780.022/12–1852: Telegram
No. 1497
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia
(Hare) to the
Department of State1
476. Have now had full discussions with Brit Amb re Buraimi, etc, following his study recent Saudi communications (Embtel 453, Dec 11 rptd info London 28, Dhahran 1592), of which he furnished copies being sent Dept by pouch.
Amb disturbed re developing situation which he interpets caused by Saudi impression Brit weak with result tribes’ gravitation towards SAG. In circumstances, Amb, while admitting Saudis may have claim to part of Buraimi oasis, now feels Turki should have been ejected at outset, forcibly if necessary, but that, having failed to [do?] so, Brit should now stiffen position, even to extent of risking war, in order re-establish prestige. In retrospect Amb also feels USG holds a primary responsibility for situation since he suggests our “passivity” interpreted as tacit support by Saudis and has encouraged Saudi excesses. Therefore, if situation is to be prevented from deteriorating to degree he foresees, Amb maintains USG and Brit should make common front in insisting Saudis accept arbitration. He expressed hope I would make strong recommendation this effect in anticipation matter would be taken up forcefully in Washington and here. Amb apologized for frankness but said wished to be clear. I replied understood and no point in pulling punches between friends. However, I did not belive observation justified that what Brit regard as Saudi intransigence should be laid at our door. Quite to contrary I had always endeavored exert restraining influence. I might have added, but did not do so, that counter-argument might be advanced regarding alleged aspirations of Shaiks who in fact appear have little voice in framing claims espoused in their behalf by Brit.
[Page 2508]Our general views on this matter have been fully reported. Basic fact is that this is a case, fortunately still in miniature, having uncomfortably close resemblance to Iranian, Egyptian and Tunisian problems where past failures of others to be sufficiently foreseen have created difficult present situations for us wherein both sides presuming on our intervention on their part as measure of our understanding and friendship. It is our view Brit made first error in approaching this matter exclusively in role of protagonist of Shaiks and putting Saudis on defensive instead of trying bridge their asserted obligations to Shaiks and their professed friendship for Saudis. Latter then sought strike back to find, probably to their surprise, that their position was even stronger than they had thought because of attitude of tribes. Now both sides are making bellicose noises, partly in order to intimidate the other and partly in order stimulate our intervention. Neither is probably as serious as he pretends but situation is progressively more disturbing. Emb hence believes sincere direct negots would have been best hope for at least interim solution but, since neither side now apparently so disposed and since neither we nor Brit favor tripartite approach, Brit suggestion of arbitration wld seem logical next step and recommend we shld say this Saudis. In doing so, however, believe we shld still maintain role of honest broker and avoid seeming disposition coerce Saudis. But in following this line of action we must realize that arbitration, in order to succeed, will require degree of cooperation by both sides (in working out terms reference, etc.) which unfortunately now lacking and that it may not prove as swift or effective as we wld wish, if in fact it works at all.
Suggest foregoing shld be read together with London’s 3245, Dec 11, to Dept rptd info Jidda 46 and Dhahran 35,3 with which we generally agree.
Would appreciate receiving guidance and views of Dept.
- Repeated to London, Dhahran, and the Arab capitals.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 4, supra.↩
- Document 1495.↩