Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/3–1954: Telegram

No. 1553
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Jidda, March 19, 1954—4 p.m.

404. Regarding last paragraph my telegram 403, March 18, 11 p.m.² Following are high-lights Duce Ohliger Ray comment as put in letter addressed to me and wired verbatim Davies for discussion with Department:

1. Aramco favors prompt determination boundaries by sovereigns; and willing cooperate every proper way;

2. Any implication Aramco contribute to solution by agreeing to alternative concession arrangements highly improper and should be strongly opposed by USG;

3. Aramco will not surrender any concession rights and thinks to do so both unpatriotic and bad business judgment;

4. Aramco did not “suggest, collaborate in the preparation of, or approve” British proposal; it had no knowledge thereof until informed by Saudis; it will file statement with State Department clarify records this respect;

5. Aramco has right, in its discretion, explore and develop any areas covered by concession agreement; that it has refrained from doing so in disputed areas to expedite settlements by sovereigns; but that it may find it necessary proceed with exploration and development in area which British proposal concedes may be confirmed as Saudi territory, “particularly if the British Government insists that British companies be allowed to continue operations in the area or if Saudi Arabian Government requests Aramco so to do”;

6. Failure stop all oil operations will render determinations more difficult;

7. Aramco strongly urges USG use influence bring about discontinuance oil operations and prompt boundary settlement all disputed areas;

8. USG attitude that British proposal will not embarrass Aramco is unrealistic and dangerous to USG as well as Aramco; “this point is beyond dispute because Aramco already has been greatly embarrassed by the proposal”;

9. Aramco fears SAG may be on verge deciding deal with British on broad basis in oil matters failing positive USG support Aramco and early settlement; and

10. Nothing in Saudi reply inconsistent Aramco’s strong conviction that all oil operations be discontinued.

Wadsworth

1. Repeated to London and Dhahran.
2. Not printed; it reported that Duce, Ohliger, and Ray were preparing their comment on the Saudi Arabian Government reply to the British proposals. They informed the Ambassador they considered the best solution from the viewpoint of U.S. interests was for the British Government to withdraw the proposal it had made in paragraph c. (780.022/3–1854)