Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/3–3154

No. 1555
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)¹

secret

Washington, March 31, 1954.

Subject:

• Buraimi Dispute

Participants:

• Aramco
  • Mr. Spurlock
  • Mr. Noble
  • Mr. Kopper
  • Mr. Chapman
• State
  • NEA—Mr. Jernegan
  • NE—Mr. Dorsey
  • NE—Mr. Fritzlan

Mr. Spurlock opened the discussion by recalling the meeting between Mr. Byroade, Mr. Davies and others on March 23,² at which time Aramco’s position in regard to the recent British proposals had been fully explained and Mr. Byroade had agreed to study the matter further in the hope that we might take it up with the British.

Mr. Spurlock stated that Aramco was about to address letters, specifically setting forth its position in this matter, to the Saudi Arabian Government and the British oil companies (IPC and AIOC).³ A similar letter would be written to the State Department and it was his hope that a copy of this could be passed through official channels to the British Foreign Office. Mr. Spurlock repeated the grounds for Aramco’s objection to the British proposals . . . . He regarded it as an urgent matter for the Department to take a strong position with the British in this regard and hoped that we would be able to let the Saudis know that we are doing this. He felt that failure to do so would be highly detrimental not only to Aramco prestige in the area but to American prestige in general. Mr. Spurlock wondered if the Department had now assumed a position concerning this question and what action it may have taken or intended to take.

Mr. Jernegan stated that the NEA Bureau was prepared to recommend to the Secretary that we tell the British that, in the light of recent developments, it would appear that they are on the wrong course and that in our opinion it would be helpful were they to agree that the British companies should suspend their activities in the disputed area pending conclusion of arbitration. We had had a number of informal conversations with the British before they had received the text of the Saudi reply to their proposals. It was probable that this reply had now been received and he felt we could profitably explore matters further with them.

Mr. Jernegan made clear our intention to impress upon the British the desirability of concluding boundary settlements without reference to oil considerations. He stated that we had already informed the Saudis that we did not support the notion that the British companies should necessarily obtain oil concessions in any areas which might be awarded to Saudi Arabia and that we had authorized our Ambassador to tell the Saudis that we would support a proposal which they might put forward permitting Aramco as well as IPC to operate in the disputed area. Mr. Jernegan felt that it would be desirable to let the Saudi Arabian Government know that we were discussing this question with the British but was not sure in his own mind as to the manner in which we should convey this information. It would certainly not be helpful for the Saudis to imagine that no further effort on their part was necessary. Mr. Spurlock expressed full agreement.

Messrs. Spurlock and Noble stressed the importance of early settlement of this matter and hoped the Department would emphasize this in any talks held with the British. Mr. Jernegan assured them that the Department had always wished to see this dispute settled as early as possible and we would certainly emphasize this aspect to the British.

Mr. Jernegan stated that, subject to approval by the Secretary, the Department would make early representations to the British and would prepare an appropriate communication to the Saudi Arabian Government. He could not of course give any assurance regarding the British reaction to such representations.

1. Filed with this memorandum of conversation was a memorandum by Dorsey to Jernegan, drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA and BNA, dated Mar. 31, discussing the meeting that was to take place with Aramco representatives later that day. Although the Department of State had previously given general support to the British proposals of Feb. 15, the memorandum suggested that in view of the position of Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government it might be in order to suggest suspension of IPC activities as a means to improve the atmosphere. It seemed unlikely, however, that the British would agree to suspend them and there seemed no way the United States could properly force them to comply. In that case, it seemed possible Saudi eagerness to settle the dispute would lead them to request the Department of State to persuade Aramco to agree to give up its concession rights in the area. The memorandum ended by stating that: “Should this happen we might conceivably consider it in the National interest for Aramco to comply with the Saudi request. Perhaps this point should be discussed with the Aramco representatives” (780.022/3–3154)
2. Supra.
3. See telegram 423 from Jidda, infra.