No. 1369
Editorial Note
The document presented in this and subsequent editorial notes in this compilation is located in Department of State file 774.5 MSP. This document and those that follow were not ribbon copies. They were typed on plain sheets of paper. They appear to be communications exchanged between American officials in Washington and American officials in Cairo. They provide useful information concerning the issue of extending grant military assistance to Egypt.
The date of the first document is November 15, 1954, and it reads as follows:
[Page 2315]“On 13 November a long conversation was held between Norman Paul, . . . , Abdul Nasar, and aides. The following is a summary of the conversation:
- “a. The 5,000,000 proposal as approved by OCB was presented to Nasr who reacted negatively. He pointed out that 40,000,000 aid for economic development had been announced to the people and the govt had already presented to the U.S. Govt projects which would more than utilize the funds authorized. He felt strongly that any diversion now was out of the question.
- “b. Re possible MDAP agreement, Nasr stated categorically not possible for him to sign any such formal undertakings now or probably in the near future. He repeated same line taken the last several months re uphill battle to win popular support after Suez agreement and felt additional agreement now with us, however worthwhile its motives, would be interpreted by enemies within and outside govt in such manner as to seriously interfere with mutual interests of U.S. and Egypt.
- “c. As conversation went on, it became clear that it was not MDAP undertakings in themselves that troubled Nasr, but that his main aversion was to the idea of ‘MDAP agreement’ as some formally executed document, whether secret or not, and idea of MDAP survey group or MAAG detailed to Egypt, particularly latter.
“The foregoing seems to suggest the following courses of action:
- “a. Abandon idea of using device of 5,000,000 out of 40,000,000 now authorized along lines OCB paper. Irrespective of reasons why, fact remains that it is now politically impossible, and in our view undesirable even if it could be done, to divert funds from economic development projects and resort to device which in minds of Egyptians can only appear to be loss of 5,000,000 already promised and desperately needed by economy.
- “b. Nasr would, we believe, be prepared to revert to substitution technique if additional funds were made available for ‘economic development’ but this would involve additional allotment from overstrained U.S. funds . . . . Do not minimize delicacy this problem and might not be possible (he maintains categorically this time he willing sign no type of agreement), but if document could be simple exchange letters or memo understanding believe major objection could be overcome. Re content, the basic thing that troubles Nasr is idea of acceptance MAAG. Suggest this problem might be overcome if agreement avoided reference to MAAG and informal arrangements made requirements Dept of Defense. Suggest possibility be explored of Presidential determination under Section 401 which would permit waiver certain formal undertakings which Nasr cannot now agree to, with instruction to negotiators that they will exact in writing as many of statutory MDAP undertakings as are possible under circumstances. Suggest content Naguib letter to President should be re-examined to see degree to which it satisfies statutory requirements. Nasr seemed to think that it did.
“In view impending arrival Gerhardt, urge prompt action on policy decisions involved in next U.S. Govt move. Believe any further approaches Nasr by Wash reps without authority discuss specific courses of action would be embarrassing and unconstructive.
[Page 2316]“Above discussed with Caffery who concurs.
“Paul requests Stassen be informed of above.”