774.00/3–2354: Despatch
No. 1304
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the
Department of State1
No. 2262
Subject:
- Conversation Between Lt. Col. Gamal Abd Al Nasir and Mr. Parker T. Hart
On Sunday March 21 Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, accompanied by Mr. William Lakeland of this Embassy, called upon Lt. Col. Gamal Abd Al Nasir at his home. The principal points covered in more than two hours conversation are reviewed below.
The most important aspect of Nasir’s remarks was the impression which he gave that the RCC has no intention of yielding tamely to its opponents. He strongly implied that General Naguib is the RCC’s most difficult problem and gave the impression that a definitive show-down with Naguib at some future date is probably inevitable. Nasir also made it clear that he did not intend to sit by and allow opposition elements to undo what the present regime has accomplished.
The conversation opened with some discussion of the Sudan situation in which Mr. Hart gave a brief account of his impressions gained during a quick visit to Khartoum. Colonel Nasir indicated his agreement with the proposition that measures which might lead to increased tension in the Sudan should be avoided. He commented that the Sudanese Prime Minister is an “intelligent man. and implied that he did not believe the Sudanese Government would try to disturb the balance in the Governor-General’s Commission.
Turning to the Egyptian situation, Nasir embarked upon a rather confused and intemperate dissertation, the principal theses of which were:
- 1)
- that the Wafdists, Communists and Muslim Brothers are attempting to exploit the current situation and are making a common cause in vociferously espousing “freedom and democracy. in the hope of displacing the revolutionary regime,
- 2)
- that communism is making great headway in Egypt through the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda activity and the ineptitude of American policy in the Near East. He asserted that he himself did not know what the United States policy in this area really was but that the United States was losing out because it “always sides with Britain”.
Mr. Hart in reply said that he could assure Nasir that Mr. Byroade had devoted a great deal of his time and effort to the Egyptian question and that the Secretary himself had taken a personal interest in the matter. He said that he was convinced that the United States Government had done everything that it could short of openly breaking with the United Kingdom in trying to bring about an Anglo-Egyptian settlement and that it would continue its efforts in this regard. Mr. Hart pointed out the world-wide basis for the US–UK alliance and the obvious interest of the Soviet Union in an Anglo-American split. He questioned whether the growth of pro-Communist and anti-Western feeling described by Nasir was not actually contrary to the interests of Egypt as well as those of the United States.
In the face of Mr. Hart’s rebuttal, Col. Nasir rather changed his tack and asserted that he not only recognized the sound basis for Anglo-American solidarity but realized that a split in the Western alliance would, in fact, be contrary to the real interests of Egypt as he sees them. He made no secret, however, of his regret that Egypt’s hopes for more effective American support had not materialized and, particularly, that the United States had not seen fit to express by any overt act of assistance its professed feelings of friendship for Egypt.
When questioned about his attitude toward an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, Nasir confirmed that he still desired an agreement with the British but said that opposition elements would violently attack any agreement signed now. When reference was made to a recent press statement by General Naguib rejecting the idea of extending the “availability” formula to include the case of an attack on Turkey, Nasir made a wry face and commented that Naguib was trying by all means to increase his popularity and was quite capable of using this, or any other issue, for that purpose. Nasir added that Naguib was in touch with “certain elements” opposed to the RCC. He implied that present tactics are to allow Naguib plenty of leeway in the hope that he will work himself out on the end of a limb.
In discussion regarding current thinking about plans for the Constituent Assembly and/or Parliament, Nasir dwelled upon the difficulties and dangers involved in any attempt to restore free political life at this time. He said that it was obviously impossible in less than two years to stamp out the widespread corruption of the old regime and create a new basis for political life. He asserted, however, that the country needed a lesson and gave the impression that he plans to allow the situation to go on deteriorating for a month or so in order to demonstrate to the people what would be in store for the country if party elections were carried out now. Without [Page 2244] saying that there will be no elections, Nasir was certainly trying to give the impression that he anticipated the development of a situation which would permit the Revolution to reassert itself in a strong fashion and resume its program of purification and reform. He asserted that “in a month or so”, after there had been a “pulling up of the reins”, an immediate settlement involving evacuation of British forces from Egypt would be very desirable. It was clear, however, that he felt that a clarification of the internal situation must precede any final settlement with the British.
Comment:
It was clear that Nasir is heavily pre-occupied with the domestic political battle which he faces and is not clear in his own mind as to just what course of action to adopt. His remarks contained even more than the usual number of inconsistencies encountered in Egyptian thinking. His transparent tactic in raising the communist bug-bear during the early part of the conversation was obviously mistakenly designed to impress the visitor from Washington but must also to some extent be explained by Nasir’s deep personal sense of disillusionment at the failure of the United States to extend to Egypt the aid which he believes Egypt was given every reason to expect.
Nasir was also probably trying to impress Mr. Hart with the strength of his own position in his preview of future internal developments. It must not be forgotten, however, that Nasir is a man of boldness and cunning and not one to be easily discouraged by a setback. He is at present devoting most of his attention to tightening his control on the Armed Forces and has always been a strong believer in the importance of the element of surprise.
- Copies of this despatch were sent to London and Khartoum.↩