Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.5/12–3154: Telegram

No. 1427
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

secret

Washington, December 31, 1954—5:32 p.m.

732. 1. Department approves views Embassy Baghdad presented in discussions with Nuri Baghdad’s 381² to Department. While not greatly encouraged by Nuri’s remarks we desire move ahead with Northern Tier arrangement. Although we believe would be counterproductive now attempt press Nuri take action Embassy Baghdad should use every suitable opportunity discreetly encourage and foster earliest Iraqi association with Pact or conclusion bi-lateral arrangements with either party.

2. In connection Nuri–Menderes talks Embassy Baghdad may, if suitable opportunity offers, express Department’s view that generally US found Middle Eastern governments unresponsive MEDO in which Western governments sought take lead in helping plan area defenses. Believe essential if area defenses are to be effective and meaningful there should be genuine indigenous effort on part of Middle Eastern countries create basis for their defense. While Turkey-Pakistan Pact loose arrangement limited in nature its provisions for military arrangements to consult and plan against possibly unprovoked attack from outside, or similar provisions, would in fact create precisely kind of basis from which full fledged regional defense organization could grow. Pending such development unprepared consider US commitment to area. Believe most useful US role for present is continue examine defense problems with, and help increase military effectiveness of governments pursuing workable joint defense efforts.

3. It would be helpful to Department in considering this question to know more clearly what Nuri envisaged in inquiring how far US and UK individually or collectively prepared go beyond NATO commitments. Embassy Baghdad may have opportunity sound him out discreetly this point.

4. In further general discussions of regional pact Embassy may wish suggest UN Article 51 and general reference to charter more suitable basis. Reference Article 52 would seem inappropriate since it directed chiefly to pacific settlement local disputes and its use would also involve provisions chapter 8 as a whole possibly creating misimpression of responsibility to keep Security Council informed at all times of activities regional organization including defense planning.

5. Concur views expressed Baghdad’s 395³ to Department.FYI Department has given substance Baghdad’s 381 to Department to representative British Embassy. He said he not aware Nuri had raised subject with UK and believed failure do so doubtless due to existence UK guarantee under present treaty and Nuri’s desire complete own domestic program before discussing treaty question in any detail. He added Nuri must be aware UK willingness continue guarantee beyond expiration of treaty in consideration for base facilities which would permit implementation. End FYI.

6. In Nuri’s attributing his unwillingness take formal step at this time to possible adverse Arab reaction, particularly on part Egyptian government, there is apparent reversal from point of view reported Cairo’s 358⁴ and 397⁵ to Department. Fact that Egyptians previously had no objection and recent Arab League meeting indicated no objection to Iraqi arrangements for Western use of basis in case of attack on Iran (Beirut to Dept 599⁶), actually seem reflect more broadminded and fluid attitude. Would therefore appreciate Embassy Cairo’s comments as to whether Egyptian reaction would actually be of serious nature if Iraq acceded to Pact or undertook bilateral with either party.

7. Embassy Ankara may wish give substance of Baghdad’s 381 to Department along with Department’s views expressed in paras 1 and 2 above to Menderes or Foreign Office.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NE, GTI, Defense, and paragraph 4 in substance by UNP. Sent as telegram 373 to Baghdad and 998 to Cairo; and repeated to London, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.
2. Supra.
3. Dated Dec. 29, not printed. The Ambassador reported he and the British Chargé had agreed that each of them should see Nuri separately before the Menderes visit, and both decided to avoid any appearance of a joint approach. The Ambassador wanted to dispel any thought Nuri might have about being able to maneuver between the United States and the United Kingdom and considered it important that this be done before the Menderes visit. He informed the Department of State that he would confine his remarks on defense to general terms, with no specific mention of the Turkish-Pakistan report. (787.5 MSP/12–2954)
4. Document 229.
5. Dated Sept. 23, not printed.
6. Dated Dec. 23, not printed, but see footnote 6, Document 240.