Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/3–1754: Telegram

No. 1551
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

secret
priority

Washington, March 17, 1954—7:45 p.m.

269. Davies, Spurlock and Chapman of Aramco called on Murphy in Department today in order express Aramco misgivings recent developments Buraimi dispute.

(1) Aramco representatives indicated agreement with SAG interpretation that paragraph 3 British proposals intended operate in such manner that British will inevitably and despite Aramco opposition obtain oil concession in disputed areas passing to Saudi Sovereignty.

(2) Davies referred to Ohliger’s recent talk with King (summarized in Jidda telegram 392)² during which King reportedly expressed disappointment in American leadership and guidance and reflected possibility that Saudi Arabia may look to British for leadership. (In this connection Department interested in receiving any evidence tending corroborate or explain such feeling on part of King.)

(3) Aramco representatives provided memorandum their position with regard current British proposals summary of which follows:

(a) Aramco has and will continue urge early determination boundary and Aramco prepared cooperate this end.Aramco has not been party to British proposals nor is it prepared surrender any rights under concession.

(b) Aramco continues believe boundary should be determined on considerations allegiance, tradition and political history rather than considerations oil and oil concessions. Aramco withdrew from disputed area and has refrained from work there and believes competitors should do likewise.

(c) Suggestion that Aramco contribute to boundary solution by compromising rights seems improper as jeopardizing not only Aramco but Saudi interests. Abu Dhabi and Buraimi cannot be isolated from over-all boundary problem and threat of similar situation would confront Aramco on all but western boundary of concession.

(d) Aramco feels strongly USG should support it and SAG in protection of rights and that assurance such support should be given to SAG and British.

(4) Aramco representatives expressed hope Department would reconsider its position and issue appropriate instructions to Wadsworth for discussion problem with King who due shortly in Jidda.

Murphy suggested there has been some confusion in past regarding Aramco’s position pointing out apparent flexible policy regarding relinquishment certain concession areas. Aramco representatives replied such has not only been policy but obligation through agreement. However Aramco had right decide which area it wished relinquish. In present instance there was every reason believe oil existed in disputed area of Trucial Coast and they had no intention relinquish any rights there.

Department representative stated further Department believes current confused situation could be cleared up through discussion with British and our Embassy London had been authorized engage in such and we had also authorized Wadsworth suggest Saudis approach British directly in order clarify any misunderstandings.

When queried Davies stated he considered it would be helpful for Embassy London in discussions with Foreign Office make clear Aramco opposition to relinquishing any concession rights it may acquire in disputed areas.

Davies inquired if Department would authorize Wadsworth clarify to SAG our position should SAG interpretation third British proposal prove correct.

For London: Embassy authorized disclose Aramco position regrading British proposals in discussions with Foreign Office.

For Jidda: In discussion with King Ambassador authorized inform him that should what we understand to be SAG interpretation third British proposal (Jidda telegram 387³) prove correct Department would be unable endorse this proposal in present form.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by BNA and NEA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.
2. Dated Mar. 15, not printed. It reported information received from Aramco officials who had recently spoken with the King. According to Aramco officials, the Saudi Arabian Government said it did not want to disregard Aramco’s rights but felt it might have no alternative if the U.S. Government would not support Aramco or the Saudi Arabian Government against the British effort to “muscle in” on the concession in the disputed area. The King saw possible financial, territorial, and political advantages to having ties with the British, who gave aggressive support to their commercial interests and friends, in contrast to the U.S. Government, which imposed Israel on the Arab world and tied loans to conditions the Saudis felt infringed their sovereignty. (786A.00/3–1554)
3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 1549.