Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/11–452: Telegram

No. 1491
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

secret

Washington, November 11, 1952—4:05 p.m.

298. Byroade called in SA Amb Nov 8² informing as follows (Embtel 338, Lon 20, Dhahran 114³ and Deptel 292, Lon 3234, Dhahran 122⁴):

(1) King’s proposal for tripartite comm to conduct plebiscite Buraimi and neighboring area put USG on spot. Due USG efforts behalf SAG, UK had indicated agreement in principle resume direct talks. Now King, who was first to accept Amb Hare personal suggestions for resumption direct talks, has subsequently attached conditions which appear to have resulted in preventing talks from beginning.

(2) Wld greatly ease problem for USG if SAG wld give direct talks trial. Realize both UK and SAG skeptical their success; but if unable agree substantive problems during such talks, they shld turn to procedural matters and discuss fact-finding, arbitration, and all possible approaches, excluding nothing. If talks fail wld seem arbitration might be logical sequence.

(3) Believe wld take considerable amt time organize tripartite comm with terms reference, transport it Buraimi, and allow it complete plebiscite, which wld be very difficult conduct under conditions existing area. In any case do not believe third party shld be brought into picture while others (UK and SAG) still trying settle and do not believe SAG shld try establish such comm and set up its terms reference prior having direct talks.

(4) USG in very uncomfortable position this whole matter. Since USG friend both SAG and UK and since both come to USG with different views and recommending different solutions, situation boils down to proposition wherein USG, having faith both sides, cannot help but alienate one side or other in choosing solution. In other words, one cannot be umpire between disputants if he is intimate friend both, as each will expect special appreciation his own position.

(5) Feel you shld not ask USG make choice until you have talked things over with UK. However, if SAG and UK decide USG is to be culprit this matter, suppose we cannot avoid our responsibilities.

SA Amb made fol comments:

(1) When King learned what Brit Amb had to say at Riyadh (Oct 23), he proposed tripartite comm. Do not believe King will abandon comm now and return direct talks.

(2) King proposed comm because wanted do away with Brit pressure in Buraimi area. Situation critical and while talks underway something may happen. King very anxious for comm to conduct plebiscite Buraimi after which talks cld be started.

(3) Can understand Brit may not want US participate comm because they might believe US has special interest in doing so in view own oil interests.

(4) Heart whole matter is both UK and US have strategic and other vital relations NE area and believe USG shld do something insure peace since so concerned with it.

(5) As understand USG position, you feel direct talks best way. Will try explain further to King.

Bruce

1. Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by E. Repeated as telegram 3260 to London and 125 to Dhahran.
2. Memorandum of conversation of Nov. 8, not printed. (641.86A/11–852)
3. Supra.
4. Dated Nov. 9, not printed; it advised the Embassy the Department of State concurred with the views in telegram 338 and would follow with a more detailed telegram. (780.022/11–452)