Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

741.56374/4–254: Telegram

No. 1316
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

top secret

London, April 2, 1954—7 p.m.

4342. Foreign Office handed us today two memoranda (summarized below, text being pouched)² outlining tentative interdepartmental thinking here re new proposals on Suez base negotiations. British would like US reaction as soon as possible and would welcome any suggestions.

In discussing matter with Foreign Office we inquired how soon Stevenson could speak to Nasir (Deptel 5106).³ We mentioned renewed informal approach from Nasir and stressed urgency which US attaches to matters outlined Department’s reference telegram. In conversation with Selwyn Lloyd earlier in day I had made same point.

We were assured Department’s inquiry would receive urgent top level consideration and reply would be furnished soonest. Working level declined further comment but seemed impressed by suggestion Stevenson might at least give Nasir some preliminary indication in immediate future that new proposals under consideration. Official commented this might have beneficial effect as regards incidents in zone.

Foreign Office current thinking re timing is that as soon as US and UK have completed consideration of documents handed Embassy today, proposals be put to Egyptians, assuming both US and UK agree do so. Foreign Office would welcome Department’s views as to whether proposals should be jointly presented to Egyptian Government or by parallel representations. Foreign Office hopes that by time both governments ready make this approach it will be clear Nasir in sufficiently strong position insure necessary stability.

Documents are (1) suggested arrangements between US–UK–Egypt re withdrawal British troops, liquidation of 1936 treaty, availability and maintenance of base; and (2) suggested arrangements for operating and maintaining base under civilian contracts. First memorandum follows:

• “1. Arrangements for withdrawal British troops, liquidation 1936 treaty and maintenance base would have to be confirmed by intergovernmental agreement.
• “2. It would be possible deal with all these matters in one comprehensive agreement, and if this formula were adopted application relevant provisions of agreement to US could perhaps form subject of exchange of notes between Egypt and US.
• “3. It might be simpler, however, have two agreements:—
  • “(a) One between UK and Egypt providing for liquidation 1936 treaty, withdrawal British troops and future availability of base to UK. Provision for use of base by US could be made in exchange of notes between Egypt and US referring to this agreement.
  • “(b) An agreement providing for detailed arrangements for operation and maintenance of base; this might perhaps be tripartite.”

Second memorandum, which contains four detailed technical appendices, begins by stating some controlling authority will be needed to place contracts, pay contractors and exercise administration. As full Egyptian cooperation essential it proposed this controlling authority should be Egyptian Government. As operation of base essentially military in character, most suitable authority to run it under Egyptian Government would be Egyptian Army. Egypt military “base commander” would be responsible for guarding and policing the base and exercising general supervision over its activities. He would let a main contract for operation of base and there would be sub-contracts covering specific activities.

Main contractor could be either (a) existing contracting firm, or (b. preferably a special commercial company with British, American and Egyptian participation. (Foreign Office explains this company if set up would be subject to Egyptian law. Its composition and powers would be specified in the inter-governmental agreement mentioned above.)

HMG would contribute toward cost of main contract in respect facilities maintained primarily for benefit HMG and would expect Egypt bear some part of cost, since base would be Egyptian. (Foreign Office explains relative participation in cost would be on pro rata basis, depending on items in which UK and Egypt respectively would be primarily interested. US would not be expected pay anything.)

Some form of inspectorate, under control of a senior British representative who would presumably be a liaison officer to the base commander, would be necessary to make sure work was done properly. (Foreign Office explains American inspectors would be included if American contractors used.)

Memorandum then lists RAF and British Army requirements and points out these set forth in detail in appendices. Total of European supervisory personnel estimated at 3,000 and of inspectors at 300 but Foreign Office states both very rough estimates and if main contractor were reliable commercial corporation number of inspectors could be much smaller.

UK would have right to approve any contractor. Some American contractors could be employed if US agreed. Number of civilian contracts might be progressively reduced by training Egyptians. Egyptian military authorities would be responsible for security of stores, installations, et cetera in base. End summary.

Would appreciate Department’s comments soonest.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 116.
2. The two memoranda were transmitted to the Department in despatch 3321 from London, Apr. 2, not printed. (641.74/4–254)
3. The Department in telegram 5106, Apr. 1, not printed, instructed Aldrich to inform the Foreign Office that an approach about the Suez base should be made to Nasir within a week, since Nasir seemed so receptive to having negotiations renewed. (741.56374/4–154)