. On May 3 Caffery might go to King and later same day Stevenson wld see PriMin.

Secy believed timing may pres diffics as Caffery’s views must be obtained on new formula. Chances for success this formula raised ques our minds partic since Caffery had expressed grave doubts re acceptability orig formula to Egypts. Secy said Dept wld give matter most urgent and careful consid and wld try reply to Eden over weekend. No doubt Stevenson and Caffery wld wish confer on matter after Brit Ambs return Cairo with latest London thinking.

Brit Amb said he entirely understood our desire consult Caffery and wld report to Eden and we were giving matter urgent attention and wld give reply as soon as poss.

Acheson

1. Repeated to London as telegram 5597.
2. Telegram 1680, supra.
3. See footnote 2, supra.

4. The reference is to the phrasing of paragraph 2 of the original draft of the Sudan formula. As transmitted in telegram 4814 from London, Apr. 23, not printed, paragraph 2 reads as follows:

   “During the interim period, and without prejudice to the question of the right of the King of Egypt, pending such self-determination, to the title of King of the Sudan, HMG declare their readiness, in consultation with the Sudanese, to seek means of reconciling a possible recognition of this title during this period with their pledges to the Sudanese people, on the understanding that neither the REG nor HMG wld allow such recognition to change in any way the present status of the Sudanese people.” (745W.00/4–2352)

5. See footnote 2, supra.

6. In telegram 4814 Ambassador Gifford also transmitted the text of a document which presented a series of undertakings which the British believed they had to obtain from Egypt in order to persuade the Sudanese to agree to recognize Farouk as King of the Sudan. The text reads as follows:

   • “(A) Public recognition of the right of self-determination.
   • “(B) A public declaration that assumption of title by the King and its recognition by UK wld not be regarded as affecting, or allowed to affect, in any way the present status of the Sudanese.
   • “(C) Recognition of the title will not be allowed to affect the administration of the Sudan.
   • “(D) The Egyptians will cooperate through a tripartite commission (or commissions) in establishing self-govt and arranging self-determination.
   • “(E) The Egyptians undertake to encourage the pro-unity parties in the Sudan to participate in the elections.” (745W.00/4–2352)