Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/7–253: Telegram

No. 1522
The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Dhahran¹

secret
priority

Washington, July 4, 1953—1:37 p.m.

2. For Ambassador at Riyadh. British Embassy July 2 gave Department summary of statement² regarding Nuwai incident which substantially agrees with report contained Consulate General’s telegram 254. It was recalled by Embassy representative that Obaid bin Juma had previously caused trouble on Buraimi-Sharjah road by attempting take British control point on behalf of Saudis. Chronology of events as provided Department follows:

1. June 23 Obaid set up post near Mahadha and opened fire on Trucial Levy patrol proceeding El Ain. Fire not returned.

2. June 26 Obaid interfered further with movement on road and Buckmaster and Trucial Levy officer turned back after 10 shots fired at them. Obaid was informed British forces would take necessary action unless he ceased interference.

3. June 27 Levies sent to Shirm and were fired at from Nuwai. Fire exchanged for about one hour during which three killed and three wounded among Obaid’s men. Obaid given 24 hour ultimatum and proceeded reinforce his check point to 100 men.

4. June 28 ultimatum expired.

5. June 29 operations undertaken at dawn and check point captured at 8:30. At no time were aircraft and armored cars employed. Head man of Nuwai and Abdullah Salim have sworn mutual pact and guaranteed keep road open. Levies now control check point and principal Mahadha wells and remainder withdrawn to Shirm.

Sultan of Muscat’s description his territories to Hart December 1949 would indicate whole area concerned this incident located within his domains as claimed by him (see Dhahran’s despatch 154 December 21, 1949³).

Department views this incident as factional strife within Beni Kaab which would seem clearly divided in sympathy and loyalty between Ibn Saud and Muscat. In view disagreement Saudi and British reports and absence impartial information Department unable assess rights and wrongs this situation. This development emphasizes importance earliest possible implementation arbitration and Department believes highly desirable that both sides consider sending neutral observer to spot to act as advance element arbitration body.

You should inform King that United States Government has taken full cognizance all available evidence concerning this incident and has formed opinion indicated above.⁴

Embassy London should also approach Foreign Office along lines indicated above.⁵

Smith

1. Drafted by Fritzlan on July 3 and cleared by EUR, BNA, and NEA. Repeated to London and Jidda.
2. A paper, dated July 2, not printed, entitled “Incidents in the Mahadha Area,” contains the information set forth in this telegram. Presumably it is the paper under reference here. (780.022/7–253)
3. Not printed.
4. Telegram 1 to Dhahran, July 1, requested the Ambassador to deliver a message from the President to King Saud, in reply to the King’s letter of June 28. The message stated that the President was concerned over the report of the bombing attack and the matter was taken up with the British Government. (780.022/6–2953)
5. See telegram 82 from London, Document 1525.