780.022/3–3154: Telegram
No. 1509
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Aldrich) to
the Department of State1
niact
5371. Strang asked me to call this afternoon re Saudi Arabian boundary problem. He said Eden had intended to discuss problem with me himself, but as he is indisposed he had asked Strang to speak on his behalf. Strang reviewed in some detail HMG’s efforts obtain equitable settlement of dispute and its anxiety retain traditionally friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. UK had made determined effort get solution by bilateral negotiations in London in 1951 and at Amman [Damman] in 1952, but Saudis never showed readiness settle on any other basis than their most extreme demands which made progressive leaps forward from time to time, British experience during negotiations prompts them to believe Saudis not interested in settlement, but eventually to extend domination over whole Arabian peninsula at expense lesser Arab rulers and HMG’s position. For their part, British ready for fair compromise and showed conciliatory spirit by agreeing Saudi request restrict activities under status quo agreement.
Strang went on to say British suspicions confirmed by subsequent events, including Saudi incursion into Buraimi Oasis last August, which was undoubtedly attempt advance claims still further. HMG in spirit conciliation and after Ambassador Hare’s intervention, had agreed stand-still arrangement which placed further restrictions on HMG’s legitimate movements and activities but which also held out some hope restoring it to normal. HMG then proposed arbitration as manifestly fair way solving dispute of [Page 2528] this nature and US supported this means. However, SAG have shown little response and while no final rejection yet received, despatch of further Saudi party to Buraimi on March 12 (Embtel 5112 March 162) convinces HMG Saudis not prepared agree arbitration.
Strang said it has become clear during last six months that Saudis have not and do not intend carry out terms their agreements with UK. Turki’s activities, of which British have informed us from time to time, are clear evidence of this. Buraimi had in effect become Saudi “election headquarters” from which they have canvassed support by proper and improper means while offering United Kingdom solution by plebiscite. Such solution would be mockery.
Strang then said that after much careful thought, HMG has concluded its only course now is to reserve freedom of action in disputed area. SAG will be informed of this decision probably on April 2.3 At same time, Churchill will address personal message to Ibn Saud which, I gathered, would explain why HMG felt compelled take this action.
Strang said HMG anxious that US Government know, on confidential basis, of contemplated action before Saudis are told. He also wanted to explain to us, for our own information only, what decision will mean in practical terms. In practice, HMG will consider their actions no longer restricted by previous interim agreements (i.e. status quo and standstill) with Saudi and will move levies into certain key positions in disputed areas. This action in no way effects offer of arbitration which still stands, nor is there any intention take aggressive action against Saudis. HMG will do what it can by peaceful means to make position of Saudis in Buraimi untenable, although it cannot undertake not to use force if necessary. It plans, moreover, intercept Saudi food supplies bound for Buraimi.
Strang concluded by saying that he hoped US would understand and be helpful in this situation, particularly by endeavoring moderate Saudi reactions and by continuing encourage reference dispute to arbitration.
When Strang had concluded, I asked him what assessment British had made re likely Saudi reaction to these moves. Did he think they would respond with force? Strang replied he did not know. Saudis might refer dispute to SC of [or] GA. HMG thought it must face this risk. HMG consider its proposed action is logical and reasonable [Page 2529] answer to conduct. He understood UN has felt in past that arbitration is fair course and that UN should not be involved in dispute. US advice to Saudis on these lines would be most valuable. In response further question as to whether HMG contemplated augmenting present military strength in area of approximately 400 levies and 12 armored cars, Strang said he did not know what plans military might have.
I leave it Department’s discretion whether repeat this message Dhahran.
- Repeated to Jidda.↩
- Not printed; it reported Foreign Office concern with a report from Hay that four Saudi vehicles with 38 armed men, led by a tax official, were en route to Buraimi. (780.022/3–1653)↩
- See telegram 759 from Jidda, Document 1511.↩