Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/4–153: Telegram

No. 1512
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

secret
priority

Washington, April 2, 1953—4:06 p.m.

565. Dhahran for Ambassador. In view implications latest British action Buraimi Department giving consideration to likelihood Saudi representations regarding Truman letter October 31, 1950.² Current thinking in Department as follows:

Despatch Saudi force Buraimi August 1952 indicative expanding Saudi ambitions which in past have periodically come to fore in Arabian Peninsula. Truman letter was intended provide Ibn Saud some measure assurance against external threat his security and not to serve as cloak for Saudi expeditions into disputed territories on periphery his domain. However applicability Truman letter to Buraimi will depend upon circumstances as developed in this disputed area. We feel most strongly that if Saudis intend rely upon us for advice and assistance in security matters they must take us into their counsels before embarking upon campaigns in disputed territories. Had they asked our advice before going into Buraimi we most certainly would have counselled against such action.

We believe it important to emphasize to Saudis disputed character Buraimi which Saudis have not occupied since 1869. Our own independent research indicates claims to area on part Abu Dhabi and Muscat and Saudis themselves have tacitly admitted that dispute existed by (a) agreeing in note of February 7, 1951, to British Embassy Jidda that investigations of frontiers by proposed mixed committee should include Buraimi area and (b) agreeing in standstill agreement that activities be avoided “prejudicial to final decision on sovereignty of area.”

We have supported arbitration because we believed it procedure best adapted to making full and impartial investigation of area and sorting out and evaluating claims of all parties on equitable basis. In view Saudi occupation and activities in Buraimi we have taken view plebiscite not fair procedure and we declined participate in proposed plebiscite commission. We do not intend become associated with Saudi practice sending governors into disputed areas on basis alleged popular demand and having their position established by plebiscite which would undoubtedly be contested. Department strongly hopes Saudis will not make outright rejection of pending British arbitration proposal but will at least consider making alternative suggestions other than plebiscite (London telegram 5376 to Dept³).

You are authorized as opportunity may arise utilize foregoing material in discussions with Saudi authorities.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fritzlan, and cleared by BNA and NE. Repeated to London and Dhahran.
2. For text of this letter, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, p. 1190.
3. Dated Apr. 1, not printed. It reported that on Apr. 2 the Foreign Office would publish a note to be delivered to the Saudi Arabians, and Eden would make an explanatory statement in the House of Commons at the same time. The Foreign Office told the Embassy it would not agree to a plebiscite, but would consider, in addition to arbitration, any other reasonable and equitable means of settling the dispute. (780.022/4–153)

4. In telegram 773 from Jidda, Apr. 7, Hare reported in part:

   “During my overnight visit Riyadh April 3–4 to present Eric Johnston [Buraimi] matter was not mentioned by King or other officials but Crown Prince communicated with me indirectly through his private secretary and Mohammed Effendi, Embassy Arab consultant, seeking my views. I replied through same channel that difficult comment specifically on recent British action but regarded it significant that British holding arbitration door open and we still felt arbitration which would include inter alia appropriate provision for ascertaining desires of people concerned, offered fair and practical solution. However, if Saudis had any other constructive ideas they would doubtless be welcomed. I added that, regarding President’s letter October 31, 1950 it was intended apply in case clear threat to security, whereas present difficulty had arisen out of unclear situation involving conflicting claims. In circumstances, wished advise most strongly that Saudis not assume or assert application presidential letter in respect Buraimi. Subsequently, reply was received from Crown Prince expressing general disappointment with attitude of American Government in this matter but saying reserving decision regarding British move until our reaction ascertained. Added that, in light my observations, would not now raise matter presidential letter.” (780.022/4–753)